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THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 


THE  BASIS    ''^''^'' 


OF  DURABLE  PEACE 


WRITTEN    AT   THE    INVITATION 

OF   THE 

NEW   YORK   TIMES 


BY 

COSMOS 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

1917 


COFYRICHT,   I917,  BY 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

Published  January,  19x7 
Reprinted  January,  February,  1917 


PUBLISHER'S  NOTE 

These  papers  were  originally  printed  in 
The  New  York  Times  of  November  20, 
21,  22,  23,  24,  25,  27,  28,  30,  and  Decem- 
ber 2,  4,  6,  9,  12,  15,  and  18,  1916. 


INTRODUCTION 

PEACE  AND   ITS   CONDITIONS 

Recent  utterances  of  the  German  Chancellor 
and  the  British  Prime  Minister  have  inclined  the 
discerning  public  to  the  belief  that  the  chief  men  of 
the  warring  nations  in  Europe  would  now  give  more 
hospitable  consideration  than  they  have  shown  in 
the  past  to  proposals  embodying  the  broad  general 
principles  upon  which  peace  must  be  concluded. 
Sharing  that  belief,  The  New  York  Times  invited, 
from  a  source  the  competence  and  authority  of  which 
would  be  recognized  in  both  hemispheres,  a  series  of 
contributions  in  which  the  terms  of  peace  should  be 
discussed. 

As  the  publication  of  the  series  proceeded  from 
day  to  day  the  public  perceived  the  candor,  the 
impartial  fairness,  the  breadth  of  view,  and  the  pro- 
found understanding  of  political  principles  with 
which  the  author  weighed  and  considered  the  general 
conditions  of  peace,  and  then  in  turn  the  policies 
and  interests  of  each  of  the  Powers  engaged  in  the 
war.  All  of  them  profess  a  desire  for  peace  upon 
terms  that  will  insure  its  permanency.  In  these  dis- 
cussions the  way  to  lasting  peace  is  brought  into 
view,  the  rivalry  of  ambition  and  the  clash  of  in- 


vi         PEACE  AND  ITS  CONDITIONS 

terests  are  so  far  as  may  be  conciliated,  and  a  set- 
tlement compatible  with  the  demands  of  justice, 
with  the  rights  of  small  and  great  nations,  and  giv- 
ing promise  of  freedom  from  the  calamity  of  war  is 
submitted  to  the  public  judgment. 

The  New  York  Times  has  confidence  that  the  pub- 
lic here  and  abroad  will  give  serious  attention  to 
these  papers  because  of  the  breadth  of  knowledge  and 
far-seeing  statesmanship  they  display,  quite  inde- 
pendent of  the  distingtiished  source  from  which  they 
come. 

December,  19 1 6. 


CONTENTS 


I 


PAGE 


IS  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  IN  SIGHT? — RECENT  BRITISH  AND 
GERMAN  STATEMENTS  AS  TO  THE  AIMS  OF  THE  WAR — 
THEIR  SIMILARITY  IN  FORM 3 

II 

GREAT  Britain's  policy  toward  small  nations  and 

STRUGGLING  PEOPLES — HER  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  POL- 
ICY— Germany's  policy  toward  small  nations  and 

STRUGGLING   PEOPLES — ^IS   AN  AGREEMENT  POSSIBLE?      .  lO 

III 

THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  AS  AN  INFLUENCE 
FOR  PEACE — ECONOMIC  WAR  AND  PRIVILEGE  A  CERTAIN 
CAUSE   OF  INTERNATIONAL  UNREST 1 6 

IV 

WHAT  IS  MEANT  BY  THE  FREEDOM  OF  THE  SEAS? — THE 
SEAS  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE  ARE  FREE — THE  SEAS  IN  TIME 
OF  WAR 21 


EXEMPTION  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AT  SEA,  NOT  CONTRA- 
BAND, FROM  CAPTURE  OR  DESTRUCTION  BY  BELLIG- 
ERENTS— THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES — ^ACTION 
OF  THE  TWO  HAGUE  CONFERENCES 26 

VI 

FRANCE  IN  THE  WAR — THE  AIMS  OF  FRANCE:  RESTITUTION, 
REPARATION  AND  NATIONAL  SECURITY — A  METHOD  OF 
SECURING  REPARATION  THAT  WILL  AID  A  DURABLE  PEACE    34 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS 


VII 


PAOK 


THE  QUESTION  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE — THE  DECLARATIONS 
OF  1871 — FAILURE  OF  GERMANY'S  POLICY  OF  ASSIMILA- 
TION        40 

vin 

RUSSIA  AND  THE  SLAVS — THE  LIBERAL  MOVEMENT  IN  RUS- 
SIA— THE  BOSPORUS  AND  THE  DARDANELLES         ...         46 

IX 

PRUSSIAN    MILITARISM — ^ITS    BASIS    AND    ITS    CAUSE — ^HOW 

FAR  IT  MAY  BE  CONTROLLED  BY  CONQUEST    ....         54 

X 

THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  A  NEW  INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER — THE  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF  NATIONS — THE  IN- 
TERNATIONAL MIND — INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AS  NATIONAL 
LAW 63 

XI 

WORK   OF  THE   FIRST  HAGUE   CONFERENCE — DISARMAMENT 

AND  ARBITRATION — THE  COURT  OF  ARBITRAL  JUSTICE    .         69 

XII 

WORK  OF  THE  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCE — DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN  AN  ARBITRAL  COURT  AND  AN  INTERNATIONAL 
COURT  OF  JUSTICE — PRACTICAL  PROPOSALS  FOR  THE 
ESTABLISHMENT  OF  A  REAL  COURT — ^ANALOGY  BETWEEN 
AN  INTERNATIONAL  COURT  OF  JUSTICE  AND  THE  SUPREME 
COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 77 


XIII 

SUGGESTED  MODE  OF  PROCEDURE  AFTER  THE   WAR — WORK 
FOR  A  THIRD  HAGUE  CONFERENCE — FOUR  SPECIFIC  PRO-        ., 
POSALS  FOR  ACTION 87 


CONTENTS  ix 


XIV 

PACK 

ENFORCEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  THE  ADMINIS' 
TRATION  OF  A  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  ORDER — CRITICISM  OF 
THE  PROPOSED  USE  OF  FORCE  TO  COMPEL  SUBMISSION  OF 
EVERY  INTERNATIONAL  QUESTION  TO  A  JUDICIAL  TRIBU- 
NAL OR  COUNCIL  OF  CONCILIATION  BEFORE  BEGINNING 
HOSTILITIES — DIFFICULTY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  MAK- 
ING ANY  AGREEMENT  TO  THIS  END — THE  REAL  INTER- 
NATIONAL  GUARANTEE   FOR  NATIONAL   SECURITY         .       .         96 


XV 


THE  PART  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  ENFORCEMENT 
OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  IN  THE  ADMINISTRATION 
OF  A  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  ORDER — THE  MONROE  DOC- 
TRINE— A  EUROPEAN  AND  AN  AMERICAN  SPHERE  OF  AD- 
MINISTRATIVE ACTION — PREPARATION  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  PARTICIPATION — NATIONAL 
POLICY   AND   NATIONAL   SERVICE 10$ 

XVI 

CONCLUSION — QUESTIONS  FOR  THE  FUTURE — THE  ESSEN- 
TIALS  OF  A  DURABLE   PEACE 11$ 

APPENDIX 123 

I.      HALL   CAINE   TO   COSMOS 
II.      COSMOS  TO  HALL  CAINE 
m.      HALL  CAINE   TO   COSMOS 
IV.      COSMOS   TO  HIS   CRITICS 
V.      THE   ARTICLES    OF   COSMOS 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE   PEACE 


IS  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR  IN  SIGHT? — RECENT  BRIT- 
ISH AND  GERMAN  STATEMENTS  AS  TO  THE  AIMS 
OF   THE   WAR — THEIR   SIMILARITY   IN   FORM 

THE  time  has  come  to  consider  whether  the 
war  may  not  shortly  be  ended  by  interna- 
tional agreement  in  which  the  United  States 
shall  participate. 

For  some  months  past  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the 
world's  interest  has  been  steadily  shifting.  It  is  now 
coming  to  rest  at  a  new  and  gravely  significant  spot. 
The  question  as  to  who  or  what  power  is  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  last  events  that  immediately 
preceded  the  war  has  become  for  the  moment  one 
of  merely  historical  interest.  It  may  not  be  settled 
to  the  universal  satisfaction  for  a  generation  to 
come.  The  importance  of  the  war's  issues  has 
thrust  into  the  background  the  discussion  of  the 
war's  direct  causes.  The  amazing  records  of  the 
war's  progress,  with  their  alternate  pages  of  cruelty 
and  of  heroism,  of  devastation  and  of  self-sacrifice,  of 
carnage  and  of  superb  national  achievement,  are  so 
many  and  so  crowded  that  they  have  overtaxed 
human  appreciation  and  human  understanding. 
We  are  now  left  unwillingly  dull  and  insensitive 
to  happenings  almost  any  one  of  which  would  or- 
dinarily stir  the  imagination  and  inspire  the  art  and 
the  letters  of  a  civilized  world. 

3 


4       THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

Men  everywhere  were  so  appalled  by  the  magni- 
tude of  the  war  when  it  suddenly  broke  out,  and  so 
amazed  at  its  revelations  and  its  massive  conse- 
quences in  life,  in  treasure,  and  in  sacrifice,  that  for 
more  than  two  years  they  could  see  no  solution  of 
the  world-wide  problem  that  it  raised  other  than  to 
permit  the  war  to  run  its  course  until  one  of  the 
groups  of  great  adversaries  was  forced  to  succumb. 
It  was  freely  predicted  that  this  end  would  be  reached 
in  three  months,  in  six  months,  or  at  most  in  a  year. 
Almost  alone,  Lord  Kitchener  indicated  three  years 
as  the  probable  duration  of  the  war.  Of  that  period 
nearly  two  and  a  half  years  have  already  passed,  and 
no  end  is  in  sight.  Nevertheless,  some  things  are 
now  plain  to  the  watching  world.  It  is  clear  that 
the  German  Empire  and  its  allies  cannot  win  this 
war.  That  fact,  which  was  confident  prophecy 
after  the  battle  of  the  Mame  and  reasonable  ex- 
pectation after  the  failure  at  Verdun  and  the  hap- 
penings along  the  eastern  front,  has  been  made  cer- 
tain by  the  battle  of  the  Somme,  already  drawn  out 
over  four  long  months,  and  by  Great  Britain's  un- 
broken, complete  command  of  the  seas.  It  is  also 
clear  that,  while  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  can, 
and  doubtless  will,  win  the  war,  yet  the  cost  will  be 
so  umbelievably  great  and  the  resulting  exhaustion 
in  men,  in  money  and  in  industry,  so  alarming,  that 
victory  on  such  terms  can  be  only  Httle  less  dis- 
astrous than  defeat. 

Both  in  the  warring  countries  and  in  neutral 
lands  there  has  been  of  late  much  discussion  as  to 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE        5 

how  similar  outbreaks  of  international  war  may  be 
avoided  in  the  future.  This  is  certainly  a  highly 
practical  question  for  governments  and  for  peoples. 
But  a  still  more  practical  question  for  governments 
and  for  peoples  is  how  to  bring  this  present  war  to 
an  end  without  waiting  for  more  complete  exhaus- 
tion, more  and  more  wide-spread  destruction,  and 
more  and  more  far-reaching  damage  to  civilization 
— provided  always  that  the  great  issues  of  moral 
principle  that  are  at  stake  be  rightly  decided. 

There  are  not  lacking  signs  that  the  belligerent 
powers  are  ready  to  have  this  question  pressed  upon 
them  with  directness  and  with  vigor.  To  under- 
take this  means,  first  of  all,  to  try  to  find  a  common 
groimd  for  discussion.  In  order  to  do  that  we  must 
go  to  the  belligerent  nations  for  a  statement  of  what 
they  severally  conceive  to  be  the  objects  for  which 
the  war  is  now  continued.  This,  in  turn,  means 
that  we  must  go  first  to  Great  Britain  and  to  Ger- 
many for  an  answer. 

The  war  began  ostensibly  as  a  conflict  between 
Austria-Hungary  on  the  one  side  and  Serbia  on  the 
other.  With  lightning-like  rapidity  the  fact  devel- 
oped that  this  conflict  in  the  southeastern  comer  of 
Europe  was  not  a  cause  but  a  symptom,  and  that  the 
materials  for  a  world  war  lay  ready  to  hand  in  the 
ambitions,  suspicions,  rivalries,  and  world  policies 
of  the  great  powers  to  the  north  and  west.  It  is  in- 
creasingly clear  that  the  war  is,  in  last  analysis, 
really  a  titanic  struggle  between  two  sharply  con- 
trasted views  of  government  and  of  life  with  Ger- 


6        THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

many  and  Great  Britain  as  protagonists.  The  first 
attack  on  Serbia  was  to  strengthen  the  position 
and  to  advance  the  policies  of  the  Central  Powers. 
The  springing  to  arms  of  Russia  was  to  prevent 
the  further  subjection  of  a  Slavic  people.  The 
quick  arming  of  Germany  was  to  ward  off  a  possi- 
ble attack  from  the  east,  on  the  one  hand,  and, 
now  that  the  fire  had  been  lighted,  to  push  forward 
to  gain  control  of  the  seas  on  the  other.  The  in- 
vasion of  Belgium  was  not  an  end,  but  a  means. 
The  invasion  and  threatened  conquest  of  France 
was  not  an  end,  but  a  means.  The  end  was  Calais, 
the  Straits  of  Dover,  Great  Britain,  and  the  con- 
trol of  the  seven  seas.    All  this  we  can  now  see. 

How  does  the  matter  stand  to-day  ?  Are  these 
once  obvious  ends  still  controlling  the  minds  and  the 
policies  of  the  warring  peoples  ?  Death,  suffering, 
and  privation  have  given  to  the  word  WAR  a  new 
and  terrible  meaning  for  peoples  who  had  known  a 
long  generation  of  peace.  While  in  no  belligerent 
country  is  there  any  weakening  of  effort  or  lack  of 
conviction  of  the  justness  of  their  cause,  there  are 
everywhere  the  plain  beginnings  of  an  effort  to  seek 
some  solution  of  the  war's  problems  that  will  not 
mean  the  continuance,  perhaps  for  a  decade,  of  the 
present  reign  of  bloodshed  and  destruction.  The 
air  is  filled  with  wireless  messages  from  chiefs  of 
state.  Who  is  to  catch  them,  to  interpret  them,  to 
act  upon  them  ?  It  is  contrary  to  the  etiquette  of 
war  for  Great  Britain  just  now  to  speak  to  Ger- 
many, or  for  Germany  to  make  polite  reply  to  Great 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE        7 

Britain.  But  when  Mr.  Asquith  and  Viscount  Grey- 
speak  in  Parliament  on  the  ends  and  objects  of  the 
war,  to  whom  are  they  really  addressing  them- 
selves ?  When  the  Imperial  German  Chancellor 
rises  before  the  Reichstag  and  makes  reply  to  pub- 
lished statements  of  Viscount  Grey,  to  whom  is  he 
addressing  himself?  Is  it  not  the  fact  that  these 
statesmen  are  at  this  very  moment  really  discussing 
publicly  terms  of  peace  and  the  conditions  on  which 
this  war  may  be  ended,  while  seeming  only  to  make 
formal  statements  to  their  immediate  colleagues  ? 

Speaking  to  the  Foreign  Press  Association  in 
London  on  October  23,  Viscount  Grey  used  these 
words : 

I  take  it  on  the  word  of  the  Prime  Minister  that  we  shall 
fight  until  we  have  established  the  supremacy  and  right  of 
free  development  under  equal  conditions,  each  in  accordance 
with  its  genius,  of  all  States,  great  and  small,  as  a  family  of 
civilized  mankind. 

That  is  a  noble  ideal,  which  must  waken  response 
in  every  liberty-loving  breast  throughout  the  world, 
and  one  must  applaud  Viscount  Grey's  assurance 
that  "  when  we  are  asked  how  long  the  struggle  is  to 
continue,  we  can  only  reply  that  it  must  continue 
until  these  things  are  secured."  But  is  it  a  fact 
that  these  ends  can  be  secured  only  by  continuing 
this  struggle  to  its  desperate  finish  ? 

It  so  happens  that  we  are  not  left  in  doubt  as  to 
Germany's  answer.  On  November  9  Chancellor  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  speaking  to  what  is  called  the 


8       THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

main  committee  of  the  Reichstag,  made  specific 
reference  to  this  statement  by  Viscount  Grey.  He 
insisted,  of  course,  that  the  war  was  forced  upon 
Germany,  and  that  as  a  consequence  Germany  would 
be  entitled  to  ask  for  guarantees  against  similar  at- 
tacks in  the  future.  But  he  added  much  the  most 
significant  statement  that  has  been  made  in  German 
official  life  in  the  memory  of  any  man  now  living. 
These  are  his  momentous  words: 

We  never  concealed  our  doubts  that  peace  could  be  guar- 
anteed permanently  by  international  organizations  such  as 
arbitration  courts.  I  shall  not  discuss  the  theoretical  as- 
pects of  the  problem  in  this  place.  But  from  the  standpoint 
of  matters  of  fact  we  now  and  in  time  of  peace  must  define 
our  position  with  regard  to  this  question. 

If  at  and  after  the  end  of  the  war  the  world  will  only  be- 
come fully  conscious  of  the  horrifying  destruction  of  life  and 
property,  then  through  the  whole  of  humanity  there  will 
ring  out  a  cry  for  peaceful  arrangements  and  understandings 
which,  as  far  as  they  are  within  human  power,  will  prevent 
the  return  of  such  a  monstrous  catastrophe.  This  cry  will  be 
so  powerful  and  so  justified  that  it  must  lead  to  some  result. 

Germany  will  honestly  co-operate  in  the  examination  of 
every  endeavor  to  find  a  practical  solution,  and  will  collaborate 
for  its  possible  realization.  This  all  the  more  if  the  war,  as 
we  expect  and  trust,  brings  about  political  conditions  that 
do  full  justice  to  the  free  development  of  all  nations,  of  small 
as  well  as  great  nations.  Then  the  principles  of  justice  and 
free  development,  not  only  on  the  Continent  but  also  on 
the  seas,  must  be  made  valid.  This,  to  be  sure,  Viscount 
Grey  did  not  mention. 

A  comparison  of  these  two  profoimdly  important 
declarations  indicates  that  it  ought  not  to  be  im- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE        9 

possible  to  find  a  formula  as  to  the  free  development 
of  all  States,  great  and  small,  as  members  of  a  single 
family  of  nations,  that  would  satisfy  both  the  Brit- 
ish Foreign  Secretary  and  the  Imperial  German 
Chancellor. 

Two  questions  immediately  present  themselves. 
When  Viscount  Grey  and  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
HoUweg  use  substantially  the  same  words  as  to  the 
free  development  of  all  nations,  do  they  really 
mean  the  same  thing  ?  If  so,  how  are  we  to  explain 
Belgium  and  Serbia?  And  then  what  about  the 
conditions  on  the  seas  ? 


II 


GREAT  BRITAIN  S  POLICY  TOWARD  SMALL  NATIONS 
AND  STRUGGLING  PEOPLES — HER  INTERNATION- 
AL  TRADE    POLICY GERMANY'S    POLICY   TOWARD 

SMALL     NATIONS     AND     STRUGGLING     PEOPLES — 
IS   AN   AGREEMENT  POSSIBLE  ? 

WHEN  Viscount  Grey  and  Chancellor  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  use  substantially  the 
same  words  in  regard  to  establishing  the 
right  of  all  nations,  great  and  small,  to  free  de- 
velopment, do  they  really  mean  the  same  thing? 

History  will  prove  a  more  useful  guide  to  an 
answer  than  merely  theoretical  discussion.  The 
record  of  Great  Britain,  particularly  that  part  of 
the  record  which  has  been  made  by  the  Liberal 
Governments  of  the  last  seventy-five  years,  is 
enviable,  with  a  single  exception.  Russell,  Palm- 
erston,  Gladstone,  Campbell-Bannerman,  and  As- 
quith  have  consistently  given  support  to  weak  and 
struggling  nationalities  aiming  for  greater  freedom, 
as  well  as  sympathy  to  those  nationalities  that 
were  submerged  imder  conquering  nations.  Great 
Britain  befriended  Belgium  and  Italy  and  Greece. 
In  Canada,  in  Australia,  and  in  South  Africa  she 
has  pursued  a  colonial  poUcy  as  wise  as  it  has  been 
able.  The  much-denoimced  actions  of  Mr.  Glad- 
stone after  Majuba  Hill  and  of  Sir  Henry  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman after  the  South  African  war  re- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      ii 

suited  in  binding  the  South  African  people  more 
closely  than  ever  before  to  the  British  Empire. 
The  one  weakness  in  Great  Britain's  dealing  with 
the  problem  of  nationality  is  found  in  Ireland. 
The  Irish  question,  cofnplicated  as  it  has  been  by 
problems  of  land  ownership,  of  violent  religious 
antipathy,  and  of  traditional  race  antagonism, 
appeared  to  be  well  on  the  way  to  at  least  a  pro- 
visional solution  when  the  war  broke  out,  and 
perhaps  even  greater  progress  may  be  made  so 
soon  as  the  war  shall  end. 

Since  1846  the  free  trade  policy  of  Great  Britain 
has  iindoubtedly  been  of  great  advantage  to  the 
world  at  large  and  to  every  nation  whether  great 
or  small.  If  it  could  speedily  have  become  uni- 
versal, to-day's  problems  of  international  trade 
and  commerce  would  be  wholly  different,  and  some 
at  least  of  the  causes  of  international  war  would 
have  been  removed.  Great  Britain  has  not  only 
supported  the  policy  of  the  open  door  abroad,  but 
she  alone  among  the  greater  nations  has  kept  an 
open  door  at  home.  The  sharp  differences  of  opin- 
ion that  have  arisen  among  the  British  people 
themselves  during  the  past  twenty  years  as  to 
the  success  of  the  free  trade  policy,  when  measured 
by  its  effects  at  home,  are  not  relevant  to  this  dis- 
cussion. What  concerns  the  world  at  large  is  the 
obvious  fact  that  this  free  trade  policy  has  been  a 
benefit  to  every  other  nation,  whether  great  or 
small.  It  has  offered  them  the  stimulus  of  a  British 
market   and  the  added  stimulus  of  British   com- 


12      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

petition.  The  history  of  German  trade  proves 
that  Germany  has  everything  to  gain  and  nothing 
to  lose  by  Great  Britain's  poHcy. 

Therefore,  it  is  only  fair  to  infer  in  view  of  these 
facts  that  Viscoiint  Grey  means  that  every  nation, 
whether  great  or  small,  shoiild  be  at  Hberty  to 
develop  as  Belgium,  as  Italy,  and  as  Greece  have 
developed;  that  to  every  dependent  nationality 
there  should  be  granted  that  full  measure  of  self- 
government  which  is  characteristic  of  Canada,  of 
Australia,  and  of  South  Africa;  and  that  inter- 
national trade  should  be  as  little  restricted  and 
hampered  as  possible.  This  policy  would  satisfy 
liberal-minded  men  everywhere  and  woiild  put 
international  peace  on  a  more  sectire  foundation 
than  it  has  ever  had  before. 

The  record  of  the  dealings  of  Germany  with 
other  nations,  particularly  small  nations,  is  a  dif- 
ferent one.  This  difference  is  due,  no  doubt,  in 
part  to  different  circumstances  from  those  which 
have  confronted  Great  Britain.  It  is,  however, 
due  in  part  to  a  distinct  public  policy.  Germany, 
unlike  Great  Britain,  has  not  foimd  itself  in  island 
seclusion,  but  with  long  and  easily  crossed  frontiers 
that  marched  with  those  of  other  and  quite  dif- 
ferent peoples.  The  relation  of  Germany  to  Po- 
land and  to  Denmark  has  been  somewhat  the  same 
as  that  in  which  England  stood  to  Scotland  and 
to  Wales  in  the  time  of  the  three  Edwards.  In  the 
latter  case  the  resulting  wars  ended,  however,  in 
a  really  imited  Great  Britain,  and  not  in  submerged 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      13 

and  unhappy  subject  pop\ilations.  At  this  mo- 
ment the  Prime  Minister  of  England  sits  for  a 
Scottish  constituency  and  the  Minister  for  War  is 
a  Welshman.  Germany's  treatment  of  Poland,  of 
the  Schleswig-Holstein  duchies,  and  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  has  been  unfortunate,  to  say  the  least, 
from  the  standpoint  of  a  nation  which  is  concerned 
for  the  free  development  of  all  nations,  whether 
great  or  small.  The  plea  of  national  necessity 
urged  in  explanation  of  this  treatment,  as  in  de- 
fense of  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  is  not  convincing 
to  modem  ears.  Yet  it  must  not  be  too  lightly 
set  aside  through  lack  of  capacity  to  see  the  Ger- 
man point  of  view. 

Prince  von  Biilow  has  described  the  policy  of  Ger- 
many toward  Poland  as  a  "mission  of  civilization," 
and  he  says  that,  if  Prussia  had  not  taken  posses- 
sion of  that  part  of  Poland  which  now  constitutes 
the  Eastern  Provinces,  these  provinces  would  have 
fallen  under  the  dominion  of  Russia.  In  this  state- 
ment there  are  two  implications.  The  first  is  that 
it  would  be  disadvantageous  to  the  national  de- 
velopment of  Germany  if  these  provinces  had 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  Russia.  The  second  is 
that  Germany  could  make  better  provision  for 
the  development  of  Poland,  or  for  that  part  of  it 
which  was  annexed,  than  Poland  could  make  for 
itself.  The  first  of  these  implications  opens  the 
door  to  a  long  debate  which,  in  view  of  the  estab- 
lished facts,  would  now  be  futile.  The  second 
raises  a  definite  question  which  bears  directly  upon 


14      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

the  meaning  of  the  words,  "the  right  of  all  nations, 
great  and  small,  to  free  development."  If  Poland, 
being  a  nation,  possessing  a  language,  a  literature, 
and  a  body  of  traditions  of  its  own,  does  not  itself 
wish  to  be  submerged  tmder  either  Germany  or 
Russia,  then  so  to  submerge  it  would  appear  to  be 
in  violation  of  the  principles  which  Chancellor  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  now  annoimces  as  his  own. 
The  Allies  are  pubUcly  committed  to  an  autonomous 
Poland.  A  solution  might  perhaps  be  foimd  if  the 
Chancellor's  language  were  interpreted  to  mean 
that,  in  such  cases  as  those  of  the  Poles  and  the 
South  Slavs,  the  peoples  in  question  should  be 
given  an  opportunity  to  decide  for  themselves 
whether  they  prefer  autonomy  with  national  in- 
dependence or  autonomy  with  dependence  on  a 
greater  and  neighboring  Power.  In  order  to  satisfy 
the  liberal  opinion  of  the  world,  such  peoples,  and 
those  of  Ireland  as  well,  must  have  autonomy. 
National  independence,  where  it  has  long  been 
lost  or  where  it  has  never  been  gained,  raises  an- 
other set  of  questions  which  can  hardly  be  answered 
save  after  detailed  examination  of  each  particidar 
case. 

Therefore,  whether  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  and  Viscount  Grey  are  in  agreement  upon 
this  point  would  seem  to  turn  upon  whether  Ger- 
many is  willing  to  permit  the  Poles  and  the  South 
Slavs  to  choose  the  form  of  their  own  political 
organization  and  to  direct  it  when  organized.  If 
so,  agreement  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain, 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      15 

in  this  respect  at  least,  is  certainly  in  sight.  Should 
Germany  demur  on  the  groimd  that  her  own  na- 
tional security  is  at  stake,  the  answer  must  be 
found  in  those  new  forms  of  international  guarantee 
for  national  security  which  it  is  hoped  will  be  pro- 
posed and  adopted  at  the  end  of  the  war. 

More  than  once  in  the  past  it  has  been  the  policy 
of  Germany  to  acquire,  when  possible,  exclusive 
trade  privileges  and  to  insist  upon  them.  Germany 
has  not  had  the  opportimity  which  the  sixteenth, 
seventeenth,  and  eighteenth  centuries  brought  to 
England,  of  establishing  great  colonial  depen- 
dencies in  the  temperate  zone,  and  therefore  she 
has  not  been  tested  as  England  has  been  by  the 
government  of  a  Canada,  or  an  Australia,  or  a 
South  Africa.  Yet,  as  far  as  the  record  goes,  it 
indicates  that  Germany  appears  to  favor  exclusive 
trade  privileges,  if  only  as  a  basis  for  diplomatic 
negotiations,  while  England  supports  the  open 
door.  It  must  therefore  be  considered  what  ad- 
vantage there  would  be  in  any  proposal  that  would 
bring  Germany  to  the  support  of  an  open  door 
policy  as  a  means  of  binding  the  nations  of  the 
world  more  closely  together  and  of  removing  one 
great  cause  of  international  rivalry  and  jealousy. 


Ill 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  IN  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  AS  AN 
INFLUENCE  FOR  PEACE — ECONOMIC  WAR  AND 
PRIVILEGE  A  CERTAIN  CAUSE  OF  INTERNA- 
TIONAL UNREST 

WHAT  may,  for  convenience,  be  called  the 
open  door  policy  of  international  trade 
does  not  necessarily  imply  the  total  aban- 
donment of  tariffs,  either  for  revenue  or  indeed  for 
protection,  if  that  which  is  to  be  protected  is  in  each 
case  conceived  as  a  really  hiiman  and  not  merely  a 
money  interest.  In  so  far  as  tariffs  are  levied  by 
any  nation  as  a  necessary  means  of  raising  revenue, 
or  in  so  far  as  they  are,  in  the  judgment  of  any  na- 
tion, necessary  to  the  protection  of  the  standard 
of  living  of  wage-earners  or  to  the  diversification  of 
industry,  and  in  so  far  as  they  apply  equally  to  all 
nations,  they  are  compatible  with  the  open  door 
policy  in  the  broad  sense.  What  the  open  door 
policy  does  involve  is  a  changed  point  of  view  on 
the  part  of  those  nations  which  like  Germany, 
France,  and  the  United  States,  have  been  too 
largely  under  the  domination  of  the  notion  that  all 
imports  are  harmful,  and  that  they  displace  an  equal 
amoimt  of  home-made  products.  So  long  as  any  one 
great  nation  holds  to  the  false  theory  that  interna- 
tional trade  is  a  mere  casual  incident  to  a  nation's 

z6 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      \^ 

business,  and  sometimes  even  a  detriment  to  it, 
just  so  long  will  other  great  nations  hold  aloof  and 
keep  their  excluding  tariff  walls  more  or  less  in  re- 
pair. Whatever  is  done  to  make  international  trade 
more  easy  and  more  general  must  be  done  by  the 
common  consent  of  the  great  commercial  nations  of 
the  world. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  false  and  mislead- 
ing views  of  international  trade  have  had  more  to 
do  with  the  development  of  those  international 
rivalries  and  suspicions  which  preceded  and  made 
possible  the  present  war  than  any  other  single 
cause.  How  to  remove  these  rivalries  and  sus- 
picions, and  how  to  substitute  a  new,  a  wiser,  and  a 
broader  view  of  international  trade  for  that  which 
has  heretofore  prevailed,  is  one  of  the  most  serious 
aspects  of  the  problem  of  effecting  a  genuine  peace. 

This  question  cannot  be  settled  by  economists 
alone.  Indeed,  they  are  incojnpetent  to  settle  it,  as 
is  made  clear  enough  by  the  fact  that  the  three 
most  prominent  German  economists  in  this  genera- 
tion have  held  sharply  differing  views  on  this  ques- 
tion. Professor  Wagner  has  taught  thoroughgoing 
protection.  Professor  Brentano  has  taught  complete 
free  trade,  while  Professor  SchmoUer  has  taken  a 
middle  course.  Similar  divisions,  though  perhaps 
not  always  quite  so  definite  as  these,  have  existed 
in  the  ranks  of  French,  British,  Italian,  Russian, 
and  American  economists.  This  question  is  to  be 
settled,  if  at  all,  on  the  broad  basis  of  constructive 
statesmanship  and  from  the  view-point  of  a  just 


1 8      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

and  seciire  international  peace  to  which  each  nation 
must  be  willing  to  make  its  contribution. 

The  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that  there  is  in 
Great  Britain  a  powerful  body  of  political  opinion, 
strongly  supported  by  some  economists,  which  would 
reverse  the  British  trade  policy  of  the  past  sixty 
years  and  institute  a  regime  of  new  trade  antago- 
nism and  new  international  suspicion.  It  would  be 
little  short  of  calamitous  should  the  trade  poHcy  of 
Great  Britain  be  essentially  changed  now.  The 
swift  concurrence  of  other  nations  in  a  liberal  trade 
policy,  which  Cobden  and  Bright  foresaw  and  so 
confidently  predicted  a  half  century  ago,  did  not 
result,  but  there  never  has  been  so  favorable  a  chance 
for  the  concurrence  of  other  nations  as  now  presents 
itself.  The  pressure  of  the  tmiversal  desire  for  a 
stable  peace  may  accomplish  what  generations  of 
argument  and  example  could  not  do.  If  Great 
Britain  will  only  persigt  in  her  present  trade  policy 
she  may  thereby  make  an  even  greater  contribution 
to  the  peace  of  the  world  than  she  can  possibly  make 
by  her  navy,  her  army,  and  her  almost  limitless 
financial  resources. 

The  Economic  Conference  of  the  Allied  Powers, 
held  in  Paris  on  Jime  14-17,  1916,  was  most  sig- 
nificant. To  the  extent  to  which  the  conference 
dealt  with  economic  measures  to  be  takerf  by  them 
diiring  the  war,  its  conclusions  and  recommendations 
need  not  be  discussed  here.  In  so  far,  however,  as 
this  conference  foreshadowed  a  period  of  purpose- 
ful and  highly  organized  economic  strife  after  the 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      19 

present  military  struggle  is  ended,  it  was  discourag- 
ing and  reactionary  in  the  extreme.  Two  genera- 
tions ago  Lord  Clarendon,  in  referring  to  the  ap- 
parent settlement  of  the  Eastern  question  by  the 
Treaty  of  Paris,  wrote:  "Nous  avons  fait  une  paix, 
mais  pas  la  paix."  If  the  present  military  contest 
is  to  be  immediately  succeeded  by  a  new  and  vigor- 
ous economic  struggle,  using  all  the  implements  of 
privilege,  discrimination,  and  favor,  then  while  the 
war  may  resiilt  in  a  peace,  it  will  not  result  in  that 
durable  and  secure  peace  on  which  the  heart  of  the 
world  is  set. 

Meanwhile  the  people  of  the  United  States,  at 
least,  are  at  school.  The  war  has  literally  forced 
upon  them  an  international  trade  of  stupendous 
magnitude,  and  it  is  rapidly  transforming  them  from 
a  debtor  into  a  creditor  nation.  Since  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  the  people  of  the  United  States  have 
bought  back  from  Europe  considerably  more  than 
$2,000,000,000  of  their  own  securities,  and,  in  ad- 
dition, they  have  loaned  nearly,  if  not  quite,  $2,000,- 
000,000  to  foreign  countries  and  municipalities. 
These  new  and  highly  profitable  experiences,  taken 
in  connection  with  the  fact  that  for  some  years  past 
American  public  opinion  has  been  gradually  taking 
larger  and  sounder  views  of  international  trade  and 
of  tariff  problems,  indicate  that  in  the  United  States 
the  ruling  tendency  is  in  the  right  direction.  Such 
facts  teach  the  American  people,  more  thoroughly 
than  any  printed  page  can  possibly  do,  what  it 
means  to  engage  in  international  trade  on  so  huge 


20     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

a  scale,  and  how  it  broadens  the  sympathies  and 
widens  the  knowledge  of  all  those  who,  directly  or 
indirectly,  are  interested  in  the  undertaking.  "  For 
where  your  treasure  is,  there  will  your  heart  be 
also." 

The  Allies  have  an  unexampled  opportunity  to 
lay  the  foundations  of  a  durable  peace  if,  when  the 
war  ends,  they  will  offer  to  Germany  and  her  alUes 
complete  participation  on  equal  terms  in  the  trade 
of  the  world,  on  the  sole  condition  that  political  ac- 
tivity in  other  countries  be  abandoned  and  that  an 
international  guarantee  for  national  security  be  at 
once  agreed  upon.  Neither  the  Allies  nor  Germany 
need  fear  that  in  such  case  the  influence  of  their 
national  ideals,  their  public  poHcies,  or  their  Htera- 
tures  will  be  lost.  It  is  undeniable,  as  the  late  Pro- 
fessor William  G.  Stmmer  once  wrote,  that:  **We 
may  be  very  sure  that  the  wheat  from  America  has 
had  far  more  effect  on  ideas  in  Europe  than  the 
ideas  from  America." 


IV 

WHAT  IS  MEANT  BY  THE  FREEDOM  OP  THE  SEAS  ? — 
THE  SEAS  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE  ARE  FREE — ^THE 
SEAS    IN   TIME    OP   WAR 

IN  application  of  the  principles  thus  far  dis- 
cussed it  would  appear  that  agreement  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Germany  in  regard 
to  establishing  "the  right  of  all  nations,  great  and 
small,  to  free  development"  probably  depends 
upon  the  granting  of  autonomy  to  Ireland,  to  Po- 
land, and  to  the  South  Slavonic  peoples,  as  well 
as  upon  the  general  adoption  of  the  open  door 
policy  in  foreign  trade.  Belgium  must,  of  course, 
be  restored  and  indemnified  by  Germany.  In  like 
manner  Serbia  must  be  restored  and  indemnified 
by  Austria-Hungary.  Underlying  and  supporting 
all  of  these  acts  would  be  a  new  international 
guarantee  for  the  national  security  of  all  peoples, 
great  and  small  alike.  If  the  mind  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  mind  of  Germany  coidd  meet  on  these 
points — and  why  should  they  not? — ^there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  either  France  or  Russia 
would  hold  back,  imless  perhaps  it  might  be  in 
regard  to  the  more  complete  application  of  the 
open  door  policy  in  foreign  trade.  But  France, 
who  seeks  nothing  tmreasonable  for  herself,  and 
asks  only  national  security  and  the  protection  of 
the  principles  of  public  conduct  in  which  she  ar- 

az 


22      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

dently  believes,  would  almost  certainly  assent  to 
a  plan  that  would  ask  her  to  sacrifice  so  little  in 
the  way  of  a  modified  economic  policy  in  order  to 
attain  so  much  of  permanent  good  for  herself  and 
for  the  world.  The  situation  as  regards  Russia 
appears  to  be  quite  similar,  particularly  if  Russia 
can  be  assured  of  that  free  access  to  the  sea  through- 
out the  year  which  she  has  so  long  desired,  and 
which  she  should  have  in  the  general  interest  as 
well  as  in  her  own. 

There  would  then  remain  the  one  important 
question  referred  to  by  Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
HoUweg  in  his  speech  of  November  9  last,  and  not 
mentioned  by  Viscount  Grey  in  his  speech  of  October 
23,  namely,  the  conditions  on  the  seas. 

That  Germany  is  deeply  concerned  on  this  point 
has  long  been  apparent.  The  freedom  of  the  seas 
is  one  of  the  five  points  covered  by  the  peace  pro- 
gramme of  the  Bimd  Neues  Vaterland.  It  is  made 
one  of  the  peace  aims  of  the  German  Socialists. 
Doctor  Demburg  includes  it  in  his  six  proposals 
for  peace  made  public  on  April  18,  191 5.  The  Im- 
perial German  Chancellor  evidently  lays  great 
stress  upon  it.  One  must  inquire,  therefore,  just 
what  is  meant  by  the  freedom  of  the  seas  and  in 
what  respect  that  freedom  is  now  lacking  or  denied. 

Under  existing  international  law  the  seas  are, 
and  long  have  been,  free  outside  of  the  conventional 
three-mile  limit.  There  are  no  longer  any  pirates, 
and  no  charge  is  made  for  traversing  the  seas  be- 
tween one  port  and  another.     There  are  no  rights 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      23 

of  way  over  the  ocean.  In  law,  therefore,  the  seas 
would  seem  to  be  even  freer  than  the  land.  Small 
peoples  with  insignificant  navies,  such  as  the  Nor- 
wegians, the  Danes,  the  Dutch,  and  the  Portuguese, 
have  been  and  are  successful  sea  traders  to  no  in- 
considerable extent.  Germany  herself  has,  within 
the  past  forty  years,  built  up  a  stupendous  mer- 
chant marine,  and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war  her  flag  was  as  familiar  as  any  other  in  the  sea- 
ports of  six  continents.  It  would  appear,  then,  that 
the  desired  freedom  of  the  seas  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  normal  conditions  of  international  peace; 
it  must  relate  entirely  to  the  abnormal  conditions 
of  international  war.  So  far,  therefore,  as  future 
international  wars  can  be  guarded  against  and 
averted  by  an  agreement  upon  such  policies  as 
have  already  been  described,  all  differences  as  to 
freedom  of  the  seas  will  disappear.  If,  however, 
the  world  is  to  contemplate  another  international 
war  like  that  now  raging,  what  is  the  ground  for 
that  German  imeasiness  as  to  the  freedom  of  the 
seas  which  is  so  apparent  ? 

It  is,  however,  not  yet  entirely  clear  just  what 
specific  things  Germany  aims  at  in  pressing  for 
freedom  of  the  seas.  The  freedom  of  the  seas  to 
which  the  United  States,  for  example,  owes  its 
existence  and  its  prosperity,  and  for  which  both 
Holland  and  Great  Britain  stoutly  contended  in 
days  gone  by,  is  the  freedom  which  Grotius  defined 
when  he  laid  it  down  as  a  specific  and  unimpeach- 
able axiom  of  the  law  of  nations,  the  spirit  of  which 


24      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

is  self-evident  and  immutable,  that:  "Every  na- 
tion is  free  to  travel  to  every  other  nation,  and  to 
trade  with  it."  It  is  in  this  broad  and  fundamental 
sense  that  the  world  already  possesses  freedom  of 
the  seas.  .  Those  municipal  regulations  which  so 
often  restrict  and  harass  international  trade  have 
no  application  on  the  sea  itself,  but  only  at  the 
ports  of  entry.  Doubtless,  however,  the  mind  of 
Germany,  like  the  mind  of  Great  Britain,  has  come 
very  largely  under  the  dominance  of  the  argument 
of  that  American  book  which,  on  the  whole,  has 
had  more  influence  in  shaping  modem  European 
policy  than  any  other  work  published  on  this  side 
of  the  Atlantic.  That  book  is  the  late  Admiral 
Mahan's  "Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  History." 
This  illuminating  book  has,  however,  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  It  deals 
wholly  with  questions  relating  to  the  control  of 
the  seas,  a  quite  different  matter.  Two  of  Admiral 
Mahan's  ruling  contentions  are  that  commerce 
needs  navies  for  its  protection  and  that  sea  power 
has  throughout  the  history  of  war  been  an  im- 
portant and  often  a  decisive  factor.  It  is  plain 
that  in  time  of  war,  and  as  one  of  the  incidents  of 
war,  the  control  of  the  seas  will  rest  with  the  most 
powerful  and  best  distributed  navy.  At  such  a 
time  the  seas  cannot  possibly  be  free  to  ships  of 
war,  which  must  take  their  chances  in  battle  with 
an  antagonist.  What  Germany  doubtless  has  in 
mind  is  the  fact  that  the  British  Navy  is  not  only 
powerful  enough  to  control  the  seas  in  time  of  war. 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      25 

but  that  this  control  may  be,  and  in  the  German 
view  is,  so  used  as  to  deprive  Germany  and  her 
aUies  of  some  advantages  through  trade  with  neu- 
trals to  which  they  are  legally  entitled.  This  nar- 
rows the  question  down  to  neutral  trade  in  time  of 
war,  and  to  the  exemption  of  private  property 
from  capture  at  sea.  On  this  topic  there  has  been 
much  discussion  in  recent  years  and  the  policies 
to  which  the  United  States  is  committed  have 
been  stated  over  and  over  again.  What,  if  any, 
just  ground  of  complaint  against  Great  Britain 
and  her  allies  have  Germany  and  the  neutral  na- 
tions because  of  the  way  in  which  Great  Britain 
has  exercised  its  power  of  sea  control  in  time  of 
war,  and  how  far  must  these  grievances  be  taken 
into  accoimt  in  laying  the  foundations  for  a  just 
and  stable  peace  ? 


V 


EXEMPTION  OF  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AT  SEA,  NOT 
CONTRABAND,  FROM  CAPTURE  OR  DESTRUCTION 
BY  BELLIGERENTS — THE  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES — ACTION  OF  THE  TWO  HAGUE  CONFER- 
ENCES 

IT  would  appear,  from  what  has  gone  before, 
that  in  time  of  peace  freedom  of  the  seas  exists 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  words.  The  disputed 
questions  relate  entirely  to  the  status  and  treat- 
ment of  merchant  vessels  and  their  cargoes  in  time 
of  war.  These  questions  involve  the  detailed  con- 
sideration of  blockade  in  time  of  war,  of  contraband 
of  war,  of  unneutral  service,  of  destruction  of  neu- 
tral prizes,  of  transfer  to  a  neutral  flag,  of  the  en- 
emy character  of  a  vessel  or  its  cargo,  of  convoy,  of 
resistance  to  search,  and  of  compensation.  Im- 
portant and  delicate  as  all  these  matters  are,  and 
seriously  as  they  have  engaged  the  attention  of  naval 
commanders  and  of  international  lawyers,  they  are 
really  all  subordinate  to  a  larger  question,  namely, 
that  of  the  exemption  of  all  private  property  at  sea, 
not  contraband  of  war,  from  capture  or  destruction 
by  belligerents.  Were  such  exemption  agreed  to  as 
a  ruling  principle,  all  of  the  other  matters  mentioned 
would  fall  into  place  and  be  disposed  of  as  parts  or 
applications  of  this  main  principle. 

The  first  inquiry  addressed  by  the  Government  of 

36 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      27 

the  United  States  to  the  Government  of  Great 
Britain  after  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  was 
as  to  whether  the  British  Government  was  wiUing 
to  agree  that  the  laws  of  naval  warfare  as  laid  down 
by  the  Declaration  of  London  of  1909,  should  be  ap- 
plicable to  naval  warfare  during  the  present  conflict 
in  Europe,  provided  that  the  Governments  with 
which  Great  Britain  was  or  might  be  at  war  would 
also  agree  to  such  application.  On  August  20,  19 14, 
an  Order  in  Council  was  issued  directing  the  adoption 
and  enforcement  during  the  present  hostilities  of 
the  convention  known  as  the  Declaration  of  London 
subject  to  additions  and  modifications.  The  sub- 
sequent history  of  the  matter,  including  action  taken 
by  the  British  Government  by  way  of  addition  to 
this  Order  in  Council  or  by  way  of  modification  of 
it,  is  common  knowledge.  Since  August,  1914,  the 
United  States  has  addressed  formal  notes  to  Great 
Britain  on  the  subjects  of  contraband  of  war,  on  re- 
straints of  commerce,  and  in  particular  on  the  case 
of  the  American  steamer  Wilhelmina.  The  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has  shown  itself  alert  to 
the  significance  of  these  questions  and  incidents  of 
war  for  all  neutral  Powers. 

On  the  vital  point  of  exempting  all  private  prop- 
erty at  sea,  not  contraband  of  war,  from  capture  or 
destruction  by  belligerents,  the  United  States  has 
taken  a  single  and  a  consistent  position  throughout 
the  entire  history  of  the  Government.  Indeed  a  pro- 
vision for  this  exemption  was  made  part  of  the  Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce  of  1785  with  Prussia.     It 


28      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

was  there  agreed  that  free  vessels  make  free  goods. 
The  signers  of  this  treaty  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  were  Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas  Jefferson, 
and  John  Adams.  In  1856  the  United  States  iirged 
the  addition  of  this  provision  to  the  clause  of  the 
Declaration  of  Paris  relating  to  privateering.  The 
fact  that  such  addition  was  refused  by  the  other 
high  contracting  Powers  led  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  to  decline  to  adhere  to  the  Declara- 
tion of  Paris. 

The  formal  instructions  to  the  American  dele- 
gates to  the  first  Hague  Conference,  held  in  1899, 
signed  by  John  Hay  as  Secretary  of  State,  concluded 
with  these  words: 

As  the  United  States  has  for  many  years  advocated  the 
exemption  of  all  private  property  not  contraband  of  war 
from  hostile  treatment,  you  are  authorized  to  propose  to 
the  Conference  the  principle  of  extending  to  strictly  private 
property  at  sea  the  immunity  from  destruction  or  capture 
by  belligerent  Powers  which  such  property  already  enjoys 
on  land  as  worthy  of  being  incorporated  in  the  permanent 
law  of  civilized  nations. 

Following  messages  on  this  subject  from  Presi- 
dent McKinley  in  December,  1898,  and  from  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  in  December,  1903,  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  adopted  on  April  28,  1904,  a  joint 
resolution  in  the  following  terms: 

That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
that  it  is  desirable  in  the  interests  of  uniformity  of  action 
by  the  maritime  states  in  time  of  war  that  the  President  en- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      29 

deavor  to  bring  about  an  understanding  among  the  principal 
maritime  Powers  with  a  view  to  incorporating  into  the  per- 
manent law  of  civilized  nations  the  principle  of  the  exemption 
of  all  private  property  at  sea,  not  contraband  of  war,  from 
capture  or  destruction  by  belligerents. 

The  formal  instructions  to  the  American  dele- 
gates to  the  second  Hague  Conference,  held  in  1907, 
signed  by  Elihu  Root,  then  Secretary  of  State,  con- 
tained this  passage: 

You  will  maintain  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United 
States  regarding  the  immimity  of  private  property  of  belUg- 
erents  at  sea. 

Secretary  Root  then  went  on  to  discuss  at  some 
length  the  importance  of  this  policy. 

At  the  first  Hague  Conference  the  representatives 
of  nearly  all  the  great  Powers  insisted  that  the  action 
of  the  Conference  should  be  strictly  limited  to  the 
matters  specified  in  the  Russian  circular  of  Decem- 
ber 30,  1898,  proposing  the  programme  of  the  Con- 
ference. For  this  reason  the  members  of  the  Confer- 
ence at  first  refused  to  receive  any  proposal  from 
the  American  delegates  dealing  with  the  subject  of 
the  immunity  of  private  property  not  contraband 
from  seizure  on  the  seas  in  time  of  war.  Eventually, 
however,  a  memorial  from  the  American  delegates, 
which  stated  fully  the  historical  and  actual  rela- 
tion of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  subject,  was 
received,  referred  to  a  committee,  and  finally  brought 
by  that  committee  before  the  Conference.    The  Con- 


30     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

ference  of  1899  adopted  a  motion  referring  the  sub- 
ject to  a  future  Conference,  so  that  all  the  American 
delegates  were  able  to  accomplish  at  that  time  was 
to  keep  the  subject  before  the  worid  for  discussion. 
At  the  second  Hague  Conference,  which  met  on 
June  15,  1907,  the  subject  of  the  private  property  of 
belligerents  at  sea  was  included  in  the  official  pro- 
gramme. It  was  among  the  topics  referred  to  the 
Fourth  Commission  of  the  Conference,  of  which  the 
chairman  was  M.  de  Martens,  of  Russia.  A  specific 
proposition,  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States,  was  supported  by  Brazil,  Norway,  Sweden, 
Austria-Hungary,  and  China.  Germany,  supported 
by  Portugal,  while  admitting  that  it  leaned  toward 
the  proposed  inviolability  of  private  property,  made 
the  reservation  that  its  adoption  of  this  principle 
depended  upon  a  preliminary  xmderstanding  on 
matters  relating  to  contraband  of  war  and  block- 
ade. Russia  did  not  think  the  question  ripe  for  prac- 
tical solution;  while  Argentina  declared  itself  cate- 
gorically in  favor  of  the  continuance  of  the  right  of 
capture.  France  was  ready  to  support  the  Amer- 
ican proposal  if  a  unanimous  agreement  could  be 
reached.  The  representatives  of  Great  Britain  held 
that  it  was  impossible  to  separate  the  question  of 
the  immimity  of  private  property  from  that  of  com- 
mercial blockade,  and  that  the  interruption  of  com- 
merce was  less  cruel  than  the  massacres  caused  by 
war.  Nevertheless,  the  British  delegates  declared 
that  their  Government  would  be  ready  to  consider 
the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  contemplating  the 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      31 

abolition  of  the  right  of  capttire  if  such  an  agreement 
would  further  the  reduction  of  armaments. 

The  proposition  of  the  United  States,  when  first 
put  to  a  vote,  obtained  from  the  forty-four  States 
represented  21  yeas,  11  nays,  i  abstention,  and  11 
States  not  answering.  The  twenty-one  States  vot- 
ing yea  included,  with  the  United  States,  the  fol- 
lowing present  belligerent  Powers:  Germany  (with 
the  reservation  already  referred  to),  Austria-Htm- 
gary,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Italy,  Rumania,  and  Tur- 
key. Of  the  present  belligerents  France,  Great 
Britain,  Japan,  Montenegro,  Portugal,  and  Russia 
voted  in  the  negative. 

The  discussions  in  the  Fourth  Commission  give 
more  ground  than  does  the  actual  vote  for  believing 
that  the  proposal  of  the  United  States  may  be  ac- 
cepted at  the  close  of  the  war.  The  expressed  ob- 
jections of  France  and  Russia  should  now  be  readily 
overcome.  The  reservations  made  by  Germany  will, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  be  discussed  and  disposed  of 
immediately  upon  the  conclusion  of  present  hostil- 
ities. There  remains  Great  Britain,  among  whose 
people  a  large  body  of  commercial  opinion  is  already 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  exemption  of  private  prop- 
erty at  sea.  Only  three  years  before  the  outbreak 
of  war,  at  a  meeting  of  the  Coimcil  of  the  London 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  a  resolution  moved  by  no 
less  important  a  person  than  the  late  Lord  Avebury, 
"that  in  the  opinion  of  this  chamber  private  prop- 
erty at  sea  should  be  declared  free  of  capture  and 
seizure,"  was  carefully  discussed  and  then  adopted 


32      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

by  a  unanimous  vote.  Other  important  commercial 
bodies  in  Great  Britain  took  similar  action  about 
the  same  time.  The  obstacle  in  the  way  to  British 
concurrence  is  said  to  be  official  admiralty  opinion; 
but  this  is  a  case  in  which  the  admiralties  of  the 
world  must  surely  be  compelled  to  give  way  to  the 
reasonable  demands  of  those  whose  property  is  sub- 
jected to  loss  and  damage  by  persistence  in  the  pres- 
ent unhappy  and  uncivilized  policy.  The  whole 
policy  of  commerce  destruction  is  really  obsolete 
and  at  variance  with  modem  notions  of  public  and 
private  right. 

At  the  conclusion  of  hostiHties  this  question 
should  be  pressed  to  a  final  and  favorable  disposition. 
When  this  is  done  the  freedom  of  the  seas  in  time  of 
war  will  be  as  fully  established  as  war  conditions 
themselves  will  permit.  Subordinate  questions  as 
to  contraband  and  blockade  and  as  to  the  specific 
treatment  of  straits  and  canals,  ought  not  to  be 
difficult  to  settle  if,  as  every  belligerent  professes, 
the  ruling  desire  is  for  the  establishment  of  a  per- 
manent peace. 

The  importance  of  the  freedom  and  safety  of  the 
ocean  pathways  was  impressively  stated  by  Sir 
Robert  Laird  Borden,  Premier  of  Canada,  in  a 
speech  delivered  on  November  i8  in  New  York. 
Sir  Robert  Borden  stated  that  the  lesson  of  the  war 
was  twofold:  "First,  that  the  liberty,  the  seciuity, 
and  the  free  existence  of  our  empire  are  depen- 
dent upon  the  safety  of  the  ocean  pathways,  whether 
in  peace  or  war;  next,  that  while  sea  power  can- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DUIIABLE  PEACE      33 

not  of  itself  be  the  instrument  of  world  domination, 
it  is  nevertheless  the  most  powerful  instrument  by 
which  world  domination  can  be  effectually  resisted. 
Three  hundred  years  ago  it  forever  crushed  arro- 
gant pretensions  then  brought  forward  to  control 
western  trade  routes  and  to  exclude  therefrom  the 
free  nations  of  the  world.  Little  more  than  a  cen- 
tury ago  it  maintained  freedom  against  world  dom- 
ination by  a  single  military  system.  To-day  it  re- 
mains the  shield  of  the  same  freedom,  and  it  will  so 
continue.  This  burden  of  so  tremendous  a  respon- 
sibility must  not  rest  upon  Britain  alone,  but  upon 
the  greater  commonwealth  which  comprises  all  the 
King's  dominions." 

Would  it  not  be  even  better  and  would  not  Great 
Britain  be  still  more  secure  if  this  burden  were 
borne  by  the  great  commercial  nations  of  the  world 
linked  together  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  as  an  instrument  and  incident  of  a 
durable  peace  ? 

The  common  sense  of  mankind,  however,  will  not 
be  satisfied  with  any  definition  of  freedom  of  the 
seas  in  time  of  war  which  does  not  frankly  put  in 
the  category  of  murder  such  amazing  barbarities  as 
history  will  recall  whenever  the  words  Lusitania 
and  Sttssex  are  mentioned. 


VI 


FRANCE  IN  THE  WAR THE  AIMS  OF  FRANCE!  RESTI- 
TUTION, REPARATION  AND  NATIONAL  SECURITY 
— A  METHOD  OP  SECURING  REPARATION  THAT 
WILL  AID  A  DURABLE  PEACE 

IF  it  be  assumed  that  Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many, together  with  their  several  allies,  could 
come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  specific  ap- 
plications of  the  principle  that  every  nation  has  a 
right  to  free  development  and  that  there  should 
be  freedom  of  the  seas  in  the  sense  heretofore  de- 
scribed, what  conditions  of  a  durable  peace  would 
remain  to  be  considered  ? 

This  war  has  made  France  the  hero  of  the  na- 
tions. Whether  she  be  judged  by  military  prowess 
or  by  power  of  national  organization  and  national 
self-control,  the  French  Republic  has  so  revealed 
itself  as  to  excite  the  imstinted  admiration  and  to 
call  forth  the  unbounded  affection  of  the  world  at 
large.  The  evidence  clearly  proves  that  France 
was  in  no  respect  an  aggressor  in  the  present  war. 
She  herself  was  promptly  attacked,  in  part  because 
she  was  the  ally  of  Russia,  in  part  because  she  was 
on  good  terms  with  England,  and  in  part  because 
the  plans  of  the  German  General  Staff  required 
that  the  French  Army  be  broken  up  and  destroyed 
first  of  all.  That  France  was  imprepared  for  war, 
and,    therefore,   was   not   contemplating  war,   has 

34 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      35 

been  obvious  to  every  one  since  August  i,  19 14. 
For  one  full  year  her  devoted  armies  were  called 
upon  to  hold  back  the  great  host  of  invaders  with 
only  partial  equipment  and  without  a  large  part 
of  the  necessary  instruments  of  successful  modem 
war.  The  military  genius  of  General  Joffre  and  his 
colleagues,  together  with  the  heroic  bravery  of  the 
army  itself,  performed  a  veritable  miracle  at  the 
battle  of  the  Mame,  and  they  have  been  perform- 
ing a  succession  of  miracles  from  that  day  to  this. 
As  a  fighting  force  the  French  Army  has  gained 
new  laurels,  and  behind  the  army  stands  the  French 
people,  calm,  confident,  and  clear-sighted  as  to  the 
ends  for  which  the  nation  is  maintaining  and  prose- 
cuting its  defense. 

Every  serious-minded  and  responsible  French- 
man intends,  if  it  be  humanly  possible,  to  make 
this  the  last  war.  The  inspiration  of  that  hope 
leads  the  French  fathers  and  mothers  to  bear  with 
an  exalted  resignation  the  loss  of  their  sons.  It  is 
the  inspiration  of  this  hope  which  calls  out  the 
limitless  sacrifice  of  women  and  the  effort  even  of 
the  aged  and  the  infirm. 

France  seeks  three  things  as  the  result  of  this 
last  of  wars.  These  have  been  defined  by  one  of 
her  representative  public  men  as  restitution,  repara- 
tion, and  national  security.  President  Poincare, 
in  his  address  on  July  14,  1916,  when  the  war  had 
been  nearly  two  years  in  progress,  stated  the  French 
aims  a  little  more  fully.  Reviewing  the  sufferings 
and   sorrows   of   France,    he   insisted   in   eloquent 


36      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

words  that  these  would  never  weaken  the  nation's 
will.  He  reasserted  the  nation's  horror  of  war  and 
its  passionate  devotion  to  those  policies  which 
would  prevent  any  return  of  the  conditions  that 
now  prevailed,  and  he  then  defined  the  essentials 
of  that  just  and  permanent  peace  for  which  France 
longs  and  which  it  is  determined  to  gain.  These 
conditions  were,  first,  the  complete  restitution  of 
invaded  French  territory,  whether  this  territory 
had  been  invaded  just  now  or  forty-six  years  ago; 
second,  reparation  for  violations  of  law  and  for 
injuries  done  to  citizens  of  France  or  its  allies; 
and,  third,  such  guarantees  as  might  be  necessary 
definitely  to  safeguard  the  national  independence 
in  the  future.  M.  Briand,  President  of  the  Council, 
has  more  than  once  reiterated  these  views.  They 
may,  therefore,  be  taken  as  an  official  statement 
of  the  terms  on  which,  and  on  which  alone,  France 
will  make  peace. 

Are  these  terms  unreasonable,  and  is  France 
justified  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  in  continuing  to 
the  bitter  end  the  struggle  to  secure  them  ? 

It  will  be  simplest  to  examine  these  three  pro- 
posed conditions  in  reverse  order  to  that  in  which 
they  are  stated  by  President  Poincar6. 

The  guarantees  for  the  future  to  which  the  Presi- 
dent refers  are  the  crux  of  the  whole  matter.  Sev- 
eral times  in  these  discussions  reference  has  been 
made  to  an  international  guarantee  of  national 
security  in  the  future,  and  in  due  time  the  question 
will  be  raised  as  to  how  this  international  guarantee 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      37 

may  be  secured  and  in  what  it  should  consist. 
France  is  certainly  entitled  to  the  protection  of 
this  guarantee.  It  can  and  should  be  the  same 
guarantee  that  will  protect  Belgiimi,  Serbia,  a 
reconstituted  Poland,  or  any  other  small  nation, 
as  well  as  Great  Britain,  Italy,  or  Germany  itself. 
In  this  respect,  then,  the  demand  of  France  is  one 
that  should  and  must  be  fairly  met. 

Then  France  demands  reparation  for  violations 
of  law  and  for  damage  done  to  her  citizens  and  their 
private  property,  as  well  as  to  those  of  her  allies. 
It  may  or  may  not  be  practicable  to  secure  at  the 
close  of  hostilities  and  as  part  of  the  settlement 
an  immediate  money  indemnity  from  Germany 
and  Austria-Htmgary  that  would  satisfy  those 
whose  territory  has  been  invaded  and  whose  citizens 
in  civil  life  have  been  killed  or  injured  and  their 
property  destroyed.  Whether  it  be  possible  or  not 
to  secure  such  an  immediate  money  indemnity, 
there  is  perhaps  a  better  way  in  which  to  gain  the 
end  which  France  properly  seeks.  It  might  readily 
be  provided  that  claims  of  this  kind  should  be 
submitted  to  an  impartial  International  Court  of 
Justice,  whose  findings  would  be  final.  The  evi- 
dence that  Germany  has  time  and  time  again 
violated  the  laws  of  war  and  the  provisions  of  the 
Hague  Conventions,  to  say  nothing  of  the  laws  of 
humanity,  is  quite  overwhelming.  It  is  just  be- 
cause this  evidence  is  so  overwhelming  that  those 
who  have  been  injured  can  afford,  in  the  interest 
of  a  durable  peace,  to  have  their  claims  judicially 


38      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

determined  rather  than  to  force  the  collection  of 
an  indemnity  by  sheer  weight  of  military  power. 
What  the  world  most  thinks  of  and  what  the  bellig- 
erents themselves  should  most  think  of  is  how  the 
settlement  of  this  conflict  is  to  affect  the  future  of 
mankind.  Where  there  are  two  ways  of  achieving 
the  same  end,  one  a  conventional  way  for  which 
there  are  many  precedents,  and  the  other  an  un- 
conventional way  which  seeks  to  set  an  example 
of  better  things,  then  the  same  spirit  which  has 
animated  and  directed  France  in  its  military  effort 
and  in  its  literally  colossal  work  of  national  or- 
ganization may  guide  it  to  choose  a  course  which 
will  most  certainly  help  to  define  and  to  secure 
the  ideals  for  which  it  has  been  carrying  on  this 
amazing  struggle. 

Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  horrors  and  atroc- 
ities of  the  present  war,  surely  one  of  its  most 
remarkable  by-products  is  its  effect  on  the  national 
mind,  the  national  conscience,  and  the  national 
will  of  France.  The  best  in  France  has  come  to 
the  surface  everywhere,  and  it  will  probably  never 
be  possible  for  the  nation  to  lose  the  good  effects 
and  the  stimulating  results  of  its  effort  to  maintain 
its  integrity  and  to  defend  its  liberty.  During  the 
epoch-making  days  at  Vienna  in  1815,  Talleyrand 
was  in  the  habit  of  describing  as  "a  good  Euro- 
pean," any  statesman  who  was  capable  of  conceiv- 
ing the  State  system  of  the  Western  World  as  a 
whole.  The  people  of  France  and  French  states- 
men generally  are  and  long  have  been  good  Euro- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DUIIABLE  PEACE      39 

peans  in  Talleyrand's  sense.  This  characteristic 
of  the  French  people  increases  the  likelihood  that 
they  will  throw  the  weight  of  their  great  influence 
and  example  in  favor  of  the  establishment,  on 
sound  foimdations,  of  a  new  European  order.  It 
was  their  own  Joubert  who  so  finely  said:  "Force 
and  Right  are  the  governors  of  this  world;  Force 
till  Right  is  ready." 

There  remains  the  restitution  of  French  territory 
which  is  or  may  be  occupied  by  the  enemy.  So  far 
as  concerns  those  northern  and  northeastern  de- 
partments which  are  at  the  moment  occupied  by 
German  military  forces,  the  matter  is  a  compara- 
tively simple  one.  Germany  will  assuredly  be  glad 
enough  to  retire  from  present  French  territory  as 
a  condition  of  peace.  The  question  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  however,  which  became  what  the  Ger- 
mans call  Reichsland  after  the  war  of  1870,  is  not 
quite  so  simple. 


VII 


THE  QUESTION  OF  ALSACE-LORRAINE THE  DECLARA- 
TIONS OF  187 1 — FAILURE  OF  GERMANY'S  POLICY 
OF   ASSIMILATION 

THERE  are  some  public  questions  which  are 
SO  wrapped  in  sentiment  that  they  cannot 
be  helpfully  treated  solely  from  the  stand- 
point of  abstract  argiiment.  The  future  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  distinctly  such  a  question.  For  forty- 
four  years  the  symbolic  statue  of  Strasbourg  in  the 
Place  de  la  Concorde,  surrounded  as  it  has  been  by 
pathetic  evidences  of  the  mournful  feeling  of  the 
French  people,  has  borne  eloquent  testimony  to 
this  fact.  Should  it  be  said  that  the  future  of  Al- 
sace-Lorraine is  to  be  settled  on  the  strict  principles 
of  nationality,  and  that  if  so  settled  the  issue  would 
be  in  large  part  favorable  to  France,  the  answer 
is  that  unless  France  herself  were  satisfied  there 
would  remain  planted  in  the  very  heart  of  Europe 
the  seeds  either  of  another  international  war  or  of 
long  generations  of  international  suspicion,  hostil- 
ity, and  imhappiness. 

In  1870  Mr.  Gladstone  supported  in  the  British 
Cabinet  the  view  that  the  transfer  of  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  from  French  to  German  sovereignty  with- 
out reference  to  the  populations  could  not  be  re- 
garded in  principle  as  a  question  between  the  two 
belligerents  only,  since  it  involved  considerations  of 

40 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      41 

legitimate  interest  to  all  the  Powers  of  Europe.  He 
pointed  out  its  bearing  upon  the  Belgian  question 
and  upon  those  principles  which  were  likely  to  be  of 
great  consequence  in  the  eventual  settlement  of  the 
Eastern  question. 

The  deputies  from  Alsace  and  Lorraine  who  had 
seats  in  the  French  National  Assembly  convoked 
at  Bordeaux  to  settle  terms  of  peace  with  Germany 
left  no  one  in  doubt  as  to  the  wishes  of  thoge  whom 
they  represented.  On  February  17,  1871,  these 
deputies  presented  to  the  National  Assembly  this 
ringing  declaration,  which  had  been  submitted  to 
Gambetta  and  which  had  the  approval  of  Victor 
Hugo,  Louis  Blanc,  Edgar  Quinet,  Clemenceau,  and 
other  leading  members  of  the  republican  party: 

Alsace  and  Lorraine  are  opposed  to  alienation.  ,  .  . 
These  two  provinces,  associated  with  France  for  more  than 
two  centuries  in  good  and  in  evil  fortune,  and  constantly  ex- 
posed to  hostile  attack,  have  consistently  sacrificed  them- 
selves in  the  cause  of  national  greatness.  They  have  sealed 
with  their  blood  the  indissoluble  compact  that  binds  them 
to  French  unity.  Under  the  present  menace  of  foreign  pre- 
tensions, they  affirm  their  unshakable  fideHty  in  the  face 
of  all  obstacles  and  dangers,  even  imder  the  yoke  of  the  in- 
vader. With  one  accord  citizens  who  have  remained  in  their 
homes,  as  well  as  soldiers  who  have  hastened  to  join  the 
colors,  proclaim,  the  former  by  their  votes  and  the  latter 
by  their  action  in  the  field,  to  Germany  and  to  the  world 
the  unalterable  determination  of  Alsace  and  of  Lorraine  to 
remain  French  territory.  France  cannot  consent  to  or  de- 
termine by  treaty  the  cession  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  .  .  . 
We  now  proclaim  as  forever  inviolable  the  right  of  Alsatians 
and  Lorrainers  to  remain  members  of  the  French  nation, 


42      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

and  we  pledge  ourselves,  our  compatriots,  our  children,  and 
our  children's  children,  to  vindicate  that  right  through  all 
time  and  by  all  possible  ways  in  the  face  of  those  who  usurp 
authority  over  us. 

Nevertheless  the  National  Assembly,  under  the 
constraint  of  overwhelming  military  defeat,  accepted 
the  treaty  of  peace  on  March  i. 

It  was  a  solemn  and  pathetic  moment  when,  be- 
fore withdrawing  from  the  National  Assembly,  the 
deputies  from  Alsace  and  from  Lorraine  read  out 
their  famous  Protest  of  Bordeaux:  , 

We,  who,  in  defiance  of  all  justice,  have  been  given  over 
by  an  odious  abuse  of  power  to  foreign  domination,  have  a 
last  duty  to  perform.  We  declare  a  compact  which  disposes 
of  us  without  our  consent  null  and  void.  It  will  ever  remain 
open  to  each  and  all  of  us  to  claim  our  rights  in  such  manner 
and  in  such  measure  as  conscience  shall  dictate.  .  .  .  Our 
brothers  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  now  cut  off  from  the  com- 
mon family,  will  preserve  their  filial  affection  for  the  France 
now  absent  from  their  homes  until  the  day  when  she  re- 
turns to  take  her  place  there  again. 

At  a  moment's  notice  intelligent  populations 
which  had  been  French  for  centuries,  and  whose 
French  patriotism  and  loyalty  were  most  fervent, 
were  compelled  to  accept  a  new  sovereignty  and  to 
assent,  in  form  at  least,  to  a  new  allegiance. 

Germany  mistmderstood  from  the  first  the  nature 
and  extent  of  her  self-imposed  task.  It  was  the  com- 
mon belief  among  Germans  that  the  loyalty  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  France  was  in  large  part  superficial,  and 
that  the  beneficent  effects  of  German  rule  would  be 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      43 

so  great  and  so  obvious  that  the  populations  of  these 
provinces  would,  in  a  short  time,  willingly  adjust 
themselves  to  the  new  conditions.  The  elder  von 
Moltke,  whose  optimism  was  not  quite  so  unre- 
strained as  that  of  some  others,  thought  that  Ger- 
many would  have  to  remain  ftdly  armed  for  fifty 
years  in  order  to  retain  Alsace,  but  that  at  the  end 
of  that  period  the  Alsatians  would  cease  to  wish  to 
be  Frenchmen  and  the  question  would  thus  be  solved. 
Time  has  proved  that  the  fears  of  Bismarck,  the 
statesman,  as  to  the  wisdom  of  this  annexation  were 
better  justified  than  the  confidence  of  von  Moltke, 
the  strategist. 

The  fifty  years  have  nearly  passed.  The  policy 
of  semi-military  occupation  and  of  stem  repression 
has  produced  the  natural,  but  not  the  expected,  re- 
sults. There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
great  body  of  the  population  of  Alsace  and  of  Lor- 
raine eagerly  await  the  day  when  these  provinces 
will  be  restored  to  their  place  in  the  French  Republic. 

There  is  little  to  be  gained  from  following  the 
course  of  learned  historical  discussions  as  to  matters 
five  hundred  or  even  a  thousand  years  old  in  the  his- 
tory of  this  territory.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  if  appeal 
be  made  to  history,  then  it  must  be  admitted  that 
away  back  in  the  Middle  Ages  Alsace,  although 
speaking  a  Germanic  dialect,  was  within  the  range 
of  the  influence  and  under  the  domination  of  French 
culture.  It  is  probably  the  case  that  the  Gothic 
artists  who  built  the  cathedral  at  Strasbourg  either 
came  from  the  He  de  France  or  had  gained  their 


44      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

inspiration  there.  Politically  speaking,  this  terri- 
tory had  been  for  hundreds  of  years  an  object  of 
continual  strife  between  the  nations  which  it  was 
supposed  to  hold  safely  apart.  It  was  in  the  very 
dubious  and  dangerous  position  of  a  small  buffer 
state  at  a  time  when  the  impulse  to  territorial  ex- 
pansion and  to  the  extension  of  dynastic  authority 
ran  strong  and  high.  When  at  the  close  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  Alsace  sought  protection  from  a 
more  powerful  state  than  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
had  shown  itself  to  be,  it  came  imder  the  protection 
of  France  at  the  request  of  its  own  people.  The 
French  Revolution  and  its  accompanying  wars  com- 
pleted the  incorporation  of  Alsace  in  France  and 
solidified  in  many  ways  the  political  relationship  al- 
ready a  century  and  a  half  old. 

There  is  Httle  use  in  threshing  over  old  straw  now, 
but  the  forcible  wresting  of  Alsace-Lorraine  from 
France  in  187 1  was  a  public  injury  which  must  now 
be  repaired  in  the  only  way  that  it  can  be  repaired, 
namely,  by  the  return  of  these  provinces  to  France 
where  they  belong  and  where  they  wish  to  be.  This 
is,  as  Mr.  Gladstone  said,  a  matter  which  affects 
the  interests  not  of  France  and  of  Germany  alone, 
but  those  of  all  Europe  and  indeed  of  the  whole  world. 

The  war  of  1870  had  two  immediate  results:  one, 
the  unification  of  Germany,  which  was  a  good  result ; 
the  second,  the  separation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  from 
France,  which  was  an  evil  resiilt.  He  would  be  a 
hardy  man  who  to-day  would  claim  that  the  holding 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  Reichsland  has  contributed  to 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      45 

German  unity,  and  he  would  be  a  blind  man  who 
could  not  see  that  if  a  durable  peace  is  to  follow  this 
war,  then  Alsace-Lorraine  must  go  back  to  France. 
As  to  this,  appeal  might  be  made  to  Treitschke  him- 
self, for  in  speaking  of  Napoleon's  policy  of  world 
conquest  he  said :  ' '  Such  a  naked  policy  of  conquest 
in  the  long  run  destroys  its  own  instruments.  .  .  . 
It  presumes  to  take  possession  of  countries  which 
cannot  be  fitted  into  the  national  state  as  living 
members." 

One  need  go  no  farther  to  find  a  justification  of 
the  demand  of  France  for  the  return  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine. If  and  when  they  finally  admit  defeat  on  the 
field  of  battle,  Germany  and  her  allies  assent  to  the 
return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  they  will  have 
given  the  strongest  possible  evidence,  which  the 
world  will  heartily  welcome,  of  their  desire  and  in- 
tention to  assist  in  making  and  in  preserving  a  peace 
that  will  be  durable  because  it  is  just.  It  is  futile  to 
suggest  as  an  alternative  the  incorporation  of  Al- 
sace-Lorraine in  the  German  Empire  with  rights 
of  autonomy.  It  is  equally  futile  to  propose  to  ob- 
literate and  to  overturn  old  geographical  and  polit- 
ical distinctions  and  landmarks  by  some  new  align- 
ment of  communities.  It  is  futile,  too,  to  suggest 
that  Alsace-Lorraine  be  erected  into  an  independent 
state  whose  neutrality  would  be  guaranteed  by  her 
neighbors.  All  these  are  ways  of  not  dealing  with 
the  problem.  In  the  interest,  and  as  part,  of  a  dur- 
able peace  Germany  must  yield  back  Alsace-Lor- 
raine to  France. 


VIII 

RUSSIA  AND  THE  SLAVS — THE  LIBERAL  MOVEMENT 
IN  RUSSIA THE  BOSPORUS  AND  THE  DAR- 
DANELLES ^ 

TO  the  Western  World,  and  to  Americans  in 
partictilar,  Russia  seems  a  far-away  land.  It 
is  a  land  of  mystery.  Its  huge  size,  its  geo- 
graphic uniformity,  its  phenomenal  natural  re- 
sources, its  heterogeneous  populations,  its  many 
and  difficult  languages  and  dialects,  its  tmusual 
calendar,  and  its  strong  religious  feeling  all  give 
it  a  character  of  its  own.  Occupying  more  than 
one-sixth  of  the  globe's  land  surface,  Russia  con- 
stitutes a  twentieth-century  bridge  between  the 
older  East  and  the  newer  West,  and  it  combines 
in  itself  striking  characteristics  of  both  Orient  and 
Occident. 

Stirrings  in  the  body  or  in  the  limbs  of  this  huge 
leviathan  are  long  in  being  recognized  and  still 
longer  in  being  understood  by  the  outside  world. 
Russia's  participation  in  this  war  and  her  direct  re- 
lation to  one  of  the  most  important  questions  that 
the  war  must  settle,  make  it  necessary  to  gain  some 
notion  of  the  part  which  she  is  likely  to  play  in  the 
world  of  the  future  and  of  what  the  results  of  this 
war  may  bring  to  her. 

The   Latin,   the  Anglo-Saxon,    and   the   Teuton 

46 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      47 

have  made  their  distinctive  contributions  to  our 
common  civilization,  and  it  is  already  possible  to 
appraise  them  with  some  definiteness.  The  Slav, 
however,  has  yet  to  make  his  full  contribution  to 
the  general  store  of  the  world's  intellectual  and 
political  capital.  Significant  words  were  spoken 
by  Count  Moiu"avieff  when  he  said:  "I  believe 
that  Russia  has  a  civilizing  mission  such  as  no  other 
people  in  the  world,  not  only  in  Asia,  but  also  in 
Europe.  .  .  .  We  Russians  bear  upon  our  shoulders 
the  new  age;  we  come  to  relieve  the  tired  men." 
This  is  a  fine  picture  and  a  stirring  prophecy. 

The  present  war  has  not  only  put  hopelessly 
out  of  date  the  various  arguments  and  considera- 
tions that  have  for  a  century  been  brought  to  bear 
on  what  Europe  knows  as  the  Eastern  question, 
but  it  has  forced  to  the  front  with  striking  clearness 
the  one  dominant  fact  that,  in  the  interest  of  a 
durable  peace,  Russia  must  control  the  straits 
which  lead  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  .^gean. 
Not  to  give  this  control  to  Russia  woiild  mean, 
first,  that  her  people,  restless  and  in  large  part 
economically  ice-boimd,  would  not  feel  that  the 
conditions  of  peace  were  permanent;  and,  second, 
it  would  mean  the  possibility  of  the  extension  at 
any  future  moment  of  Germany's  political  system 
and  Machtpolitik  to  the  Balkan  Peninstda,  to  Asia 
Minor,  and  beyond.  It  is  just  because  these  facts 
are  clearly  imderstood  by  the  Allies  that  military 
and  naval  operations  have  been,  and  are  being, 
carried  on  in  the  southeastern  theatre  of  war.    The 


48      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

importance  which  Germany  and  her  allies  attach 
to  them  is  made  evident  by  the  fact  that  com- 
manders of  the  high  competence  of  Falkenhayn 
and  Mackensen  are  conducting  in  person  the  opera- 
tions against  Riimania. 

It  has  more  than  once  been  hinted  that  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  holds  the  conviction  that  some  day 
the  world  will  divide  itself  into  two  great  camps, 
the  one  speaking  the  Slavonic  and  the  other  speak- 
ing the  Anglo-Saxon  and  Germanic  tongues,  and 
that  the  great  yellow  races  of  the  East  will  join 
the  Slavs  and  so  bring  the  world  face  to  face  with 
a  contest  between  two  widely  different  and  his- 
torically opposed  civilizations.  If  this  was  a  shrewd 
forecast  ten  years  ago,  it  is  far  less  likely  now. 
Russia  is  increasingly  Western  in  thought  and  in 
domestic  policy.  The  rigid  censorship,  more  severe 
than  ever  since  the  outbreak  of  war,  keeps  from 
us  an  exact  or  complete  knowledge  of  what  is  tak- 
ing place  in  the  political  and  social  order  of  the  Rus- 
sian Empire.  It  would  be  no  less  cruel  than  igno- 
rant to  suppose  that  Russia  is  a  nation  given  over 
entirely  to  corrupt  officials  and  to  a  barbarous  police, 
to  irreconcilable  socialists  and  to  lawbreaking  an- 
archists. Catherine,  who  in  this  respect  played  for 
Russia  somewhat  the  same  part  that  Frederick  the 
Great  did  for  Prussia,  introduced  into  Russian  life 
and  thought  some  of  the  personal,  literary,  and 
philosophical  influences  which  aided  so  effectively 
in  bringing  on  the  French  Revolution.  These  in- 
fluences have  been  at  work  in  Russia  ever  since. 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      49 

They  have  been  colored  and  modified  by  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  conditions  prevailing  there,  and  they 
have  taken  on  some  of  that  sombreness  and  senti- 
ment which  are  revealed  in  Russian  literature,  Rus- 
sian art,  and  Russian  music.  The  progress  of  in- 
ternal political  development  has  assuredly  been  slow, 
and  it  has  met  with  many  and  hard  setbacks,  but 
with  the  traditional  forms  of  local  self-government 
to  build  upon  it  has  in  later  years  made  some  sub- 
stantial advances.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that 
the  events  and  necessities  of  the  war  have  aided  this 
movement  materially,  and  it  is  more  than  probable 
that  when  Russia  unites  with  her  allies  in  establish- 
ing the  terms  of  a  durable  peace  she  will,  at  the  same 
time,  be  able  to  announce  significant  changes  in  her 
internal  organization  and  policies. 

Those  who  have  not  known  Russia  may  take 
encouragement  from  the  recent  words  of  M.  B. 
Bourtzeff,  active  and  influential  in  every  Russian 
progressive  movement.  "Even  we,"  he  wrote, 
"the  adherents  of  the  parties  of  the  Extreme  Left, 
and  hitherto  ardent  anti-militarists  and  pacifists, 
even  we  believe  in  the  necessity  of  this  war.  This 
war  is  a  war  to  protect  justice  and  civilization.  It 
will,  we  hope,  be  a  decisive  factor  in  our  united 
war  against  war,  and  we  hope  that,  after  it,  it  will 
at  last  be  possible  to  consider  seriously  the  ques- 
tion of  disarmament  and  of  universal  peace.  .  .  . 
To  Russia  this  war  will  bring  regeneration.  We 
are  convinced  that  after  this  war  there  will  no 
longer  be  any  room  for  political  reaction,  and  Rus- 


50     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

sia  will  be  associated  with  the  existing  group  of 
cultured  and  civilized  countries." 

The  Tsar's  manifesto  of  October  30,  1905,  fur- 
nishes the  point  of  departure  for  further  prog- 
ress in  the  development  and  definition  of  Russian 
civil  liberty.  The  first  article  of  that  manifesto 
reads:  "The  poptilation  is  to  be  given  the  inviolable 
foimdation  of  civil  rights  based  on  the  actual  in- 
violability of  the  person,  freedom  of  belief,  of  speech, 
of  organization,  and  of  meeting."  It  will,  therefore, 
in  all  likelihood  be  a  more  unified,  a  more  vigorous, 
as  well  as  a  freer  and  a  more  tolerant  Russia  that 
will  emerge  from  the  present  conflict.  Prince 
Gorchakof  once  said:  "La  Russie  ne  boude  pas; 
elle  se  recueille."  A  kindly  and  sympathetic  world 
hopefully  awaits  the  result. 

It  has  been  said  of  the  Eastern  question  that  it 
has  as  many  heads  as  a  hydra.  The  present  war 
has  been  the  Hercules  which  has  cut  off  all  these 
heads  but  three.  These  three  remaining  heads  are: 
first,  the  organization  of  the  peoples  of  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  on  the  basis  of  nationality  imder  an 
international  guarantee  of  their  national  security; 
second,  the  erection  of  a  barrier  against  the  pos- 
sible extension  of  German  Machtpolitik  to  Asia 
Minor  and  its  adjoining  lands  and  seas — the  Drang 
nach  Osten — and,  third,  the  possession  of  the  Bos- 
porus, the  Dardanelles,  and  the  adjoining  shores 
by  Russia  as  a  necessary  element  of  her  economic 
independence  and  her  national  security. 

The  first  of  these  topics  need  not  be  further  dis- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      51 

cussed.  It  is  covered  by  what  has  already  been 
said  as  to  the  application  of  the  principles  of  na- 
tionality and  the  protection  of  the  rights  of  small 
nations.  The  second  is  one  of  the  necessary  results 
of  the  present  war.  From  one,  and  a  very  im- 
portant, point  of  view  the  Allies  are  fighting,  not 
the  German  people,  but  to  prevent  the  extension 
over  other  lands  and  other  peoples  of  those  polit- 
ical theories,  doctrines,  and  practices  which  the 
German  people  have  for  the  time  at  least  made 
their  own.  If  there  is  to  be  a  durable  peace,  and 
one  which  will  justify  the  sacrifices  that  the  Allies 
have  already  made,  then  every  door  to  a  syste- 
matic and  studied  extension  of  Germany's  political 
influence  must  of  necessity  be  locked.  In  Germany 
this  suggestion  will  be  denounced  as  one  more 
example  of  the  Einkreisungspolitik  from  which  she 
has  already  suffered  so  much.  It  must,  however, 
be  borne  in  mind  that  in  these  discussions  all  pos- 
sible emphasis  has  been  laid  upon  the  maintenance 
of  the  open  door  in  international  trade.  German 
trade,  therefore,  would  be  in  no  wise  hampered  if 
these  suggestions  were  followed,  but  the  active 
propaganda  in  other  countries  on  behalf  of  Ger- 
man political  ideas  and  German  political  control 
would  be  stopped.  This  policy  would  remove  the 
greatest  present  cause  of  war  without  introducing 
a  new  one  to  take  its  place. 

The  third  topic  appears  to  be  vital  to  Russia 
and,  therefore,  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  A  glance 
at  the  map  and  a  modest  knowledge  of  political 


52      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

and  economic  history  will  explain  the  persistence  of 
Russia  in  seeking  access  to  the  seas  at  points  that 
are  open  to  navigation  throughout  the  year.  From 
her  central  plains  she  has  thrown  out  three  arms  or 
tentacles,  one  of  prodigious  length,  with  a  view  to 
the  uninterrupted  use  of  the  ocean  highways  by 
her  commerce.  The  Trans-Siberian  Railway  has 
been  thrown  across  the  steppes  of  Asia  in  order 
to  reach  the  Pacific.  Russia's  diplomacy  in  regard 
to  Persia,  to  British  India,  and  to  Turkey  has 
steadily  had  in  mind  to  secure  an  outlet  to  the 
waters  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  third  arm  or 
tentacle  is  reaching  out  through  the  Black  Sea  to 
the  Bosporus  and  the  Dardanelles.  With  Russia 
established  there,  under  the  international  condi- 
tions which  these  discussions  propose,  her  economic 
independence  would  be  secure,  the  world's  sources 
of  food  supply  would  be  greatly  increased,  and  the 
principles  for  which  the  Allies  are  fighting  would 
gain  a  material  guarantee  of  the  first  importance. 

It  is  already  assumed  in  Russia  that  both  Eng- 
land and  France  will  agree,  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  war,  to  the  annexation  by  Russia  both  of  Con- 
stantinople and  of  the  adjoining  straits.  In  March, 
1 91 5,  the  important  liberal  journal  of  Moscow, 
Russkia  Viidomosti,  published  an  article  by  Prince 
Eugene  Troubetzkoi,  which  is  known  to  have 
exercised  a  very  strong  influence  in  Russia,  and  to 
have  given  expression  to  the  prevailing  opinion 
among  all  classes  in  the  empire.  Prince  Troubetzkoi 
flatly  says  that  the  only  solution  which  fairly  meets 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      53 

the  nation's  interests  is  that  Constantinople  and  the 
straits  should  become  Russian.  A  like  opinion  has 
been  expressed  by  M.  Milioukoff,  whose  leading 
position  among  the  Russian  Liberals  is  well  known. 
It  would  appear,  then,  that  before  long  some  of 
the  most  serious  blunders  of  both  British  and  Rus- 
sian diplomacy  in  the  nineteenth  century  may  be 
remedied  and  the  whole  worid  be  the  gainer  there- 
by. Mr.  Gladstone  assailed  Lord  Beaconsfield  and 
Lord  Salisbury  for  having  spoken  at  the  Berlin 
Congress  in  1878  in  the  tones  of  Mettemich,  and 
not  in  the  tones  of  Mr.  Canning,  of  Lord  Palmerston, 
and  of  Lord  Russell.  He  insisted  that  their  voice 
was  not  heard  in  unison  with  the  institutions,  the 
history,  and  the  character  of  England.  Was  he 
wrong  ? 


IX 


PRUSSIAN    MILITARISM — ITS    BASIS    AND    ITS    CAUSE 

HOW     FAR     IT     MAY     BE     CONTROLLED     BY     CON- 
QUEST 

THE  ground  that  has  now  been  traversed  in- 
cludes the  outline  of  a  settlement  of  the 
issues  of  the  war  that  would  secure  the  free 
national  development  of  every  state  whether  great 
or  small,  the  policy  of  the  open  door  in  international 
trade,  the  exemption  of  private  property  at  sea, 
other  than  contraband,  from  capture  or  destruction, 
and  that  would  restore  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France 
as  well  as  make  Russia  mistress  of  the  Dardanelles 
and  the  Bosporus.  There  is  one  other  subject 
mentioned  by  Mr.  Asquith  in  his  Guildhall  Declara- 
tion, but  not  referred  to  by  Viscoimt  Grey,  which  is 
constantly  in  the  minds  of  the  Allies,  and  which 
never  fails  to  be  mentioned  when  conditions  of  a 
lasting  peace  are  discussed.  In  Mr.  Asquith's  own 
words:  "We  shall  never  sheathe  the  sword,  which  we 
have  not  lightly  drawn,  .  .  .  until  the  miHtary 
domination  of  Prussia  is  wholly  and  finally  de- 
stroyed." Mr.  Asquith  chooses  his  words,  and  par- 
ticularly his  adjectives  and  adverbs,  with  more 
scruptilous  care  than  any  other  statesman  of  our 
time.  His  statement,  therefore,  is  of  primary  im- 
portance. 

Prussian   military    domination    rests   first    upon 

54 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      55 

Prussia's  military  policy  and  its  fixed  habit  of 
thinking  of  all  questions  of  foreign  policy  in  terms 
of  military  power  and  of  that  alone,  as  well  as  upon 
the  vast  population  of  the  German  Empire  which 
supplies  the  needed  men  to  keep  in  effective  organi- 
zation huge  armies  ready  to  move  at  command.  The 
fact  that  Prussia  has  a  system  of  universal  training 
and  universal  military  service  has  little  or  noth- 
ing to  do  with  its  military  domination.  Switzerland 
has  substantially  the  same  thing,  and  no  one  thinks 
of  the  Swiss  as  other  than  a  people  devoted  to  the 
ways  of  peace.  A  Swiss  army  of  the  same  size  as 
that  of  Prussia  woidd  not  give  to  Switzerland  the 
military  domination  which  Prussia  has  imtil  just 
now  enjoyed.  The  reason  is  that  military  domina- 
tion does  not  consist  chiefly,  or  indeed  at  all,  in 
potential  military  power,  but  rather  in  the  attitude 
of  the  public  mind  toward  the  military  system  and 
the  army,  and  in  the  relative  importance  assigned 
to  force  and  to  right  in  weighing  and  deciding  upon 
matters  of  international  policy.  In  other  words, 
militarism  is  a  state  of  mind.  Prussian  militarism 
is  a  Prussian  state  of  mind,  and  in  so  far  as  the  Ger- 
man people  as  a  whole  have  accepted  the  Prussian 
state  of  mind  as  a  sound  or  as  a  necessary  one  Ger- 
many is  just  now  a  militaristic  nation.  Of  course, 
this  was  not  always  so.  The  South  German  people 
from  time  immemorial  have  been  poets  and  artists, 
kindly  and  gentle  in  their  manners  and  without 
overruling  ambitions  to  conquer  and  to  reform  the 
world.     The   Prussian  hegemony,   while   certainly 


56      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

necessary  to  bring  about  and  to  insure  German 
unity,  has  brought  not  a  few  evils  in  its  train.  One 
of  the  chief  of  these  is  the  extension  to  the  South 
German  folk  of  the  Prussian  point  of  view  together 
with  Prussian  leadership. 

The  history  of  Prussia  is  a  record  of  extraordinary 
success  in  making  the  most  of  a  meagre  beginning, 
and  in  extending  Prussian  rule  by  sheer  force  of 
will,  might,  and  administrative  effectiveness.  Prus- 
sia may  well  be  proud  of  her  accomplishment  dur- 
ing the  past  hundred  years,  both  in  creating  a  new 
and  highly  efficient  administrative  system  and  in 
extending  her  influence  and  rule  over  other  members 
of^the  Germanic  family.  Prussia  has  always  been  a 
militaristic  state,  and  has  never  put  off  the  military 
uniform  even  when  creating  and  developing  a  stu- 
pendous industrial  and  commercial  system.  Prussia 
has  always  conceived  of  history  as  a  struggle  between 
either  the  Teuton  and  the  Slav,  the  Teuton  and  the 
Frank,  the  Teuton  and  the  Anglo-Saxon,  or  the 
Teuton  and  somebody  else.  She  always  thinks  of 
the  Teuton  as  fighting.  She  studies  her  neighbors 
not  in  terms  of  friendship  and  co-operation,  but  in 
terms  of  rivalry  and  fear.  These  have  always  been 
the  characteristics  of  Prussia;  and  as  the  modem 
European  system  developed,  and  Prussian  thought 
came  imder  the  control  of  a  new  and  almost  ecstatic 
political  philosophy  which  placed  Prussia  at  the 
pinnacle  of  history's  greatness,  sharply  marked  off 
by  its  inherent  superiority  from  the  remaining 
world,  it  was  but  a  short  step  to  the  conviction, 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      57 

perfectly  sincere,  that  it  wotdd  be  good  for  the  re- 
maining world  to  be  brought  under  the  domination 
of  the  Prussian  political  philosophy.  To  a  normal 
Prussian  the  army  seemed  the  best  and  most  nat- 
ural agent  for  use  in  this  process  of  world  salvation. 
Men  otherwise  sober  and  self-contained,  scholars 
otherwise  learned  and  highly  trained,  men  of  af- 
fairs otherwise  practical  and  shrewd  to  the  point  of 
cunning,  became  enamoured  of  the  vista  which  was 
thus  spread  out  before  them.  When  Houston  Cham- 
berlain told  the  Prussians  that  they  were  the  modem 
elect,  his  tribute  was  received  as  a  matter  of  course 
and  as  being  fully  deserved.  To  the  onlooker  there 
is  in  all  this  an  absence  of  saving  humor  to  a  degree 
that  is  almost  incredible;  nevertheless  it  is  the  com- 
bination of  Prussian  history,  Prussian  pride,  Prus- 
sian political  philosophy,  and  Prussian  lack  of  humor 
that  has  created  what  is  known  as  Prussian  militar- 
ism. It  is  this  curiously  composite  and  elusive  but 
yet  terribly  real  thing  which  Mr.  Asquith  demands 
shall  be  brought  to  an  end. 

How  can  this  be  done  ?  Prussian  miHtary  domina- 
tion is  ended  as  far  as  the  rest  of  the  world  is  con- 
cerned when  the  German  armies  are  defeated,  and 
when  the  military  force  of  the  Allies  proves  itself 
adequate  not  only  to  restrain  the  German  armies 
from  further  advance,  but  to  drive  them  back  upon 
their  own  territory  broken  and  defeated.  This, 
however,  can  hardly  be  the  whole  of  the  end  which 
Mr.  Asquith  has  in  mind.  So  far  as  Prussian  mili- 
tarism is  a  menace  to  Europe  because  of  its  power, 


58      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

its  zeal,  and  its  determination  in  attack,  it  can  and 
will  be  restrained  by  the  outcome  of  this  war.  In 
so  far,  however,  as  Prussian  militarism  is  a  state  of 
mind  it  cannot  be  exorcised  by  any  forcible  process 
whatsoever.  It  can  be  got  rid  of  only  by  a  change 
of  heart  on  the  part  of  the  German  people  themselves. 
Herein  lies  the  hope  of  the  future  and  herein  is  an 
essential  element  of  a  durable  peace. 

There  is  an  analogy  which  Americans  should  not 
overlook  between  the  condition  in  which  Prussia  will, 
according  to  all  signs,  shortly  find  itself  and  the  con- 
dition in  which  the  Southern  States  of  the  American 
Union  were  left  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War.  Though 
defeated  on  the  field  of  battle,  the  leaders  of  South- 
em  opinion  and  the  men  and  women  of  the  South 
generally  never  changed  their  minds  as  to  the  jus- 
tice and  correctness  of  the  cause  for  which  they 
fought  so  bravely.  For  a  whole  generation  after  Ap- 
pomattox they  spoke  of  "the  lost  cause,"  and  while 
they  admitted  the  cause  was  lost,  they  continued  to 
insist  that  it  had  been  just.  After  fifty  years  con- 
ditions have  so  changed  that  all  this  is  largely  a 
matter  of  history.  Men  who  fought  face  to  face  in 
the  opposing  armies  can,  and  often  do,  discuss  with 
the  utmost  calmness  and  in  the  friendliest  possible 
spirit  the  causes  and  issues  of  the  conflict  that  shook 
the  Union  to  its  foundations  from  1861-5.  The 
lesson  would  appear  to  be  that  when  Germany  is 
defeated  she  will  not  of  necessity — and,  indeed,  prob- 
ably will  not  at  all — change  her  mind  as  to  the  cor- 
rectness of  her  position  in  this  war  and  as  to  the  jus- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      59 

tice  of  her  cause.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  the  South, 
after  a  half-century  has  passed  this  will  be  only  a 
matter  of  academic  discussion  and  debate.  Prussian 
militarism  will  be  overthrown  so  far  as  the  Allies' 
armies  can  overthrow  it  when  Germany  is  brought 
to  join  in  arrangements  for  a  durable  peace  on  the 
basis  of  justice. 

The  German  people  themselves  must  do  the  rest. 
It  is  probably  true  that  whatever  may  have  been 
the  German  Emperor's  personal  preferences  in  July, 
1914,  this  war  would  never  have  taken  place  had 
the  revolutionary  movement  of  1848  resulted  differ- 
ently in  Germany.  The  failtue  of  that  movement, 
involving  as  it  did  the  emigration  to  America  of  a 
considerable  body  of  German  Liberals  and  the  slow 
elimination  from  German  public  life  of  that  power- 
ful and  constructive  type  of  Liberal  found  in  every 
other  European  country,  left  Germany  without  the 
strong  impulse  toward  democratic  policies  which  the 
revolution  of  1688  gave  to  England  and  the  revolu- 
tion of  1789  to  France.  With  the  disappearance  of 
the  German  Liberal  the  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  ultra-Conservative  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
advanced  Socialist  on  the  other  became  increasingly 
sharp,  and  under  the  benign  possibilities  of  the  Prus- 
sian electoral  system  and  of  the  Imperial  German 
Constitution  the  power  of  the  ultra-Conservative 
element  has  been  maintained  even  in  the  face  of  a 
large  increase  in  the  number  of  Socialists.  It  is  this 
ultra-Conservative  element  in  Germany,  with  its 
dominant  philosophy  of  life  and  of  politics,  that  has 


6o     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

come  into  conflict  with  the  Uberal  nations  of  the 
Western  World.  Just  as  Napoleon  by  the  sheer 
force  of  his  personality  and  his  military  genius 
gathered  into  his  own  hands  for  twenty  years  all 
the  power  and  the  energy  of  post-revolutionary 
France,  so  the  ultra-Conservative  Prussian  has 
gathered  into  his  hands  for  more  than  twenty  years 
all  the  power  and  energy  of  non-revolutionized  Ger- 
many. 

Following  Waterloo,  Napoleon's  throne  quickly 
tottered  and  fell.  After  a  few  years  of  stagnation 
and  reaction  France  resumed  its  forward  post- 
revolutionary  progress  until  it  became  the  French 
Republic  of  to-day.  A  similar  development  doubt- 
less lies  before  Prussia  and  the  German  people. 
They  themselves  must  determine  what  the  form 
and  the  spirit  of  their  own  government  are  to  be, 
and  no  other  nation  or  group  of  nations,  however 
completely  victorious,  can  undertake  to  change 
it  for  them  without  throwing  away  the  very  prin- 
ciples for  which  the  war  is  being  waged  by  them. 
The  victory  over  Prussian  militarism  considered 
as  a  state  of  mind,  and  the  making  over  of  non- 
revolutionized  Germany  into  a  more  liberal  and 
more  democratic  state,  are  tasks  for  the  German  peo- 
ple themselves.  There  is  no  compulsory  road  to  re- 
pentance. It  is  incredible  that  a  people  of  their 
intellectual  force,  discipline,  power  of  organization, 
and  scientific  competence  should  not  in  due  time 
view  the  democratic  movement  precisely  as  France 
and  Great  Britain  have  viewed  it.    When  this  comes 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      6i 

about,  Germany  will  displace  her  Machtpolitik  for 
the  Interessenpolitik  upon  which  Bismarck  laid  such 
constant  stress.  She  will,  to  use  another  of  Bis- 
marck's striking  phrases,  again  justly  measure  "das 
Gewicht  der  Imponderabilien,"  and  moral  law  will 
be  recognized  as  applying  to  the  conduct  of  her 
public  policies  as  weU  as  to  that  of  her  private  life. 

It  is  true  that  Prussian  militarism  must  be  wholly 
and  finally  destroyed  before  the  peace  of  the  world 
will  be  really  secure,  but  inasmuch  as  it  can  only  be 
wholly  and  finally  destroyed  by  the  German  people 
themselves,  the  war  need  not  be  continued  until 
that  end  is  accomplished.  All  that  the  Allies  can 
do  toward  the  destruction  of  Prussian  military 
domination  is  to  confine  it  to  Germany.  When  so 
confined  it  will  disappear  not  slowly,  but  relatively 
fast  by  reason  of  its  own  weight  and  untimeliness. 

There  is,  however,  one  way  in  which  Prussian 
militarism  might  emerge  victorious  even  if  the  Ger- 
man armies  are  finally  defeated  on  the  field  of  bat- 
tle— that  is,  if  the  spirit  and  policies  of  Prussian 
militarism  should  conquer  the  mind  of  Great  Britain 
or  that  of  any  other  allied  Power.  A  Hymn  of 
Hate  is  as  unlovely  when  sung  in  English  as  when 
stmg  in  German.  The  destruction  of  liberal  policies 
and  practices  under  the  guise  of  national  necessity 
differs  but  little  from  "die  Not  kennt  kein  Gebot," 
with  which  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  de- 
fended the  ravishing  of  Belgium.  The  Allies,  and 
particularly  Great  Britain,  have  urgent  need  to  be 
on  their  guard  that  when  they  are  defeating  Prus- 


62      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

sian  militarism  on  the  field  of  battle,  it  does  not  gain 
new  and  striking  victories  over  them  in  the  field  of 
ideas.  A  durable  peace  requires  that  Prussian  mili- 
tarism be  wholly  and  finally  destroyed;  first,  by  the 
allied  armies  in  the  field;  second,  by  the  German 
people  in  their  domestic  policies;  and,  third,  by  the 
allied  Powers  in  keeping  it  from  invading  their  own 
political  systems. 


X 


THE  FUNDAMENTAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  A  NEW  INTER- 
NATIONAL ORDER — THE  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF 
NATIONS — THE  INTERNATIONAL  MIND — INTER- 
NATIONAL LAW  AS   NATIONAL  LAW 

4  FTER  what  has  gone  before,  it  is  not  neces- 
r\  sary  to  pass  in  extended  review  those  as- 
pects of  a  durable  peace  which  are  of  most 
immediate  concern  to  Italy  and  to  what  may, 
without  disrespect,  be  termed  the  other  minor 
belligerent  Powers.  If  it  is  reasonable  to  expect 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  to  make  their 
own  the  principles  and  policies  already  laid  down, 
and  if  it  is  also  reasonable  to  expect  Germany  to 
accept  them — save  in  so  far  as  the  giving  up  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  the  assi^mption  by 
Russia  of  jiuisdiction  over  the  Bosporus  and  the 
Dardanelles,  and  the  restriction  of  what  is  called 
Prussian  militarism  to  the  German  Empire,  there 
to  be  dealt  with  by  the  German  people  in  their 
own  way  and  in  their  own  time,  are  compulsory  as 
the  price  of  peace  when  the  military  victory  of  the 
Allies  is  admitted — then  it  is  time  to  consider  the 
foundations  of  a  new  international  order  sanctioned 
and  protected  by  international  law  and  supported 
by  an  international  guarantee  so  definite  and  so 
powerful  that  it  cannot  and  will  not  be  lightly  at- 
tacked or  shaken  in  the  futiu^e  by  any  Power. 

63 


64      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

This  new  international  order  will,  it  is  hoped  and 
believed,  justify  the  assertion  which  Mr.  Gladstone 
made,  too  confidently  as  it  proved,  nearly  fifty 
years  ago,  when  he  said:  "The  greatest  triiimph 
of  our  time  has  been  the  enthronement  of  the  idea 
of  public  right  as  the  governing  idea  of  European 
politics." 

There  can  be  no  question  that  the  idea  of  public 
right  has  taken  strong  root  in  the  minds  of  the 
smaller  nations  and  in  those  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  as  well.  Following  this  war  it  will  be  the 
opportunity  and  the  duty  of  every  lover  of  Hberty, 
of  justice,  and  of  peace  to  labor  to  extend  the  rule 
of  public  right  not  alone  over  the  politics  of  Europe, 
but  over  those  of  the  whole  world. 

In  order  to  find  a  point  of  beginning  there  must 
be  an  agreement,  assented  to  by  all  the  great  Powers, 
including  the  United  States  and  Japan,  as  to  what 
are  the  fimdamental  rights  and  duties  of  nations. 
On  January  6,  1916,  the  American  Institute  of  In- 
ternational Law,  consisting  of  representatives  of 
every  one  of  the  American  repubUcs  in  session  at 
Washington,  adopted  a  statement  as  to  the  rights 
and  duties  of  nations  which  it  would  be  hard  to 
improve.    It  is  this: 

1.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  exist,  and  to  protect  and 
to  conserve  its  existence;  but  this  right  neither  implies  the 
right  nor  justifies  the  act  of  the  state  to  protect  itself  or  to 
conserve  its  existence  by  the  commission  of  unlawful  acts 
against  innocent  and  unoffending  states. 

2.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  independence  in  the  sense 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      65 

that  it  has  a  right  to  the  pursuit  of  happiness  and  is  free  to 
develop  itself  without  interference  or  control  from  other 
states,  provided  that  in  so  doing  it  does  not  interfere  with 
or  violate  the  rights  of  other  states, 

3.  Every  nation  is  in  law  and  before  law  the  equal  of 
every  other  nation  belonging  to  the  society  of  nations,  and 
all  nations  have  the  right  to  claim  and,  according  to  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  of  the  United  States,  "to  as- 
simie,  among  the  Powers  of  the  earth,  the  separate  and 
equal  station  to  which  the  laws  of  nature  and  of  nature's 
God  entitle  them." 

4.  Every  nation  has  the  right  to  territory  within  defined 
boundaries  and  to  exercise  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  its 
territory,  and  all  persons,  whether  native  or  foreign,  found 
therein. 

5.  Every  nation  entitled  to  a  right  by  the  law  of  nations 
is  entitled  to  have  that  right  respected  and  protected  by  all 
other  nations,  for  right  and  duty  are  correlative,  and  the 
right  of  one  is  the  duty  of  all  to  observe. 

6.  International  law  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  both 
national  and  international:  national  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
the  law  of  the  land  and  applicable  as  such  to  the  decision 
of  all  questions  involving  its  principles;  international  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  the  law  of  the  society  of  nations  and  appli- 
cable as  such  to  all  questions  between  and  among  the  mem- 
bers of  the  society  of  nations  involving  its  principles. 

Should  this  declaration  be  generally  agreed  to, 
and  should  the  necessary  steps  be  taken  to  make 
it  effective,  it  will  hardly  be  disputed  that  as  the 
outcome  of  the  present  war  the  world  will  be  carried 
further  forward  on  the  road  to  a  durable  peace 
than  even  the  most  optimistic  would  have  thought 
possible  a  decade  ago.  At  the  same  time  care  must 
be  taken  not  to  put  too  much  reliance  upon  formal 


66     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

declarations  and  upon  the  machinery  of  even  the 
most  approved  international  system.  More  im- 
portant than  the  declaration  of  rights  and  duties 
of  nations,  and  more  important  than  the  machinery 
which  may  be  erected  to  give  that  declaration 
vitality  and  force,  is  the  spirit  of  the  peoples  who 
tmite  in  taking  these  steps.  What  the  world  is 
waiting  for  and  what  it  must  achieve  before  the 
foundations  of  a  durable  peace  are  seciirely  laid  is 
what  Nicholas  Murray  Butler  has  called  the  inter- 
national mind,  which  he  defines  as  "nothing  else 
than  that  habit  of  thinking  of  foreign  relations  and 
business,  and  that  habit  of  dealing  with  them, 
which  regard  the  several  nations  of  the  civilized 
world  as  friendly  and  co-operating  equals  in  aiding 
the  progress  of  civilization,  in  developing  com- 
merce and  industry,  and  in  spreading  enlighten- 
ment and  culture  throughout  the  world." 

Once  this  point  of  view  is  gained  and  this  code 
of  international  morals  accepted,  then  all  dreams 
of  world  conquest  will  fade  forever,  as  well  as  all 
schemes  to  extend  Anglo-Saxon,  or  Latin,  or  Teu- 
tonic, or  Slavonic  cultiu"e  over  the  whole  world. 
The  several  stones  in  the  structure  of  civilization 
will  differ  in  size,  in  character,  and  in  the  weight 
that  they  support,  but  each  one  of  them  will  do 
its  part. 

The  several  nations  now  at  war  and  those  neutral 
nations  that  will  join  them  in  bringing  about  a 
new  international  order  coiild  do  no  better  than 
adopt  as  their  platform  the  eloquent  words  of  the 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      6^ 

declaration  made  by  Elihu  Root  when  Secretary  of 
State  of  the  United  States  in  the  presence  of  the 
official  delegates  of  the  American  republics  ac- 
credited to  the  third  Pan  American  Conference 
held  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  on  July  31,  1906,  which 
stirred  the  heart  of  every  American  republic  and 
which  sounded  the  note  of  a  genuinely  new  inter- 
national freedom: 

We  wish  for  no  victories  but  those  of  peace,  for  no  terri- 
tory except  our  own,  for  no  sovereignty  except  the  sover- 
eignty over  ourselves.  We  deem  the  independence  and  equal 
rights  of  the  smallest  and  weakest  member  of  the  family  of 
nations  entitled  to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the  greatest 
empire,  and  we  deem  the  observance  of  that  respect  the 
chief  guarantee  of  the  weak  against  the  oppression  of  the 
strong.  We  neither  claim  nor  desire  any  rights,  or  privi- 
leges, or  powers  that  we  do  not  freely  concede  to  every 
American  republic.  We  wish  to  increase  our  prosperity,  to 
expand  our  trade,  to  grow  in  wealth,  in  wisdom,  and  in 
spirit,  but  our  conception  of  the  true  way  to  accomplish 
this  is  not  to  pull  down  others  and  profit  by  their  ruin,  but 
to  help  all  friends  to  a  common  prosperity  and  a  common 
growth,  that  we  may  all  become  greater  and  stronger  together. 

The  declaration  that  international  law  is  at  one 
and  the  same  time  both  national  and  international 
has  far-reaching  and  very  practical  significance  for 
the  work  of  building  a  new  international  order. 
The  courts  of  Great  Britain,  beginning  with  Lord 
Chancellor  Talbot  in  1733,  and  including  Lord 
Chief  Justice  Mansfield  in  1764,  have  held  that  the 
law..Jof  nations  is  part  of  the  common  law  of  Eng- 
land.    Sir  William  Blackstone  supported  this  doc- 


68      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

trine  in  his  classic  commentaries.  This  doctrine 
holds  good  as  well  in  the  United  States  as  in  Great 
Britain,  a  fact  to  which  both  Thomas  Jefferson  and 
Alexander  Hamilton  bore  convincing  testimony. 
In  the  lifetime  of  the  present  generation  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  international 
law  is  part  of  our  law,  £wid  that,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain and  administer  it  in  cases  where  there  is  no 
treaty  and  no  controlling  executive  or  legislative 
act  or  judicial  decision,  resort  must  be  had  to  the 
customs  and  usages  of  civilized  nations.  A  suf- 
ficient legal  basis  is,  therefore,  already  at  hand  for 
the  bringing  into  being  at  the  close  of  the  war  of 
a  new  international  order  that  will  include  the 
United  States  in  its  scope.  An  international  order 
of  the  effective  kind  here  contemplated  calls  for 
the  establishment  of  an  International  Court  of 
Justice.  The  next  step,  then,  is  to  discuss  the 
constitution  and  the  fiuictions  of  such  a  court  and 
to  recall  what  progress  had  been  made  before  Au- 
gust I,  1 9 14,  toward  bringing  it  into  existence. 


XI 


WORK  OF  THE  FIRST  HAGUE  CONFERENCE — DIS- 
ARMAMENT AND  ARBITRATION — THE  COURT  OP 
ARBITRAL   JUSTICE 

SPEAKING  as  a  member  of  the  second  Peace 
Conference  at  The  Hague  on  August  i,  1907, 
Mr.  Joseph  H.  Choate  closed  his  address  in 
support  of  the  American  project  for  a  permanent 
court  of  arbitral  justice  with  these  words:  "We 
have  done  much  to  regulate  war,  but  ver)^  little 
to  prevent  it.  Let  us  unite  on  this  great  pacific 
measure  and  satisfy  the  world  that  this  second 
Conference  really  intends  that  hereafter  peace,  and 
not  war,  shall  be  the  normal  condition  of  civilized 
nations."  Mr.  Choate 's  language  may  well  serve 
as  the  text  for  a  discussion  of  the  form  and  juris- 
diction of  such  an  International  Court  of  Justice  as 
will  contribute  most  powerfully  to  a  durable  peace. 

It  is  desirable  to  make  clear  the  important  dis- 
tinction between  a  real  court  and  an  arbitral  tribu- 
nal, and  not  to  permit  ourselves  to  confuse  the  one 
with  the  other. 

The  history  of  the  principle  of  international 
arbitration  and  its  various  applications  is  a  long 
and  interesting  one,  but  it  is  not  necessary  to  re- 
coimt  or  to  examine  it  here.  At  the  first  Peace 
Conference  at  The  Hague  international  arbitration 
was  not  originally  a  matter  of  main  concern.    The 

69 


70     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

Russian  circular  note  proposing  that  Conference, 
which  was  held  in  1899,  dealt  almost  entirely  with 
the  desirabiHty  of  reducing  armaments  or  at  least 
of  checking  their  rapid  growth.  In  a  few  striking 
sentences  this  note,  which,  coming  from  Russia, 
took  the  whole  world  by  surprise,  pointed  out  how 
national  cultiire,  economic  progress,  and  the  pro- 
duction of  wealth  were  being  either  paralyzed  or 
perverted  in  their  development  by  the  huge  ex- 
penditures upon  "terrible  engines  of  destruction, 
which  though  to-day  regarded  as  the  last  word  in 
science  are  destined  to-morrow  to  lose  all  value  in 
consequence  of  some  fresh  discovery  in  the  same 
field."  Moreover,  continued  the  note,  "in  pro- 
portion as  the  armaments  of  each  Power  increase 
so  do  they  less  and  less  attain  the  object  aimed 
at  by  the  Governments.  ...  It  appears  evident, 
then,  that  if  this  state  of  affairs  be  prolonged  it 
will  inevitably  lead  to  the  very  cataclysm  which 
it  is  desired  to  avert,  and  the  impending  horrors 
of  which  are  fearfiil  to  every  human  thought." 
In  this  note  the  subject  of  arbitration  was  not 
specifically  mentioned,  although  it  may  fairly  be 
urged  that  the  principle  of  the  judicial  settlement 
of  international  disputes  was  latent  in  the  expres- 
sion of  the  hope  that  such  a  Conference  as  was  pro- 
posed* would  result  in  an  agreement  among  the 
nations  to  unite  in  "a  solemn  avowal  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  equity  and  law,  upon  which  repose  the 
security  of  states  and  the  welfare  of  peoples."  If 
the  nations  are  to  agree  upon  an  avowal  of  belief 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      71 

in  certain  cx)ntrolling  principles  of  equity  and  law, 
then  it  would  seem  that  they  must  be  prepared  to 
construct  an  institution  for  the  application  of  these 
principles  to  specific  cases  of  international  differ- 
ence, and  such  an  institution  could  only  be  what 
the  world  knows  as  a  court. 

When  the  adhesion  of  the  leading  Powers  had 
been  secured  to  the  principle  that  such  an  inter- 
national Conference  as  the  Russian  Government 
proposed  should  be  held,  Count  Mouravieil,  Rus- 
sian Foreign  Minister,  submitted  a  programme  for 
the  Conference  containing  eight  topics.  The  last 
of  these  related  to  the  acceptance  in  principle  of 
the  use  of  good  offices,  mediation,  and  voluntary 
arbitration  in  cases  where  they  were  available  with 
the  purpose  of  preventing  armed  conflict  between 
nations,  together  with  an  understanding  in  relation 
to  their  mode  of  application,  and  the  establishment 
of  a  uniform  practice  in  applying  them.  As  the 
event  proved,  it  was  this  topic  and  not  any  ques- 
tion of  the  reduction  of  armaments  that  most  en- 
gaged the  attention  of  the  first  Hague  Conference. 
It  was  quickly  felt,  not  only  by  the  delegates  to 
the  Conference,  but  by  the  public  opinion  of  the 
whole  world,  that,  generous  and  humane  as  were 
the  motives  of  the  Tsar  in  inviting  an  international 
Conference  to  consider  a  limitation  of  armaments, 
this  question  did  not  furnish  either  the  wisest  or 
the  most  practical  mode  of  approach  to  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  of  establishing  a  new  inter- 
national   order  by   means   of  which  peace  would 


72      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

be  better  secured.  It  was  seen  and  generally  ad- 
mitted that  armaments  are  themselves  an  effect 
and  not  a  cause,  that  they  are  the  instnmients 
with  which  war  is  waged,  but  that  armaments 
alone  do  not  declare  or  directly  provoke  war.  There- 
fore to  attempt  to  limit  armaments,  while  leaving 
untouched  the  real  causes  of  war  and  the  real  in- 
centives to  international  jealousy  and  hostihty, 
would  be  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse. 

By  such  a  policy  war  would  not  be  prevented, 
but  it  would  be  carried  on,  in  all  probability,  at  a 
greatly  increased  cost  in  hmnan  life  and  himian 
treasure  because  of  the  necessity  of  improvising 
at  short  notice  a  great  series  of  military  and  naval 
instrumentalities  with  which  to  conduct  a  war 
that  was  the  outgrowth  of  international  jealousy,  in- 
ternational ambition,  or  international  greed.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  a  competitive  race  in  arma- 
ments among  nations  is  an  economic  and  moral 
disorder  that  has  the  gravest  consequences,  but 
the  way  in  which  to  cure  that  disorder  is  to  strike 
at  its  causes  and  not  merely  at  its  symptoms.  Its 
causes  He  deep  in  himian  nature  and  in  national 
pride  and  ambition.  There  is  no  practical  way  to 
lessen  the  likelihood  of  international  war  and  to 
insure  a  consequent  steady  diminution  in  military 
and  naval  armaments  except  one  which  will  bring 
the  public  opinion  of  the  great  nations  of  the  world 
more  and  more  to  the  support  of  the  principle  that 
international  differences  may  and  should  be  judi- 
cially examined  and  determined. 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      73 

For  these  reasons  the  work  of  the  first  Hague 
Conference  is  not  only  commendable,  but  stands 
as  a  notable  landmark  in  the  history  of  the  progress 
of  better  international  relations.  Americans,  Eng- 
lishmen, and  Frenchmen  may  well  be  proud  that 
in  establishing  that  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice, 
which  was  the  chief  permanent  result  of  the  first 
Hague  Conference,  the  initiative  was  taken  and 
the  greatest  influence  in  carrying  the  project  to  a 
successful  issue  exercised  by  Doctor  Andrew  D. 
White  and  Frederick  W.  Holls,  Chairman  and 
Secretary,  respectively,  of  the  American  delegation; 
by  Lord,  then  Sir  Julian,  Pauncefote,  Chairman  of 
the  British  delegation;  and  by  MM.  L4on  Bour- 
geois, d'Estoumelles  de  Constant,  and  Renault, 
the  three  chief  representatives  of  the  French  Repub- 
Hc.  Doctor  White's  personal  letter  to  von  Biilow, 
then  Imperial  German  Chancellor,  written  imder 
date  of  June  16,  1899,  may  well  prove  to  be  one  of 
the  most  important  documents  in  modem  diplo- 
matic history.  That  letter,  together  with  the  per- 
sonal influence  in  Germany  of  Doctor  White  and 
of  Mr.  Holls,  who  was  its  bearer,  persuaded  the 
German  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor  to  withdraw 
their  opposition  to  any  recognition  of  the  principle 
of  arbitration  and  so  secured  the  adhesion  of  Ger- 
many to  the  final  act  of  the  Conference.  When  a 
real  International  Court  of  Justice  comes  to  be 
established,  it  may  be  found  that  the  support  both 
of  official  Germany  and  of  German  public  opinion, 
if  given,  may  be  traceable  in  large  part  to  the  ac- 


74      THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

tion  taken  by  the  German  Emperor  and  his  Chancel- 
lor in  1899,  at  the  tirgent  and  most  persiiasive  so- 
licitation of  Doctor  White. 

The  first  Hague  Conference  did  not  really  estab- 
lish a  court  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word  is  gen- 
erally understood,  but  it  did  make  great  progress 
toward  the  establishment  of  such  a  court,  and 
toward  preparing  the  pubHc  mind  for  farther  and 
more  definite  steps.  It  was  no  small  achievement 
to  have  the  powers  unite,  as  they  then  did,  in  the 
declaration  that  they  would  use  their  best  efforts 
to  insure  the  pacific  settlement  of  international 
differences  with  a  view  to  obviating  as  far  as  pos- 
sible recourse  to  force  in  the  relations  between 
states.  They  agreed  upon  admirable  provisions  for 
good  offices  and  mediation  as  well  as  for  interna- 
tional commissions  of  inquiry.  They  defined  in- 
ternational arbitration  as  having  for  its  object 
"the  settlement  of  disputes  between  states  by 
judges  of  their  own  choice  and  on  the  basis  of  re- 
spect for  law."  It  will  at  once  be  seen  how  far  this 
falls  short  of  the  settlement  of  disputes  between 
states  by  judges  independently  chosen,  and  on  the 
basis  not  alone  of  respect  for  law,  but  of  submission 
to  law.  The  permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  was 
really  nothing  more  than  a  panel  of  men  "of  known 
competency  in  questions  of  international  law,  of 
the  highest  moral  reputation  and  disposed  to  ac- 
cept the  duties  of  arbitrators."  Such  a  tribunal 
as  this,  wholly  dependent  for  its  existence  and  use- 
fulness upon  the   concurrence  of  two  disagreeing 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      75 

states  in  submitting  a  question  to  arbitration  and 
in  agreeing  to  the  choice  of  individual  arbitrators, 
was  not  a  true  court.  Nevertheless  its  importance 
must  not  be  minimized,  for  this  tribunal  has  dealt 
with  not  a  few  cases  of  more  than  usual  difficulty, 
and  it  has  served  to  accustom  the  public  opinion 
of  the  civilized  world  to  the  spectacle  of  sovereign 
nations  submitting  international  disputes  which  had 
not  been  resolved  by  the  usual  diplomatic  means 
to  inquiry  and  judgment  by  arbitrators. 

Mexico  and  the  United  States,  at  the  instance 
of  President  Roosevelt,  quickly  submitted  to  this 
tribimal  the  Pious  Fund  Case.  Shortly  afterward 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy  brought  before 
it  in  the  Venezuelan  Preferential  Case  their  con- 
troversy with  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  over  cer- 
tain pecuniary  claims  of  their  subjects.  Similarly 
France,  Germany,  and  Great  Britain  submitted 
to  the  Hague  Tribunal  their  difference  with  Japan 
over  a  matter  arising  from  the  extraterritorial 
jurisdiction  which  prior  to  1894  was  maintained  in 
respect  to  the  citizens  of  foreign  nations  resident 
in  Japan.  The  Casablanca  Case  between  France 
and  Germany  and  the  Savarkar  Case  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  similarly  considered 
and  decided.  Doubtless  the  most  important  case 
yet  heard  by  this  tribimal  was  the  North  Atlantic 
Coast  Fisheries  Case,  in  which  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  were  opposing  parties  in  a  vexa- 
tious controversy  that  had  lasted  for  one  hundred 
years. 


76     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  while  the  nations 
have  not  yet  established  a  real  International  Court 
of  Justice,  they  have  taken  such  long  steps  toward 
it  that  it  should  not  be  difficult  to  cover  the  re- 
maining distance,  in  view  of  the  vital  importance 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  court  to  an  international 
order  which  aims  to  secure  a  durable  peace. 


XII 


WORK  OP  THE  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCE — DIS- 
TINCTION BETWEEN  AN  ARBITRAL  COURT  AND 
AN  INTERNATIONAL  COURT  OF  JUSTICE — PRAC- 
TICAL PROPOSALS  FOR  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OP  A 
REAL  COURT — ANALOGY  BETWEEN  AN  INTERNA- 
TIONAL COURT  OP  JUSTICE  AND  THE  SUPREME 
COURT   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES 

A  VIGOROUS  attempt  to  add  a  real  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  to  the  permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  that  was  estabHshed 
at  The  Hague  by  the  Conference  of  1899  was  made 
at  the  second  Hague  Conference,  which  met  in  1907. 
This  was  largely  due  to  the  urgent  insistence  of  the 
American  delegation.  Their  action  was  taken  under 
the  explicit  instructions  of  Secretary  Root,  and  it 
achieved  a  far  larger  measure  of  success  than  is 
generally  understood.  The  point  then  reached  in 
the  establishment  of  a  court  is  the  point  at  which 
to  begin  when  this  war  is  ended. 

In  his  formal  instructions  to  the  American  dele- 
gates to  that  conference  Mr.  Root  pointed  out  that 
the  principal  objection  to  arbitration  rests  not  upon 
the  imwillingness  of  nations  to  submit  their  con- 
troversies to  impartial  arbitration,  but  upon  an 
apprehension  that  the  arbitrations  to  which  they 
submit  them  may  not  be  really  impartial.  In  other 
words,  he  pressed  upon  the  American  delegates,  and 

77 


78      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

through  them  upon  the  conference,  a  clear  recog- 
nition of  the  distinction  between  the  action  of  judges 
deciding  questions  of  fact  and  law  upon  the  record 
before  them  under  a  sense  of  judicial  responsibility, 
and  the  action  of  negotiators  effecting  settlement 
of  questions  brought  before  them  in  accordance  with 
the  traditions  and  usages  and  subject  to  all  the 
considerations  and  influences  which  affect  diplomatic 
agents.  The  one  is  a  judicial  determination  of  a 
disputed  question ;  the  other  is  an  attempt  to  satisfy 
both  contending  parties  by  arriving  at  some  form  of 
compromise.  Secretary  Root  pointed  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  passing  with  im- 
partial and  impersonal  judgment  upon  questions 
arising  between  citizens  of  the  different  States  or 
between  foreign  citizens  and  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  as  a  type  of  tribunal  to  which  the  nations  of 
the  world  would  be  much  more  ready  than  now  to 
submit  their  various  controversies  for  decision.  He 
instructed  the  American  delegates  to  make  an  ef- 
fort to  bring  about  a  development  of  the  existing 
Hague  Tribimal  into  a  permanent  court  composed 
of  judges  who  are  judicial  officers  and  nothing  else, 
who  are  paid  adequate  salaries,  who  have  no  other 
occupation,  and  who  will  devote  their  entire  time 
to  the  trial  and  decision  of  international  causes  by 
judicial  methods  and  under  a  sense  of  judicial  re- 
sponsibility. He  pointed  out  that  the  members  of 
such  a  court  should  be  selected  from  different 
countries  in  such  manner  that  the  different  systems 
of  law  and  procedure  and  the  principal  languages 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      79 

would  be  fairly  represented.  It  was  Secretary 
Root's  expressed  hope  that  this  court  might  be  made 
of  such  dignity,  consideration,  and  rank  that  the 
best  and  ablest  jurists  would  accept  appointment 
to  it,  and  that  the  whole  world  would  have  absolute 
confidence  in  its  judgments. 

There  have  been  no  better  definition  and  descrip- 
tion than  those  given  by  Secretary  Root  of  that  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice  which  is  an  essential 
part  of  any  international  order  that  will  have  a 
durable  peace  as  its  aim.  Before  such  a  court  can 
be  brought  into  existence,  however,  it  is  necessary 
to  remove  the  fears  and  doubts  of  those  who  ques- 
tion whether  such  a  court  could  really  be  impartial, 
and  therefore  judicial.  The  American,  with  the 
example  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  be- 
fore him,  and  with  that  conception  of  an  independent 
judiciary  which  removes  judges  from  executive  or 
political  control  and  which  gives  them  authority 
not  only  to  settle  disputes  between  individuals  but 
to  protect  the  individual  and  his  constitutional 
rights  against  invasion  by  the  executive  and  the 
legislature  themselves,  has  little  difficulty  in  grasp- 
ing the  conception  of  an  independent  and  impartial 
international  court.  This  has  also  become  easier 
for  the  subject  of  Great  Britain  as  the  later  develop- 
ments in  the  history  of  the  Judicial  Committee  of 
the  Privy  Council  have  shown  him  grave  questions 
of  constitutional  and  international  law  that  arise 
in  all  parts  of  the  empire  being  judicially  settled  by 
that  body  sitting  at  Westminster. 


8o     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

To  understand  what  is  meant  by  such  a  court  is 
much  more  difficult  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  cotmtries  in  which  the  judiciary  is  really 
a  part  of  the  general  administrative  system  and  not 
an  independent  body  having  the  authority  to  pass 
in  review  the  legality  of  governmental  acts.  In  coim- 
tries  where  courts  have  no  other  fimction  than  to 
determine  controversies  between  individuals,  and 
where  nations  have  not  progressed  to  the  advanced 
position  of  protecting  civil  and  political  liberty  by 
judicial  process,  it  is  not  easy  to  secure  adhesion 
to  a  project  which  contemplates  bringing  the  act 
of  a  Government  to  the  bar  of  judicial  inquiry. 
Probably  there  is  no  better  or  quicker  way  to  bring 
home  to  the  people  of  Austria-Himgary,  of  Ger- 
many, and  of  Russia  the  purpose  and  fxmctions  of 
such  a  coiut  as  here  described  than  to  establish  it 
in  order  that  its  acts  and  processes  may  be  their 
own  explanation. 

It  was  by  the  joint  efforts  of  the  delegates  from 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  France,  and  the  United 
States  that  the  project  for  an  International  Court  of 
Justice  was  approved  by  the  second  Hague  Con- 
ference on  October  i6,  1907.  Unfortimately  the 
Conference  could  not  agree  upon  the  method  by 
which  the  judges  of  the  proposed  court  were  to  be 
chosen.  Failure  to  agree  on  this  vital  point  deprived 
the  project  for  the  moment  of  any  practical  effect. 
The  Conference  went  so  far,  however,  after  having 
adopted  the  project,  as  definitely  to  recommend  that 
the  court  be  established  as  soon  as  the  nations  could 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      8i 

agree  upon  a  method  of  appointing  judges.  The 
German  Government  has  officially  declared  its  readi- 
ness to  co-operate  in  the  establishment  of  this  court, 
and  the  British,  French,  and  American  Govern- 
ments have  publicly  supported  the  action  of  their 
representatives  at  The  Hague.  These  significant 
facts  must  not  be  overlooked. 

It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  action  of 
the  second  Hague  Conference  in  1907  was  not 
merely  the  expression  of  a  wish  or  desire  that  a 
court  should  be  established,  but  it  was  a  definite 
recommendation  to  the  Powers  to  undertake  the 
establishment  of  the  court.  Ever  since  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  second  Hague  Conference  it  has,  there- 
fore, been  easy  for  any  group  of  nations  to  agree 
to  establish  such  a  court  for  themselves  by  coming 
to  a  common  determination  as  to  how  its  judges 
should  be  appointed.  One  hope  was  that  an  Inter- 
national Prize  Court  might  be  called  into  existence 
and  its  jurisdiction  gradually  enlarged  to  cover  the 
field  of  an  International  Court  of  Justice.  It  would 
now  give  great  satisfaction  to  the  lovers  of  justice 
throughout  the  world  if,  without  waiting  for  the 
conclusion  of  the  war,  the  Governments  of  the  Allied 
Powers  would  publicly  annoimce  that  as  one  of  the 
terms  and  conditions  of  a  durable  peace  they  pro- 
posed to  imite  in  the  prompt  establishment  of  an 
International  Court  of  Justice  substantially  as  out- 
lined and  agreed  upon  at  the  second  Hague  Con- 
ference. Such  a  declaration  on  their  part  would 
emphasize  anew  the  principles  of  liberty,  of  order, 


82      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

and  of  justice  for  which  they  are  now  contending  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  would  turn  the  thoughts  of 
men,  when  tenns  of  peace  are  discussed,  more  and 
more  to  that  justice  which  must  underlie  and  ac- 
company any  peace  that  is  to  be  dxirable,  and  away 
from  that  vengeance  and  reprisal  which  can  only 
incite  to  new  wars. 

To  take  this  step  should  not  be  difficult,  since  the 
American  Government  has  been  pressing  it  upon  all 
the  chief  Powers  for  some  years  past  and  has  in- 
dicated with  definiteness  and  precision  how  the  nec- 
essary steps  may  be  taken.  The  work  of  the  Naval 
Conference  at  London  in  1908-9  made  a  beginning 
in  the  formulation  of  some  parts  of  that  law  which 
the  proposed  coiut  must  interpret  and  administer. 
The  war  came,  however,  before  an  agreement  as 
to  the  Declaration  of  London  had  been  finally 
worked  out  and  all  further  progress  was  necessarily 
suspended.  There  has  never  been  a  clearer  demon- 
stration of  the  truth  of  the  ancient  maxim,  "Inter 
arma  silent  leges." 

As  late  as  January  12,  1914,  Mr.  James  Brown 
Scott,  who  as  Solicitor  for  the  Department  of  State 
had  been  a  technical  delegate  at  the  second  Hague 
Conference,  addressed  to  Mr.  Loudon,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Netherlands,  a  letter  begging 
him  to  take  the  initiative  in  bringing  about  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  Cotu-t  of  Arbitral  Justice  through 
the  co-operation  of  Holland,  Germany,  the  United 
States,  Austria-Hungary,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  Japan,  and  Russia.    In  this  letter,  which  was 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      83 

written  with  the  approval  of  Mr.  EUhu  Root  and 
Mr.  Robert  Bacon,  former  Secretaries  of  State,  it 
was  pointed  out  that  a  coiirt  constituted  through  the 
co-operation  of  these  nations  would,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  have  the  advantages  and  render  the 
services  of  a  true  international  court,  and  in  a  very- 
short  time  would  probably  become  a  court  to  which 
every  nation  woiild  be  glad  to  resort.  Before  any 
action  could  be  taken  the  overhanging  war-clouds 
biu^st  into  storm. 

It  is  probable  that  the  plan  brought  forward  by 
Mr.  Scott  is  the  most  practicable  and,  therefore,  the 
one  most  likely  eventually  to  be  followed.  An  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice  established  by  agree- 
ment of  the  nine  nations  named  would  have  all 
needed  prestige  and  authority.  Shoidd  a  nation 
not  party  to  the  agreement  wish  to  appear  before 
the  coiurt  as  litigant  or  be  ready  to  accept  an  invita- 
tion or  summons  so  to  appear,  it  would  be  easy  to 
provide  that  in  such  case  the  nation  in  question 
might  appoint  an  assessor  for  the  hearing  of  that 
particular  cause.  Should  a  case  come  before  the 
court  involving  two  or  more  nations  not  parties  to 
the  agreement  for  its  establishment,  then  similarly 
each  of  those  nations  might  be  given  the  right  to 
name  an  assessor  to  participate  in  hearing  the  argu- 
ments in  that  case.  It  is  neither  necessary  nor  de- 
sirable to  go  here  into  further  detail  as  to  the  con- 
stitution and  scope  of  this  court.  These  matters 
are  dealt  with  in  the  fullest  possible  way,  and  from 
every  point  of  view  in  the  published  records  of  the 


84      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

second  Hague  Conference  and  in  subsequent  pub- 
lications that  deal  with  this  specific  question. 

Americans  must  be  pardoned  if  they  keep  insist- 
ing upon  the  advantage  of  studying  the  history  and 
practice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in 
order  to  answer  objections  and  to  smooth  away  diffi- 
culties which  arise  in  the  minds  of  many  thoughtful 
men  in  other  coimtries  as  to  the  practicability  of  an 
International  Coiut  of  Justice.  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  any  strictly  legal  question  as  to  the  rights  of 
nations  and  their  nationals  will  arise  before  such  a 
cotut  which  has  not  already  arisen  in  some  form  or 
other  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
as  a  question  involving  the  rights  of  States  and  their 
citizens.  For  example,  nearly  eighty  years  ago  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  was  called  upon  to 
distinguish  a  judicial  from  a  political  question;  it 
did  so  then  and  has  frequently  done  so  since  with- 
out serious  difficulty.  A  question  addressed  to  the 
framework  and  poUtical  character  of  a  Government 
is  essentially  political;  it  is,  therefore,  not  a  question 
that  is  in  its  natm^e  justiciable  and  that  can  be  pre- 
sented to  a  court.  It  woiild,  of  course,  be  necessary 
for  an  International  Court  of  Justice  to  build  up 
gradually  and  by  a  series  of  decisions  a  body  of 
precedents  that  would,  so  to  speak,  take  the  form  of 
an  international  common  law.  The  point  of  de- 
partiure  would  be  the  international  law  of  the  mo- 
ment, existing  treaties,  and  the  form  of  agreement 
through  which  the  court  itself  would  come  into  be- 
ing.   It  might  be  expected  that  this  court  would  de- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      85 

cide  for  itself  in  matters  of  doubt  whether  or  not  a 
given  question  was  justiciable.  The  International 
Court  of  Justice  could  hardly  vary  from  the  prac- 
tice of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  not  at- 
tempting to  compel  the  presence  of  any  Government 
made  defendant  or  in  not  attempting  to  execute  by 
force  its  finding  against  the  contention  of  any  Gov- 
ernment. If  the  publicity  attending  the  operations 
of  such  a  court,  the  inherent  and  persuasive  reason- 
ableness of  its  findings,  and  a  body  of  international 
public  opinion  that  has  turned  with  conviction  to 
the  judicial  settlement  of  international  disputes, 
cannot  insure  the  carrying  into  effect  of  the  judg- 
ments of  an  International  Coiut  of  Justice,  then  the 
world  is  not  ready  for  such  a  coiirt.  To  establish 
it  tmder  such  circumstances  would  merely  be  to  pro- 
vide another  opportunity  for  so  magnifying  and 
sharpening  points  of  international  difference  as 
probably  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  war.  There 
was  a  time  when,  imder  great  stress  of  party  and 
personal  feeling,  Andrew  Jackson  could  say:  "John 
Marshall  has  made  his  decision;  now  let  him  en- 
force it."  Nevertheless,  the  judgments  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  are  not  only  obeyed  but  re- 
spected. This  results  not  alone  from  the  confidence 
in  their  reasonableness  which  the  tradition  of  a 
century  has  built  up,  but  from  the  fact  that  Amer- 
ican public  opinion  will  not  tolerate  any  other 
course.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  a 
course  of  judicial  action  that  has  been  demonstrated 
to  be  practicable,  wise,  and  beneficent  within  the 


86      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

United  States  will  also  in  time  be  demonstrated  to 
be  practicable,  wise,  and  beneficent  as  between 
nations.  The  important  thing  is  to  make  a  be- 
ginning.   This  the  AUies  are  in  position  to  do. 


XIII 

SUGGESTED  MODE  OF  PROCEDURE  AFTER  THE  WAR — 
WORK  FOR  A  THIRD  HAGUE  CONFERENCE — FOUR 
SPECIFIC  PROPOSALS  FOR  ACTION 

THE  natural  mode  of  action  on  the  part  of 
the  several  Powers  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  would  be  to  arrive,  in  international 
conference,  at  an  agreement  upon  a  restatement  of 
the  convention  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes  as  formulated  at  the  second  Hague 
Conference,  and  upon  the  establishment  of  an  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice  in  some  such  fashion 
as  has  been  already  outlined.  In  both  cases  it  would 
be  possible  to  simplify  and  to  improve  the  forms  of 
statement  as  these  were  previously  agreed  upon. 
This  war  has  itself  made  not  only  possible,  but 
easy,  considerable  advance  beyond  the  positions 
then  taken.  Public  opinion  understands  more 
clearly  than  it  did  at  that  time  what  these  arrange- 
ments involve  and  how  desirable  they  are.  For 
example,  if  the  International  Commissions  of  In- 
quiry are  to  be  really  valuable,  the  limitation  im- 
posed upon  them  as  to  disputes  of  an  international 
nature  that  involve  either  honor  or  essential  in- 
terests must  be  removed.  It  is  a  poor  sort  of  in- 
ternational dispute  in  which  some  one  cannot  find 
a  point  involving  either  honor  or  an  essential  interest. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  to 

«7 


88      THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

make  no  promises  that  camiot,  and  will  not,  be  kept 
by  the  contracting  nations.  Therefore,  only  in  so 
far  as  the  constitution  and  jurisdiction  of  the  In- 
ternational Court  of  Justice  and  the  constitution 
and  authority  of  the  International  Commissions  of 
Inquiry  are  understood  and  assented  to  by  the 
people  of  the  several  nations  which  enter  into  them 
should  anything  be  attempted.  To  endeavor  to 
do  more  than  this  is  to  hold  out  a  hope  that  will 
surely  be  dashed  later  to  the  ground.  To  attempt 
a  formal  international  order  in  advance  of  anything 
for  which  the  world  is  ready  might  well  result  in 
setting  back  that  international  order  for  a  gen- 
eration, or  even  for  a  century.  The  war  has  pre- 
pared the  world  for  much  that  it  would  not  have 
accepted  three  years  ago.  It  is  the  task  of  states- 
manship to  ascertain  what  instructed  public  opin- 
ion is  now  willing  to  support  and  to  fix  it  in  inter- 
national institutions. 

Any  international  conference  to  fix  the  condi- 
tions of  a  dtirable  peace  will,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
include  the  United  States.  The  United  States  is 
a  participant  in  this  war,  although  an  imwilling  and 
a  neutral  participant.  Modem  conditions  have 
brought  it  to  pass  that  a  nation  may  remain  neutral 
and  yet  be  involved,  both  directly  and  indirectly, 
economically  and  in  point  of  principle,  in  a  war 
that  breaks  out  on  another  continent.  Moreover, 
this  is  no  ordinary  war.  It  is,  as  has  been  said  over 
and  over  again,  a  clash  of  ideals,  of  philosophies 
of  life,  or  political  and  social  aims.    This  is  why  it 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      89 

must  be  fought  imtil  the  principles  at  stake  are  or 
can  be  established,  and  why  it  cannot  be  com- 
promised. One  who  cannot  range  himself  on  one 
side  or  the  other  in  this  conflict  must  be  either  so 
dull  of  understanding  as  not  to  be  able  to  com- 
prehend the  greatest  things  in  the  world  or  so  pro- 
foundly immoral  as  not  to  care  what  becomes  of 
the  human  race,  its  liberty,  and  its  progress.  To 
guard  against  a  repetition  of  any  such  conflict, 
representatives  of  neutral  states  will  imdoubtedly 
be  summoned  to  the  same  coimcil  table  with  the 
representatives  of  the  belligerent  Powers. 

Admirable  and  far-sighted  plans  for  securing  a 
peaceful  international  order  have  been  before  the 
world  for  three  hundred  years.  M.  Emeric  Cruc6 
submitted  his  plan,  which  included  liberty  of  com- 
merce throughout  all  the  world,  as  early  as  1623, 
Following  the  Peace  of  Utrecht,  the  Abb6  de  St. 
Pierre  developed  his  plan,  which  included  media- 
tion, arbitration,  and  an  interesting  addition  to  the 
effect  that  any  sovereign  who  took  up  arms  before 
the  union  of  nations  had  declared  war,  or  who  re- 
fused to  execute  a  regulation  of  the  union  or  a  judg- 
ment of  the  Senate,  was  to  be  declared  an  enemy 
of  European  society.  The  union  was  then  to  make 
war  upon  him  until  he  should  be  disarmed  or  un- 
til the  regulation  or  judgment  should  be  executed. 
Some  twenty  years  earlier  William  Penn  had  pro- 
duced his  quaint  and  really  extraordinary  plan  for 
the  peace,  of  Europe,  in  which  he,  too,  proposed  "to 
proceed  by  military  power  against  any  sovereign 


90      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

who  refused  to  submit  his  claims  to  a  proposed 
diet,  or  parliament  of  Eiu-ope,  or  who  refused  to 
abide  by  and  to  perform  any  judgment  of  such  a 
body.  All  these  plans,  like  those  of  Rousseau, 
Bentham,  and  Kant,  which  came  later,  as  well  as 
William  Ladd's  elaborate  and  carefully  considered 
essay  on  a  Congress  of  Nations,  published  in  1840, 
were  brought  into  the  world  too  soon.  They  were 
the  fine  and  noble  dreams  of  seers  which  it  is  tak- 
ing civilized  men  three  centuries  and  more  to  begin 
effectively  to  realize. 

Out  of  the  international  conference  that  will  fol- 
low the  war  there  should  come,  and  doubtless  will 
come,  a  union  of  states  to  secure  peace.  That  Mr. 
Asquith  has  long  had  this  idea  in  mind  is  plain. 
Speaking  at  Dublin,  on  September  25,  19 14,  when 
the  war  was  still  very  young  and  when  German 
hopes  were  high  and  confident,  Mr.  Asquith,  in  dis- 
cussing the  causes  and  meaning  of  the  war,  said: 
' '  It  means,  finally,  or  it  ought  to  mean,  perhaps  by 
a  slow  and  gradual  process,  the  substitution  for  force, 
for  the  clash  of  competing  ambitions,  for  groupings 
and  alliances  and  a  precarious  equipoise, — ^the  sub- 
stitution for  all  these  things  of  a  real  European  part- 
nership, based  on  the  recognition  of  equal  right  and 
established  and  enforced  by  a  common  will.  A 
year  ago  that  would  have  sounded  like  a  Utopian 
idea.  It  is  probably  one  that  may  not,  or  will  not, 
be  realized  either  to-day  or  to-morrow.  If  and 
when  this  war  is  decided  in  favor  of  the  Allies,  it 
will  at  once  come  within  the  range,  and  before  long 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      91 

within  the  grasp,  of  European  statesmanship." 
Events  are  hastening  the  consummation  of  Mr.  As- 
quith's  hope.  On  November  9  last,  Chancellor  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  said  before  the  main  committee 
of  the  Reichstag:  "Germany  is  at  all  times  ready  to 
join  a  league  of  nations — yes,  even  to  place  herself 
at  the  head  of  such  a  league — to  keep  in  check  the 
disturbers  of  the  peace."  Previously,  on  May  27, 
1 91 6,  speaking  in  Washington,  President  Wilson  had 
used  these  words:  "Only  when  the  great  nations  of 
the  world  have  reached  some  sort  of  agreement  as 
to  what  they  hold  to  be  fundamental  to  their  com- 
mon interest,  and  as  to  some  feasible  method  of 
acting  in  concert  when  any  nation  or  group  of  na- 
tions seeks  to  disturb  those  fundamental  things, 
can  we  feel  that  civilization  is  at  least  in  a  way  of 
justifying  its  existence  and  claiming  to  be  finally 
established."  Similar,  if  less  direct,  expressions 
have  come  from  responsible  statesmen  and  from 
leaders  of  opinion  in  other  lands.  It  would  seem  as 
if  the  world,  at  the  close  of  this  war,  would  have 
within  its  grasp  the  possibility  to  achieve  at  once  a 
union  of  nations  to  establish  an  International  Court 
of  Justice  to  try  justiciable  causes,  International 
Commissions  of  Inquiry  to  facilitate  a  solution  of 
non-justiciable  disputes  by  means  of  an  impartial 
and  conscientious  investigation  of  the  facts  and  by 
making  them  public,  and  generally  to  secure  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

It  would  be  best  if  the  Allied  Powers,  after  the 
terms  of  settlement  of  the  present  conflict  have 


92      THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

been  agreed  upon,  were  themselves  to  invite  such  a 
conference  to  meet  at  The  Hague  and  there  to  con- 
tinue to  build  upon  the  foundations  already  laid  in 
1899  and  in  1907.  It  is  natural  to  expect  the  Allies 
to  take  the  initiative  in  calling  this  conference,  for 
such  a  step  would  be  in  entire  accord  with  the  em- 
phatic and  oft-repeated  jieclarations  of  their  Gov- 
ernments. The  powerful  participation  of  France 
would  assist  to  realize,  so  far  as  is  now  possible,  the 
prophetic  declaration  of  Michelet:  "Au  XX*  sidcle, 
la  France  declarera  la  Paix  au  monde." 

Should  the  Allies  for  any  reason  be  reluctant  to 
invite  such  a  conference,  it  has  been  made  easy  for 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to  do  so.  The 
Sixty-fourth  Congress  in  enacting  the  Naval  Appro- 
priation bill  for  the  cturent  year  included  the 
following  provision,  which  is  now  the  law  of  the 
land: 

It  is  hereby  declared  to  be  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
to  adjust  and  settle  its  international  disputes  through  media- 
tion or  arbitration,  to  the  end  that  war  may  be  honorably 
avoided.  It  looks  with  apprehension  and  disfavor  upon  a 
general  increase  of  armament  throughout  the  world,  but  it 
realizes  that  no  single  nation  can  disarm,  and  that  without 
a  common  agreement  upon  the  subject  every  considerable 
power  must  maintain  a  relative  standing  in  military  strength. 

In  view  of  the  premises,  the  President  is  authorized  and 
requested  to  invite,  at  an  appropriate  time,  not  later  than 
the  close  of  the  war  in  Europe,  all  the  great  Governments 
of  the  world  to  send  representatives  to  a  conference  which 
shall  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  formulating  a  plan  for  a 
court  of  arbitration  or  other  tribunal,  to  which  disputed 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE      93 

questions  between  nations  shall  be  referred  for  adjudication 
and  peaceful  settlement,  and  to  consider  the  question  of 
disarmament  and  submit  their  recommendation  to  their 
respective  Governments  for  approval.  The  President  is 
hereby  authorized  to  appoint  nine  citizens  of  the  United 
States  who,  in  his  judgment,  shall  be  qualified  for  the  mis- 
sion by  eminence  in  the  law  and  by  devotion  to  the  cause  of 
peace,  to  be  representatives  of  the  United  States  in  such  a 
conference.  The  President  shall  fix  the  compensation  of 
said  representatives  and  such  secretaries  and  other  employees 
as  may  be  needed.  Two  hundred  thousand  dollars,  or  so 
much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  is  hereby  appropriated 
and  set  aside  and  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  to 
carry  into  effect  the  provisions  of  this  paragraph. 

It  may  be  assumed,  therefore,  that  whether  called 
by  the  Governments  of  the  Allied  Powers  or  by  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  such  a  third  Hague 
Conference  will  be  held  as  promptly  as  may  be  after 
the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  Such  a  conference 
will,  in  effect,  be  the  first  step  in  making  a  union  of 
states  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  world.  There 
should  be  urged  upon  it  by  the  delegates  from  the 
United  States  not  only  (i)  the  establishment  of  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  and  (2)  the  Interna- 
tional Commissions  of  Inquiry,  already  referred  to 
and  described,  but  (3)  the  high  wisdom  of  making 
provision  for  the  stated  and  automatic  reassembling 
of  the  conference  at,  say,  foiir-year  intervals,  and 
(4)  the  adoption,  in  substance,  and  so  far  as  possible 
in  form,  of  the  declaration  as  to  the  fundamental 
rights  and  duties  of  nations  that  has  already  been  set 
out  in  full  in  these  discussions.     The  result  of  the 


94      THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

action  last  named  would  be  to  give  the  International 
Court  of  Justice  a  definite  and  specific  statement 
of  fundamental  principles  to  be  applied  and  inter- 
preted in  the  various  causes  that  will  come  before 
it  for  adjudication. 

In  all  this  the  United  States  is  at  liberty,  without 
departing  from  its  traditional  policies  or  without 
sacrificing  any  of  its  own  interests,  to  participate  to 
the  full.  In  making  international  law  and  in  estab- 
lishing an  international  order  for  the  whole  world, 
the  United  States  is  keenly  and  directly  interested. 
A  point  of  gravest  difficulty  presents  itself,  however, 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  effective  enforce- 
ment of  international  law  and  the  effective  uphold- 
ing of  whatever  international  order  is  established 
and  the  relation  of  the  United  States  thereto.  On 
signing  the  convention  for  the  pacific  settlement  of 
international  disputes  agreed  to  at  the  Hague 
Conference  of  1899  the  delegation  of  the  United 
States  made  the  following  formal  declaration : 

Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  con- 
strued as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America  to  depart 
from  its  traditional  policy  of  not  intruding  upon,  interfering 
with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political  questions  or  policy 
or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state;  nor  shall 
anything  contained  in  the  said  convention  be  construed  to 
imply  a  relinquishment  by  the  United  States  of  America  of 
its  traditional  attitude  toward  purely  American  questions. 

This  reservation  was  explicitly  renewed  by  the 
American  delegates   to  the   Hague   Conference  of 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      95 

1907.  Put  in  plain  language,  this  declaration  means 
that  while  there  is  one  international  law  and  while 
there  may  be  one  international  order,  in  the  declara- 
tion and  establishment  of  which  the  United  States 
participates,  yet  there  are  two  separate  and  dis- 
tinct areas  of  jurisdiction  for  the  enforcement  of 
international  law  and  for  the  administration  of  the 
international  order.  The  area  of  one  of  these  juris- 
dictions is  Europe  and  those  parts  of  Asia  and 
Africa  immediately  dependent  thereon;  the  area  of 
the  second  of  these  jurisdictions  is  America. 


XIV 

ENFORCEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  THE  AD- 
MINISTRATION OF  A  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  ORDER 
— CRITICISM  OF  THE  PROPOSED  USE  OF  FORCE  TO 
COMPEL  SUBMISSION  OP  EVERY  INTERNATIONAL 
QUESTION  TO  A  JUDICIAL  TRIBUNAL  OR  COUNCIL 
OF  CONCILIATION  BEFORE  BEGINNING  HOSTIL- 
ITIES— DIFFICULTY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  MAK- 
ING   ANY   AGREEMENT   TO    THIS    END THE    REAL 

INTERNATIONAL   GUARANTEE    FOR   NATIONAL   SE- 
CURITY 

BEARING  in  mind  the  reservation  made  by 
the  delegates  of  the  United  States  at  the 
two  Hague  Conferences,  what  are  likely  to 
be  the  methods  adopted  for  the  enforcement  of  in- 
ternational law  and  for  the  administration  of  an 
international  order,  in  the  establishment  of  which 
the  United  States  participates,  and  what  is  likely  to 
be  the  relation  of  the  United  States  thereto  ?  What 
are  the  possible  and  desirable  sanctions  of  interna- 
tional law  and  for  the  findings  of  an  International 
Court  of  Justice  ? 

It  will  be  convenient  to  discuss  the  latter  question 
first. 

It  may  be  assimied,  perhaps,  that  what  Mazzini 
somewhere  described  as  the  philosophy  of  Cain  will 
no  longer  find  a  hearing  in  the  world.  In  a  broad 
sense,  at  least,  the  nations  of  the  world  are  their 
brothers'  keepers.    Those  principles  and  poHcies  and 

96 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE   PEACE      97 

those  conditions  of  human  happiness  and  human 
progress  which  are  not  limited  by  national  boun- 
daries and  are  not  confined  by  any  barriers  of  race, 
or  religion,  or  language  are  not  matters  of  indiffer- 
ence to  any  people.  They  are  the  common  interest 
and  the  joint  concern  of  all.  The  analogy  between 
individuals  and  Governments,  and  that  between 
states  as  members  of  a  federal  system  and  nations  as 
co-operating  equals  in  an  international  order,  is 
illuminating  and  helpful,  but  it  must  not  be  pressed 
too  far.  An  individual  is  a  single  responsible  human 
being  whose  deeds  may  be  visited  upon  his  own  head. 
A  nation  is  a  large  community  of  individuals  hold- 
ing different  personal  opinions  and  having  different 
personal  interests,  all  of  whom  may  or  may  not 
agree  with  and  support  a  given  action  of  their 
Government,  and  who  cannot  therefore  be  held  per- 
sonally responsible  for  governmental  policy  without 
injustice  and  unnecessary  injury.  It  is  small  rec- 
ompense for  the  misdeeds  of  a  Government  to  kill 
innocent  men,  women,  and  children  who  are  its  sub- 
jects or  to  ravage  and  destroy  their  property.  There 
are  serious  objections  to  the  use  of  force  as  between 
nations,  which  objections  have  nothing  to  do  with 
pacifist  teachings  or  with  the  doctrine  of  non-re- 
sistance, but  which  arise  out  of  the  natiire  of  the 
facts.  There  is  at  present  no  suggestion  from  any 
authoritative  source  that  some  sort  of  international 
sheriff  should  be  called  into  existence  for  the  piu-- 
pose  of  enforcing  the  findings  of  an  International 
Court  of  Justice.    It  is  everywhere  proposed  to  leave 


98     THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

this  to  international  public  opinion.  There  are, 
however,  well-supported  proposals  that,  in  case  any 
nation  which  has  become  a  member  of  the  proposed 
international  order  shall  issue  an  ultimatum  or 
threaten  war  before  submitting  any  question  which 
arises  to  an  international  judicial  tribunal  or  council 
of  conciliation,  it  shall  be  proceeded  against  forth- 
with by  the  other  Powers;  first,  through  the  use  of 
their  economic  force,  and,  second,  by  the  joint  use 
of  their  military  forces  if  the  nation  in  question 
actually  proceeds  to  make  war  or  invades  another's 
territory. 

In  so  far  as  a  plan  of  this  kind  is  a  recognition  of 
the  undoubted  fact  that  force  of  some  kind  is  the 
ultimate  sanction  in  all  human  affairs,  it  is  on  safe 
ground.  When,  however,  it  proposes  to  make  im- 
mediate practical  application  of  this  principle  in  the 
manner  described,  the  case  is  by  no  means  so  clear. 
It  is  not  imlikely,  for  example,  that  the  adoption  of 
such  a  policy  would  require  that  every  war  of  what- 
ever character  should  become  in  effect  a  world  war. 
If  it  be  repHed  that  the  joint  forces  of  the  other 
Powers  would  be  so  overwhelming  that  no  one  Power 
would  venture  to  defy  them,  then  one  who  recalls 
the  political  and  military  history  of  Europe  must  be 
permitted  to  doubt.  Other  matters  apart,  it  is  not 
always  so  easy  to  determine  to  the  general  satis- 
faction which  of  several  parties  to  an  agreement  is 
the  first  aggressor  as  to  warrant  the  terrible  conse- 
quences that  would  follow  from  treating  as  an  act 
of  aggression  on  the  part  of  a  given  nation  what  that 


THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE      99 

nation  considered  an  act  of  self-defense,  thereby 
precipitating  a  world  war  through  the  application  of 
the  principle  in  question.  If  one  will  take  the  pains 
to  examine  with  care  the  official  communications 
which  passed  between  the  various  European  Gov- 
ernments between  July  23  and  August  4,  19 14,  it 
will  be  apparent  what  pains  each  Government  was 
taking  to  put  some  other  Government  in  the  wrong. 
With  time  to  make  leisurely  examination  of  the 
records,  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  has  made  up 
its  mind  on  these  points  so  far  as  the  present  war  is 
concerned.  But  would  it  have  been  practicable,  or 
indeed  possible,  for  a  concert  of  nations  to  have 
moved  with  their  joint  military  forces  against 
Austria-Hungary,  or  Russia,  or  Germany  in  the  first 
days  of  August,  19 14,  and  have  been  quite  sure  of 
their  ground  ?  If  it  be  said  that  in  the  presence  of 
such  an  agreement  among  the  nations  as  is  sug- 
gested no  such  acts  of  aggression  as  were  committed 
in  the  last  days  of  July  and  the  first  days  of  August, 
1 9 14,  would  have  taken  place,  the  obvious  reply  is 
that  this  is  a  very  large  and  a  very  dangerous  as- 
sumption. 

An  even  more  interesting  illustration  may  be 
given.  On  April  20,  19 14,  the  President  of  the 
United  States  in  a  formal  address  to  the  Congress 
narrated  certain  circumstances  which  occurred  at 
Tampico,  Mexico,  on  April  9  and  the  days  next 
following.  Having  set  forth  the  facts  concerning 
these  incidents,  the  President  continued:  "I,  there- 
fore, come  to  ask  your  approval  that  I  should  use 


loo    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  in  such  ways 
and  to  such  an  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  obtain 
from  General  Huerta  and  his  adherents  the  fullest 
recognition  of  the  rights  and  dignity  of  the  United 
States."  Two  days  later  the  Congress  adopted  a 
joint  resolution  declaring  that  the  President  was 
justified  in  the  employment  of  armed  forces  of  the 
United  States  to  enforce  his  demand  for  unequivocal 
amends  for  certain  affronts  and  indignities  com- 
mitted against  the  United  States,  and  at  the  same 
time  disclaimed  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  any 
hostility  to  the  Mexican  people  or  any  piirpose  to 
make  war  upon  Mexico.  It  so  happened  that  be- 
tween the  day  of  the  President's  address  to  the  Con- 
gress and  that  of  the  passage  of  the  joint  resolution, 
namely,  on  April  21,  the  admiral  commanding  the 
American  Navy  off  Vera  Cruz,  acting  under  orders, 
landed  a  force  of  marines  at  that  place  and  seized 
the  custom-house.  In  these  operations  nineteen 
American  marines  were  reported  killed  and  seventy 
wounded,  while  the  Mexican  loss  was  reported  to  be 
one  himdred  and  twenty-six  killed  and  one  hun- 
dred and  ninety-five  woimded.  That  legally  this 
was  an  act  of  war  can  hardly  be  doubted. 

At  the  time  of  these  incidents  there  was  in  exis- 
tence a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico 
which  explicitly  provided  that  any  disagreement 
arising  between  the  Governments  of  the  two  repub- 
lics should,  if  possible,  be  settled  in  such  manner  as 
to  preserve  the  state  of  peace  and  friendship  that 
existed  when  the  treaty  was  made,  and  that  if  the 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     loi 

two  Governments  themselves  should  not  be  able  to 
come  to  an  agreement  a  resort  shoiild  not  on  that 
account  be  had  to  reprisals,  aggression,  or  hostil- 
ity of  any  kind  until  that  Government  which  deemed 
itself  aggrieved  should  have  maturely  considered, 
in  the  spirit  of  peace  and  good  neighborship,  whether 
it  would  not  be  better  that  such  difference  should 
be  settled  by  the  arbitration  of  commissioners  ap- 
pointed on  each  side  or  by  that  of  a  friendly  nation. 
This  provision,  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  Guada- 
lupe Hidalgo,  proclaimed  July  4,  1848,  was  explicitly 
reaffirmed  in  the  Gadsden  Treaty,  proclaimed  June 
30.  1854. 

These  being  the  facts,  would  it  be  the  contention 
of  those  who  lu-ge  the  use  of  force  to  compel  a  power 
to  submit  its  international  disputes  to  a  judicial 
tribunal  or  to  a  council  of  conciliation  before  making 
or  threatening  war,  >  that  had  such  an  agreement 
been  in  existence  in  April,  19 14,  the  armies  and  navies 
of  Great  Britain,  of  France,  of  Germany,  of  Russia, 
of  Italy,  and  of  Japan  should  have  jointly  moved 
against  the  United  States?  Would  such  action,  if 
taken,  have  been  likely  to  promote  international 
peace  or  to  compel  prolonged  and  destructive  in- 
ternational war  ? 

Again,  if  it  be  said  that  with  such  an  agreement  in 
force  the  Government  of  the  United  States  would  not 
have  taken  the  action  in  question,  the  answer  must 
be  that  such  an  inference  is,  to  say  the  least,  exceed- 
ingly doubtful. 

Those  who  deal  with  the  facts  of  international  re- 


I02    THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

lationships  and  who  refuse  to  be  misled  by  formulas 
and  mere  generalizations  must  find  many  reasons  to 
withhold  their  assent  from  any  plan  which  imder  the 
circumstances  just  stated  would  have  compelled  the 
various  Powers  of  Europe,  with  all  of  whom  the 
United  States  was  on  friendly  relations,  to  make 
joint  war  upon  the  American  people.  It  is  difficult 
to  contemplate  such  an  event  or  its  possibility  hav- 
ing any  place  in  a  plan  whose  aim  is  to  secure  a 
durable  peace. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  only  practical  sanction  of 
international  law  is  the  public  opinion  of  the  civilized 
world.  Even  now  nations  are  not  anxious  to  incur 
the  condemnation  of  other  peoples.  Such  condem- 
nation leads  to  unfriendliness,  and  unfriendliness 
leads  to  economic  and  intellectual  isolation.  These 
are  universally  disliked  and  dreaded.  The  strongest 
Governments  are  the  quickest  to  respond,  as  a  rule, 
to  the  judgment  of  international  public  opinion. 
It  is  in  highest  degree  deplorable  that  the  German 
Government  felt  itself  strong  enough  to  defy  the 
public  opinion  of  the  world  in  its  relation  to  the 
origin  of  the  present  war  and  in  its  conduct  of  it; 
but  in  so  doing  it  departed  from  the  precepts  and  the 
practice  of  Bismarck.  He  was  always  anxious  that 
before  beginning  a  war  steps  should  be  taken  to 
predispose  the  opinion  of  other  nations  in  favor  of 
his  policies  and  acts.  That  decent  respect  to  the 
opinions  of  mankind  upon  which  was  rested  the  first 
national  public  act  in  the  Western  World  is  still  a 
powerful  moving  force  among  men  and  nations.    It 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     103 

may  well  be  doubted  whether  this  very  sanction  is 
not  more  effective  in  securing  obedience  even  to 
municipal  law  than  are  the  punishments  which  the 
various  statutes  provide.  Many  a  man  who  would 
not  fear  the  legal  penalty  of  a  wrong  act  is  with- 
held from  it  by  fear  of  the  terrible  punishment 
which  is  involved  in  the  loss  of  the  respect  and  con- 
fidence of  his  fellow  men. 

So  far  as  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  con- 
cerned, there  would  appear  to  be  an  almost  insuper- 
able obstacle  to  their  joining  in  an  agreement  to 
make  war  upon  a  recalcitrant  nation  which  might 
insist  upon  beginning  hostilities  before  submitting 
a  dispute  to  arbitration.  There  is  no  higher  or  more 
solemn  act  of  sovereignty  than  the  declaration  of 
war.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  lodges 
this  power  in  the  Congress.  Should  the  United 
States  enter  into  an  international  agreement  to  con- 
tribute its  military  and  naval  forces  to  a  joint  war 
against  some  other  nation  not  named,  at  a  time  not 
stated,  and  under  circumstances  only  generally  de- 
scribed, then — waiving  all  questions  of  constitu- 
tionality— ^it  woiild  have  put  the  power  to  exercise 
this  solemn  sovereign  act  in  commission.  After  an 
interval  of  years,  or  perhaps  of  decades,  the  people 
of  the  United  States  might  awake  some  morning  to 
find  themselves  at  war  with  Russia,  or  with  Greece, 
or  with  Spain,  or  with  Argentina,  because  of  some 
happening  of  which  they  themselves  knew  little  or 
nothing  and  on  accoimt  of  which  they  might  well 
regard  going  to  war  as  incredible.     The  chances 


I04    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

that  under  such  circumstances  an  agreement  of  this 
kind  would  be  kept  are  not  very  great.  It  ought 
not,  therefore,  to  be  entered  into. 

In  this  connection  it  is  worth  while  recalling  the 
fact  that  when,  on  March  i8,  19 13,  President  Wilson 
announced  the  unwillingness  of  the  United  States 
to  participate  in  the  so-called  six-power  loan  to 
China,  he  gave  as  a  reason  the  fact  that  the  respon- 
sibility which  participation  in  the  loan  would  in- 
volve might  go  to  the  length,  in  some  unhappy  con- 
tingency, of  bringing  about  forcible  intervention  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  in  the  financial  and 
even  in  the  political  affairs  of  China. 

The  international  guarantee  for  national  security 
for  which  the  nations,  those  of  Europe  in  particular, 
are  seeking  would  be  had  through  the  establishment 
of  the  institutions  and  by  the  declaration  of  prin- 
ciples that  have  been  already  set  forth  and  described. 
The  support  and  the  sanction  of  these  institutions 
and  their  guarantees  would  be  the  public  opinion  of 
the  world.  By  this  is  meant  not  the  opinion  of 
Governments  only,  but  the  instructed  and  enlight- 
ened opinion  of  the  peoples  who  owe  allegiance  to 
these  Governments,  The  several  nations  would 
not  disarm,  but  they  might  well  begin  to  limit  their 
armaments  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  a  mutual 
agreement.  The  faces  of  mankind  would  be  set  to- 
ward a  happier  and  more  peaceful  future,  but  neither 
Utopia  nor  the  millennium  would  be  reached  at 
once. 


XV 


THE  PART  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  IN  THE  ENFORCE- 
MENT OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  IN  THE 
ADMINISTRATION      OF      A     NEW      INTERNATIONAL 

ORDER THE"    MONROE    DOCTRINE — A    EUROPEAN 

AND  AN  AMERICAN  SPHERE  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION — PREPARATION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
FOR  INTERNATIONAL  PARTICIPATION — NATIONAL 
POLICY   AND   NATIONAL   SERVICE 

THE  relation  of  the  United  States  to  the 
methods  that  will  be  adopted  for  the  en- 
forcement of  international  law  and  for  the 
administration  of  an  international  order  is  a  matter 
of  highest  concern  not  only  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States  themselves  but  to  the  people  of  Eu- 
rope as  well.  If,  an  international  order  having  been 
established  with  the  co-operation  of  the  United 
States,  the  responsibility  for  the  administration  of 
that  international  order  in  Europe  and  in  those 
parts  of  Asia  and  Africa  that  are  politically  de- 
pendent thereon,  is  a  matter  in  which  the  United 
States  will  not  directly  concern  itself,  then  it  is  im- 
portant that  this  fact  and  its  implications  be  clearly 
understood. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  we  come  face  to  face  with 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States,  built,  it 
has  always  been  believed,  upon  obedience  to  the  in- 
junction of  Washington's  Farewell  Address  and  upon 

los 


io6    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

the  declarations  and  policies  that  taken  together 
constitute  what  is  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
It  was  this  which  the  American  delegates  to  the 
two  Hague  Conferences  had  in  mind  when  they 
made  the  formal  declaration  of  reservation  that  has 
already  been  quoted. 

As  a  matter  of  pure  theory  it  might  readily  be 
argued  that,  in  looking  to  the  future  of  the  world's 
peace  and  comity,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  United 
States  should  not  imite  on  equal  terms  with  the  na- 
tions of  Europe  to  assume  international  duties  and 
responsibilities  in  all  parts  of  the  world.  On  the 
contrary,  viewed  thieoretically,  many  reasons  might 
be  brought  forward  why  such  a  new  departure  in 
policy  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  would  be 
sound  and  judicious.  Whatever  may  prove  to  be 
possible  a  century  hence,  it  seems  quite  plain  that  as 
a  practical  matter  the  people  of  the  United  States 
could  not  now  be  induced  to  take  any  such  novel 
and  revolutionary  steps.  Their  form  of  government 
is  not  well  adjusted  to  possible  action  of  this  kind 
and  their  habits  of  thought  would  make  any  con- 
sistent and  persistent  co-operation  of  this  sort  prob- 
ably out  of  the  question,  at  least  for  the  present  and 
for  some  time  to  come. 

It  is,  of  course,  true  that  the  precise  facts  which 
Washington  had  in  mind  when  he  wrote  his  Fare- 
well Address  and  those  which  Monroe  had  in  mind 
when  he  sent  his  message  of  December  2,  1823, 
to  the  Congress,  have  long  since  changed.  There 
is   no  longer  any  such  thing  as  a  European  sys- 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     107 

tern  of  government  which  might  be  extended  to 
this  or  any  other  continent.  The  spread  of  dem- 
ocratic ideas  and  principles  has  brought  by  far 
the  larger  number  of  European  nations  under  their 
sway,  and  the  love  of  liberty  is  just  as  strong  in  the 
breasts  of  those  peoples  as  it  is  in  the  breasts  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  Time  is  on  the  side  of 
democracy.  Those  nations  which  still  maintain 
barriers  against  it  in  their  governmental  forms  are 
bound  to  give  way  with  more  or  less  good  grace  and 
in  a  shorter  or  a  longer  time.  The  gap  which  sepa- 
rates Europe  and  America  is  no  longer  one  made 
by  the  difference  between  their  political  philosophies, 
for  these  have  been  steadily  growing  into  closer 
accord.  It  is  no  longer  one  made  by  wide  and  tem- 
pestuous oceans  crossed  with  danger  and  difficulty, 
for  steam  and  electricity  have  united  to  make  this 
distance  almost  negligible.  The  real  gap  is  the  one 
signified  by  the  distinction  between  the  names  Old 
World  and  New  World.  This  difference,  which  of 
course  has  its  roots  in  history,  may  be  in  large  part 
sentimental,  but  it  is  on  that  accotmt  none  the  less 
real  and  compelling.  It  was  just  this  distinction 
which  underlay  the  counsels  of  Washington.  It 
would  be  foolish  to  treat  those  counsels  as  an  in- 
junction never  to  be  modified  or  departed  from,  no 
matter  what  might  be  the  changed  conditions  in 
the  world,  and  it  would  be  incorrect  to  read  into 
them  a  severe  and  narrow  meaning  which  they  do 
not  necessarily  have;  and  yet  it  remains  true  that 
progress  is  more  likely  to  be  made  by  the  American 


io8    THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE   PEACE 

people  through  following  those  counsels  and  through 
modifjring  them  in  various  ways  as  circumstances 
invite  or  compel  than  through  departing  from  them 
entirely  in  an  effort  to  strike  out  in  new  and  hitherto 
untried  paths. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  national  policy  that  has 
come  to  be  widely  recognized  and  in  large  part  ac- 
cepted by  European  nations.  It  is  not  a  part  of 
international  law,  but  it  might  easily  become  so  in 
the  working  out  of  an  international  order,  responsi- 
bility for  the  administration  of  which  will  be  divided 
into  two  spheres,  one  European,  the  other  American. 
Before  sending  the  message  in  which  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  announced,  Monroe  consulted  Jeffer- 
son and  received  from  him  a  well-known  letter  in 
which  this  striking  passage  occurs:  "The  question 
presented  by  letters  you  have  sent  me  is  the  most 
momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my  con- 
templation since  that  of  independence.  That  made 
us  a  nation;  this  sets  our  compass  and  points  the 
course  which  we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean  of 
time  opening  on  us.  .  .  .  Our  first  and  fimdamental 
maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the 
broils  of  Eiirope;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe 
to  intermeddle  with  Cis- Atlantic  affairs."  Shortly 
afterward  Daniel  Webster,  who  represented  the  op- 
posite pole  of  political  thought,  speaking  in  his 
place  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  used  these 
words  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine:  "I  will  neither  help 
to  erase  it  or  tear  it  out ;  nor  shall  it  be,  by  any  act 
of  mine,  blurred  or  blotted.     It  did  honor  to  the 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     109 

sagacity  of  the  Government,  and  will  not  diminish 
that  honor."  Two  generations  later,  in  his  message 
of  December  17,  1895,  to  the  Congress,  President 
Cleveland  described  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  in- 
tended to  apply  to  every  stage  of  our  national  life 
and  to  last  while  our  republic  endures. 

While  State  papers  give  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
more  or  less  precise  statement  and  significance,  in 
the  minds  of  the  people  as  a  whole  it  betokens  rather 
a  point  of  view  and  a  general  guiding  principle  of 
international  policy.  Even  if  it  were  desirable  to 
attempt  to  change  this  national  point  of  view  and 
to  alter  this  guiding  principle  of  policy,  it  would  be 
quite  impracticable  to  do  so.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine must  be  accepted  as  an  elementary  fact  in 
attempting  to  arrive  at  any  practical  conclusion  as 
to  the  participation  of  the  United  States  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  a  new  international  order.  So  far 
as  European  territory  and  jurisdiction  are  concerned, 
the  new  international  order  will  have  to  be  admin- 
istered by  the  European  nations  themselves.  So 
far  as  American  territory  and  jurisdiction  are  con- 
cerned, the  new  international  order  will  have  to  be 
administered  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  in 
friendly  concert  with  those  of  the  other  American 
republics. 

The  formal  erection  of  these  two  separate  juris- 
dictions need  not  in  the  least  weaken  the  position  or 
the  influence  of  the  United  States  in  the  counsels  and 
semi-legislative  acts  which  will  lay  the  basis  for  a 
durable  peace,  and  out  of  which  the  new  interna- 


no    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

tional  order  will  grow.  Neither  should  it  be  held  to 
deprive  the  people  of  the  United  States  of  the  op- 
portunity and  the  right  to  give  expression  to  their 
feelings  and  convictions  when  questions  of  law  and 
justice,  of  right  and  wrong,  are  raised  as  between 
nations  in  any  part  of  the  world.  It  simply  means 
that  for  the  reasons  stated  and  on  the  grounds  given 
the  direct  responsibility  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  for  the  enforcement  of  the  new  inter- 
national order  will  be  limited  to  the  American  conti- 
nents and  to  territory  belonging  to  some  one  of  the 
American  republics. 

For  participation  in  this  task  of  international 
counsel  and  of  better  international  administration 
the  people  of  the  United  States  must  prepare  them- 
selves. They  must  come  to  imderstand,  while  the 
largest  measure  of  local  self-government  is  vital  to 
the  continued  existence  and  effective  working  of  our 
domestic  institutions,  that  when  the  nation  acts  in 
foreign  policy  it  must  act  as  a  unit  and  its  action 
must  be  everywhere  upheld.  A  wrong  step  in  do- 
mestic legislation  can  be  corrected  with  no  damage  to 
any  one  but  ourselves.  A  wrong  step  in  foreign 
policy,  however,  can  never  be  corrected,  for  it  af- 
fects not  only  ourselves  but  the  opinion  which  others 
have  of  us.  The  present  German  Emperor  is  re- 
ported to  have  said  on  one  occasion  that  he  did  not 
see  how  his  Government  could  ever  make  another 
treaty  with  the  United  States,  because,  under  our 
constitutional  law,  treaty  provisions,  so  far  as  they 
were  mimicipal  law  in  the  United  States,  might  be 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     iii 

and  frequently  were  modified  or  repealed  by  a  sub- 
sequent act  of  Congress  without  any  formal  notice 
to  the  other  high  contracting  party.  It  is,  of  course, 
well  known  that  the  treaty-making  power  of  the 
United  States  bristles  with  difficult  and  delicate 
questions,  and  it  must  be  conceded  that  if  the  United 
States  is  to  become  an  effective  international  in- 
fluence in  support  of  the  ideas  and  principles  upon 
which  its  own  Government  and  polity  are  based,  and 
if  it  is  to  lend  useful  aid  in  securing  and  maintain- 
ing a  durable  peace,  it  must  first  set  its  own  house 
in  order.  It  must  have  a  care  to  make  no  interna- 
tional agreements  and  to  assume  no  international 
responsibilities  which  it  will  not  keep  and  bear  to  the 
full,  at  whatever  cost  to  itself.  Having  made  such 
engagements  they  must  be  scrupulously  observed. 
To  bring  this  to  pass  means  that  the  treaty-making 
power  must  not  march  far  in  advance  of  supporting 
public  opinion  and  that  the  whole  power  of  the  Gov- 
ernment must  be  available  to  enforce  the  terms  of  a 
treaty  once  entered  into. 

These  questions  of  constitutional  law  and  of  polit- 
ical policy  are  boimd  up  with  questions  affecting  the 
military  and  naval  systems  of  the  United  States. 
Competition  in  armaments  is  the  worst  possible 
form  of  international  rivalry;  but  to  take  a  seat  at 
an  international  council  table  in  the  present  state  of 
world  public  opinion  and  world  policy  without  some 
effective  means  of  representing  a  nation's  purpose 
is  to  reduce  such  participation  to  mere  futile  debate. 
The   other  liberty-loving  nations  would  be   quite 


112    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

justified  in  asking  two  questions  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States :  first,  what  are  the  poHcies 
which  you  believe  to  be  just  and  practicable  as  part 
of  a  new  international  order;  and,  second,  what  con- 
tribution can  you  and  will  you  make  to  the  support 
of  that  international  order  if  you  join  with  us  in 
bringing  it  into  being?  It  is,  perhaps,  by  coming 
face  to  face  with  these  searching  questions  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  will  most  quickly  be 
brought  to  realize  what  new  domestic  policies  they 
must  enter  upon  in  order  to  prepare  themselves  for 
international  participation.  The  spirit  of  interna- 
tional and  of  national  devotion  which  time  and  time 
again  has  triumphed  over  provincialism,  local  in- 
terest, and  selfishness  must  be  appealed  to  once  more. 
National  service  can  no  longer  remain  an  empty 
phrase,  but  must  be  given  life  and  meaning  and 
universal  application.  As  the  spirit  and  principles 
of  democracy  require  that  there  be  the  widest  possi- 
ble participation  in  the  formulation  of  public  poUcy, 
so  this  spirit  and  these  principles  require  that  there 
shall  be  the  widest  possible  participation  in  the 
nation's  service,  and,  if  need  be,  in  its  defense.  An 
army  of  hired  soldiers  as  the  chief  dependence  of  a 
democratic  people  is  as  much  of  an  anachronism  as 
an  army  of  hired  voters  would  be.  The  coimtry's 
system  of  public  education  must  be  taken  in  strong 
hand,  purged  of  much  of  its  sentimentality  and  weak 
and  futile  philosophizing,  and  made  more  and  more 
a  genuine  preparation  of  American  youth  for  intel- 
ligent and  helpful  participation  in  American  life. 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     113 

Outside  of  and  beyond  the  public  educational  sys- 
tem of  the  nation  there  should  be  established  with- 
out delay  a  system  of  iiniversal  training  for  national 
service  and,  should  it  ever  be  needed,  for  national 
defense.  Such  a  policy  is  the  antithesis  of  mili- 
tarism; it  is  democracy  conscious  and  mindful  of 
its  duties  and  responsibilities  as  well  as  of  its  rights. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  will  never  become 
an  important  agency  in  the  development  of  helpful 
world  policies  imless  they  first  take  those  steps  that 
both  entitle  and  enable  them  genuinely  to  partici- 
pate in  such  a  task.  Every  belligerent  nation  is  re- 
ceiving at  the  hands  of  this  war  the  severest  possible 
course  of  instruction  and  discipline.  Every  impor- 
tant belligerent  nation  will  emerge  from  this  war  a 
generation  or  perhaps  a  century  in  advance  of  the 
United  States  in  all  that  pertains  to  national  service, 
to  national  sacrifice,  and  to  that  strengthening  of 
character  which  comes  not  from  talking  about  ideals 
but  from  actively  supporting  them  in  the  most 
fiery  of  contests.  It  is  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States  to  find  ways  and  means  of  learning  the  lessons 
of  the  war  without  having  to  pay  the  awful  cost  in 
life  and  treasure  which  military  participation  in  it 
involves.  Their  future  place  in  the  world's  history, 
the  regard  which  other  nations  will  have  for  them, 
and  their  own  more  fortunate  and  just  development 
all  depend  upon  the  way  in  which  these  searching 
problems  are  solved.  It  deprives  a  nation's  voice  of 
half  its  force  if  it  protests  against  cruelty  and  op- 
pression and  injustice  abroad  while  there  are  cruelty 


114    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

and  oppression  and  injustice  at  home.  The  war  has 
forced  all  these  considerations  upon  Great  Britain 
and  France  and  Germany  and  Russia  and  the  rest, 
and  they  are  dealing  with  them  each  in  its  own  way. 
The  war  has  also  forced  these  considerations  upon  the 
people  of  the  United  States.  How  are  they  going  to 
deal  with  them  ?  Will  they  merely  wish  to  have  a 
durable  peace,  or  will  they  so  act  at  home  and  abroad 
as  to  help  to  insure  a  durable  peace  ? 


XVI 

CONCLUSION — QUESTIONS      FOR      THE      FUTURE — THE 
ESSENTIALS    OF    A   DURABLE    PEACE 

THE  ground  proposed  to  be  covered  in  these 
discussions  has  now  been  traversed.  Start- 
ing with  the  assumptions  that  the  principles 
and  pohcies  for  which  the  Alhes  are  contending 
must  prevail  if  the  war  is  to  be  followed  by  a  dur- 
able peace,  and  that  the  progress  of  military  opera- 
tions thus  far  has  made  it  plain  that  Germany  and 
the  Powers  associated  with  her  cannot  possibly  win 
the  war  but  must  in  all  probability  shortly  give 
way  before  the  military  and  economic  superiority  of 
the  Allies,  an  effort  was  first  made  to  find  a  possible 
point  of  departure  for  the  consideration  of  the  basis 
of  a  durable  peace.  This  appeared  to  be  provided 
by  certain  recent  statements  of  Viscount  Grey  and 
Chancellor  von  Bethmann-HoUweg  as  to  the  objects 
for  which  the  Allies  and  the  Germanic  Powers,  re- 
spectively, are  contending.  A  comparison  of  these 
statements  led  to  a  discussion  of  what  is  meant  by 
the  rights  of  nations,  great  and  small,  and  of  what 
is  involved  in  providing  them  with  a  satisfactory 
guarantee  for  their  security,  including  the  open 
door  policy  in  international  trade.  An  examination 
of  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "freedom  of  the  seas" 
followed,  and  then  a  discussion  of  the  part  played 

"S 


ii6    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

by  France  and  by  Russia  in  the  war,  and  of  the  spe- 
cific acts  and  policies  which  would  probably  be  asked 
for  by  them  as  conditions  of  a  durable  peace.  It 
next  became  necessary  to  analyze  what  is  meant  by 
Prussian  militarism,  which  it  is  a  chief  aim  of  the 
Allies  to  destroy.  So  much  being  premised,  there 
followed  an  examination  of  the  progress  heretofore 
made  in  the  establishment  of  an  international  order, 
and  this  was  followed  by  specific  suggestions  for  the 
development  and  strengthening  of  that  international 
order  in  ways  and  for  the  purposes  that  have  been 
set  forth  in  detail.  It  was  natural  to  examine  next, 
with  some  particularity,  the  possible  and  the  prob- 
able attitude  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to- 
ward such  an  international  order,  toward  its  ad- 
ministration, and  toward  the  future  enforcement  of 
international  law.  As  a  corollary  to  the  examination 
of  these  points,  some  suggestions  were  offered  as  to 
the  lessons  of  this  war  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States  in  matters  of  their  own  domestic  policy. 

In  this  survey  many  matters,  some  of  them  highly 
important,  have  been  left  on  one  side.  There  is, 
for  example,  the  question  as  to  the  best  disposition, 
in  the  interest  of  a  durable  peace,  of  the  colonial 
possessions  that  were  held  by  Germany  at  the  out- 
break of  the  war.  This  natiirally  raises  questions  as 
to  the  future  policy  of  the  civilized  nations  toward 
the  whole  subject  of  colonization  and  the  assumption 
of  sovereignty  over  new  territory.  Then  there  is 
the  Far  East,  with  its  special  problems.  At  the  mo- 
ment this  is  an  area  in  which  both  the  European 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     117 

nations  and  the  United  States  participate,  after  a 
fashion,  in  the  carrying  out  of  various  important 
poHcies  of  an  international  character.  Whether  it 
would  be  best  to  look  forward  to  a  continuance,  for 
some  time  at  least,  of  this  general  relationship,  or 
whether  it  would  be  better  to  institute  in  the  Far 
East  a  third  administrative  area  for  the  carrying  on 
of  an  international  order  and  the  enforcement  of 
international  law,  with  chief  responsibility  in  the 
hands  of  Japan,  that  nation  operating  under  a  sort  of 
Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine,  is  well  worth  considering. 

Important  questions  suggest  themselves  as  to  the 
domestic  policy  of  various  peoples  toward  races  and 
religions  represented  in  the  populations  dependent 
upon  them,  which  frequently  give  rise  to  interna- 
tional unrest  and  international  friction.  Instances 
of  this  sort  are  the  Armenians  in  Turkey,  the  Finns 
in  Russia,  the  Serbians  in  Austria,  and  the  Jews  in 
both  Russia  and  Rumania.  Not  all  of  these  vexed 
questions  will  be  answered  within  the  lifetime  of 
any  one  now  living;  but  if  certain  principles  of  na- 
tional and  international  conduct  are  kept  clearly  in 
view,  and  if  an  international  order  is  erected  on 
those  principles  as  a  foundation  and  a  true  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  established,  then  a  possible 
way  will  have  been  provided  for  the  calm  considera- 
tion and  judicial  examination  of  even  such  perplex- 
ing questions  as  these. 

Finally,  there  is  the  whole  question  of  disarma- 
ment, or  rather  the  limitation  of  armaments,  the 
presentation  of  which  by  the  Tsar  was  the  formal 


ii8    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

reason  for  the  calling  of  the  first  Hague  Conference. 
This  same  question,  it  must  be  remembered,  was 
considered  by  the  British  representatives  at  the 
second  Hague  Conference  to  have  a  bearing  on  the 
so-called  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  particularly  on 
the  exemption  of  private  property,  not  contraband, 
from  capture.  Even  if  what  appears  to  be  a  durable 
peace  is  the  outcome  of  the  present  war,  it  is  plain 
that  the  world  will  have  left  enough  hard  problems 
of  an  international  character  to  occupy  it,  even 
without  war,  for  generations  to  come. 

The  deep  underlying  causes  of  the  present  war 
must  be  understood  and  taken  into  full  considera- 
tion in  any  discussion  of  a  durable  peace  that  is  to 
have  practical  value.  By  this  is  not  meant  the  nar- 
row question  of  the  precise  sequence  of  events  from 
July  23  to  August  I,  1 9 14,  or  the  weight  to  be  at- 
tached to  any  given  act  or  word  of  any  particular 
Government  at  that  hectic  time.  All  these  matters, 
as  was  said  at  the  outset  of  these  discussions,  are  for 
the  time  at  least  of  merely  historical  interest.  Some 
day  the  dispassionate  writer  of  history  will  set  out  an 
accotmt  of  them  which  will  govern  the  belief  of  the 
generations  that  are  to  come;  but  this  is  after  all  a 
minor  matter.  The  real  imderlying  cause  of  the 
war  was  an  irrepressible  conflict  between  two  views 
and  ideals  of  national  development  and  of  civiliza- 
tion. As  has  already  been  explained,  the  militaristic 
policy  of  Prussia,  extended  for  the  time  being  over 
all  Germany  and  Germany's  allies,  represents  and 
gives  voice  to  an  old  and  dying  order.     Perhaps 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     119 

that  militaristic  policy  was  at  one  time  necessary 
to  the  development  not  only  of  Prussia  and  of 
Germany  but  of  the  worid  at  large;  but  if  so,  it 
has  long  since  served  its  proper  purpose  and  must 
now  give  way  to  the  wiser,  more  hiimane,  and  more 
advanced  philosophy  of  national  and  international 
life,  for  which  the  Allies,  despite  all  their  superficial 
differences,  are  contending  with  an  amazing  single- 
ness of  purpose. 

To  conquer  the  militaristic  ideal,  as  represented 
for  the  moment  by  Prussian  policy,  will  not  be 
enough  to  insure  a  durable  peace.  The  spirit  and 
the  point  of  view  which  manifest  themselves  in  mili- 
tarism, in  the  subordination  of  civil  to  military  au- 
thority and  policy,  and  in  the  setting  of  right  below 
might,  must  be  driven  out  of  the  hearts  and  minds  of 
men.  It  will  not  be  enough  to  drive  them  out  of  the 
hearts  and  minds  of  Prussians  and  Germans;  they 
must  be  driven  out  of  the  hearts  and  minds  of  those 
Englishmen,  those  Frenchmen,  those  Russians, 
those  Americans,  and  those  Japanese  in  which  they 
may  have  found  lodgment.  This  can  take  place  only 
if  the  minds  and  purposes  of  men  are  controlled  by 
something  that  is  more  powerful  than  militarism  be- 
cause it  is  more  moral  and  more  helpful  to  mankind. 
In  other  words,  the  basis  of  sound  international  pol- 
icy will  be  foimd  in  sound  domestic  poHcy,  and  in 
sympathy  with  equally  soimd  domestic  policies  in 
other  lands.  As  nations  come  more  and  more  to  see 
that  their  greatness  consists  in  doing  justice  and  se- 
curing happiness  at  home  rather  than  in  extending 


I20    THE  BASIS   OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

their  physical  power  over  their  neighbors  and  in 
forcing  their  trade  by  undue  and  unfair  grants  of 
privilege,  the  peaceful  area  of  the  world  will  rapidly 
widen. 

The  institutions  which  the  new  international  or- 
der that  has  here  been  proposed  and  outlined  will 
erect,  should  be  and  doubtless  will  be  of  the  great- 
est value  in  educating  the  mind  of  the  world  toward 
healthier  and  wiser  international  relationships,  but 
those  institutions  cannot  do  the  work  alone.  They 
must  have  behind  them  the  driving  force  of  a  pur- 
pose to  keep  the  peace,  of  a  desire  to  execute  in  spirit 
as  weU  as  in  letter  international  engagements,  and 
also  a  ciirbing  of  those  cruder  and  more  brutal 
forms  of  patriotism  which  manifest  themselves  by 
doing  injustice  and  wrong  to  others.  If  it  be  said 
that  such  a  development  would  mean  the  breaking 
down  of  nations  and  of  nationalism  as  a  force  in  the 
world,  the  answer  is  that  it  will  do  nothing  of  the 
sort.  The  individual  human  being  whose  acts  are 
controlled  by  an  overmastering  sense  of  duty  is  not 
less  of  a  person,  but  more,  than  the  individual  hu- 
man being  whose  acts  are  controlled  by  sheer  sel- 
fishness. What  is  true  of  men  in  this  regard  is  true 
also  of  nations.  A  nation,  like  an  individual,  will 
become  greater  as  it  cherishes  a  high  ideal  and  does 
service  and  helpful  acts  to  its  neighbors  whether 
great  or  small,  and  as  it  co-operates  with  them  in 
working  toward  a  common  end.  If  this  be  pro- 
noimced  Utopian,  then  Utopia  is  the  goal  for  which 
every  moral  person  in  the  world  is  laboring. 


THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE     121 

Though  to  be  defeated  in  this  war,  the  German 
people  will,  on  that  very  account,  have  a  still  more 
important  part  to  play  in  civilization  than  has  yet 
fallen  to  their  lot.  They  have,  it  is  complained, 
come  late  into  the  world,  and  found  the  choice  places 
already  possessed  by  others.  But  the  choice  places 
in  political  development,  in  administrative  compe- 
tence, in  uplifting  and  making  comfortable  the  great 
mass  of  the  population,  in  developing  literature  and 
science  and  art,  and  in  finding  new  ways  to  express 
the  joy  and  satisfaction  of  living,  are  always  open  to 
the  possession  of  any  one  qualified  to  enter  into  them. 
The  sense  of  duty  has  taken  a  strong  hold  of  the  Ger- 
man people  ever  since  Fichte's  time.  It  has  mightily 
increased  the  excellence  of  their  excellences  and  it 
has  greatly  magnified  the  seriousness  of  their  defects. 
Should  this  war  prove  to  be  a  burning  up  of  the  most 
powerful  remnants  of  militarism  that  yet  remain 
in  the  world,  it  will  have  done  the  German  people 
the  greatest  possible  service.  One  hundred  and 
twenty  millions  of  eager,  active,  purposeful  men, 
living  in  the  temperate  zone  and  having  a  long  tra- 
dition of  heroic  endeavor,  cannot  be  reduced  to 
nothingness  by  any  power  but  their  own.  Stripped 
of  the  militaristic  piupose  and  brought  into  har- 
mony with  the  other  great  peoples  of  the  world,  the 
Germans  would,  it  may  safely  be  predicted,  enter 
upon  a  new  period  of  usefulness  and  achievement 
that  would  make  the  history  of  the  last  hundred 
years  seem  paltry  by  comparison.  What  Frederick 
William  III  so  finely  said  when  the  humiliation  of 


122    THE  BASIS  OF  DURABLE  PEACE 

Jena  was  still  fresh  may  well  be  repeated  one  htin- 
dred  and  ten  years  afterward. 

In  conclusion,  then,  a  durable  peace  depends  upon 
the  victory  of  the  Allies  in  the  present  war  and 
upon  the  establishment  in  public  policy  of  the  prin- 
ciples for  which  they  are  contending.  It  depends 
upon  a  withholding  of  all  acts  of  vengeance  and  re- 
prisal, and  the  just  and  statesmanlike  application  to 
each  specific  problem  that  arises  for  settlement  of 
the  principles  for  which  the  war  is  being  fought. 
It  depends  upon  the  establishment  of  an  interna- 
tional order  and  of  those  international  institutions 
that  have  been  here  sketched  in  outline.  It  depends 
upon  a  spirit  of  devotion  to  that  order  and  to  those 
institutions,  as  well  as  upon  a  fixed  purpose  to  up- 
/  hold  and  to  defend  them.  It  depends  upon  domestic 
'  policies  of  justice  and  helpfulness,  and  the  curbing 
/  of  arrogance,  greed,  and  privilege,  so  far  as  it  is 
/  within  the  power  of  government  to  do  so.  It  de- 
pends upon  the  exaltation  of  the  idea  of  justice,  not 
only  as  between  men  within  a  nation,  but  as  between 
nations  themselves;  for  durable  peace  is  a  by-prod- 
uct of  justice.  When  these  things  are  accomphshed 
there  will  be  every  prospect  of  a  durable  peace  be- 
cause the  essential  prerequisite  will  have  been  pro- 
vided— the  Will  to  Peace. 


APPENDIX 

I.  HALL  CAINE  TO  COSMOS 

n.  COSMOS  TO  HALL  CAINE 

III.  HALL  CAINE  TO  COSMOS 

IV.  COSMOS  TO  HIS  CRITICS 
V.  THE  ARTICLES  OF  COSMOS 


HALL  CAINE  TO  COSMOS 

(Cable  to  The  New  York  Times) 

London,  November  25,  1916. 
To  Cosmos: 

The  New  York  Times  has  done  me,  with  others,  the  honor 
of  asking  me  to  reply  to  your  plea  for  immediate  peace.  I 
recognize  in  your  opinions  and  in  your  method  of  present- 
ing them  a  marked  resemblance  to  the  opinions  and  meth- 
ods of  certain  distinguished  and  honored  EngUshmen,  but, 
assuming  that  you  are  an  American,  I  begin  by  saying  that 
your  whole  argument,  so  far  as  it  has  been  made  known  to 
us  on  this  side  of  the  ocean,  labors  under  the  disadvantage 
of  your  aloofness  from  the  emotions  excited  by  the  war. 
We  have  it  on  ancient  authority  that  the  lookers-on  see 
most  of  the  game;  but  it  will  not  be  denied  that  the  players 
feel  most  of  it,  and  we  think  it  is  necessary  to  feel  as  well 
as  to  see  this  war  in  order  to  know  which  is  the  moment 
most  favorable  for  a  discussion  of  peace. 

I  think  you  have  failed  to  see  that  the  first  condition  of 
such  a  discussion  is  not  the  military  position  of  the  belliger- 
ents but  their  spiritual  temper.  You  say  that  the  similarity 
of  the  recent  utterances  of  Viscount  Grey  and  Herr  von 
Bethmann  HoUweg  gives  hope  of  a  formula  that  would  sat- 
isfy both,  but  we  think  the  peace  speech  of  the  German 
Chancellor  was  inspired  by  the  idea  of  peace  with  German 
victory  behind  it,  and  we  are  not  surprised  that  the  German 
people  should  think  that  the  so-called  peace  speech  of  the 
British  Foreign  Secretary  was  inspired  by  a  corresponding 
idea  of  peace  with  a  victory  for  the  AUies  behind  it.  Not 
until  one  or  the  other  of  these  ministers  approaches  the 
subject  without  the  thought  of  victory,  or  with  the  idea  of 
submission,  or  the  theory  of  a  drawn  war  can  conditions 


126  APPENDIX 

come  to  that  point  which  is  favorable  to  a  discussion  of 
peace.  We  see  no  sign  whatever  of  that  condition  either  in 
England  or  Germany  at  the  present  moment. 

Cause  of  War  Still  an  Issue 

We  gather  that  you  think  it  is  useless  to  concern  ourselves 
now  with  any  question  of  the  causes  of  the  war.  We,  on 
the  contrary,  think  that  this  is  not  only  necessary,  but  in- 
evitable, to  any  hopeful  consideration  of  peace.  We  think 
the  war  had  its  origin  in  a  plot;  that  this  plot  found  its  cli- 
max in  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia;  that  Serbia  could 
only  have  accepted  that  ultimatum  by  ceasing  to  be  a  na- 
tion; that  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  certainly, 
and  the  Kaiser  probably,  knew  and  approved  of  the  terms 
of  the  ultimatum  before  it  was  despatched;  that  the  delib- 
erate object  of  the  ultimatum  was  to  break  the  peace  of 
Europe  in  the  interests  of  Germany's  designs;  that  Germany 
regarded  the  war,  not  merely  as  a  necessary  evil,  but  as  a 
laudable  means  of  obtaining  dominion,  and  that  the  subju- 
gation of  Serbia  and  the  violation  of  Belgium  were  the  logical 
outcome  of  this  false  and  wicked  policy.  We  see  no  evi- 
dence that  Germany  has  repented  of  that  plot,  and  no 
prospect  of  a  lasting  and  authentic  peace  until  she  does 
repent  of  it  or  sufifer  for  not  doing  so. 

We  also  gather  that  you  think  that,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
impossible  at  this  moment  to  discuss  the  motives  of  the 
belligerents,  it  ought  to  be  sufficient  for  us  to  recognize  that, 
equally  with  ourselves,  Germany  believes  she  is  in  the  right. 
But  that  Germany  believes  she  is  in  the  right  makes  her, 
in  our  view,  all  the  more  wrong,  and  a  discussion  of  terms 
of  peace  all  the  more  impossible.  Only  when  she  realizes 
that  she  is  in  the  wrong  can  we  approach  a  discussion  of  a 
peace  that  will  be  permanent,  because  based  not  merely 
on  military  necessities  but  on  a  practical  recognition  of  the 
precepts  of  moral  law.  Of  such  a  realization  we  see  no  sign 
in  Germany  at  present. 

You  think  that  the  time  has  come  for  a  consideration  of 


APPENDIX  127 

peace  because  Germany  must  now  know  that  she  cannot 
win  the  war,  and  because  the  Allies  must  see  that  they  can 
only  win  at  a  cost  that  would  be  scarcely  less  disastrous 
than  defeat;  but  we  think  this  is  a  condition  that  is  less  than 
half-way  toward  peace.  Only  when  Germany  sees  she  must 
certainly  lose  the  war,  or  when  the  Allies  feel  that  the  worst 
disasters  which  may  result  from  going  on  with  it  will  not 
be  atoned  for  by  the  triumph  of  the  principles  they  are 
fighting  for  can  the  favorable  moment  come  for  a  peace 
that  will  be  founded  merely  on  calculations  of  loss  or  gain. 
We  see  no  evidence  whatever  that  the  belligerents  are  yet 
willing  to  accept  these  conclusions. 

Wicked  Waste  est  Ending  War  Now 

We  gather  that  you  think  that  because  the  war  has  gone 
on  so  long  without  producing  any  results  except  immeasur- 
able misery  it  should  stop,  having  failed  in  whatever  object 
the  belligerents  expected  from  it;  but  it  is  just  because  the 
war  has  thus  far  produced  no  definite  military  results  that 
we  think  it  cannot  stop.  We  think  that  to  end  the  war 
now,  after  so  much  suffering  and  sacrifice,  by  any  form  of 
inconclusive  peace,  which  would  prove  and  establish  noth- 
ing, would  be  waste — wanton,  wicked,  irretrievable,  inex- 
cusable, blind,  and  blinding  waste  such  as  we  dare  not  for 
one  moment  contemplate.  We  think  such  a  peace  would 
be  treason  to  the  dead,  disloyalty  to  the  living,  an  assault 
on  the  authority  of  government,  an  open  appeal  to  the  law- 
lessness of  anarchy,  a  deliberate  outrage  on  the  principles 
of  patriotism,  and  even  on  the  sacred  precepts  of  religion. 

You  think  the  time  favorable  for  a  discussion  of  peace, 
because  the  Allies,  though  they  may  well  win,  cannot  want, 
and  would  not,  probably,  be  able  utterly  to  crush  their  ene- 
mies. But  though  such  of  us  as  know  history  and  take  a 
human  view  of  war  and  its  probable  results  have  never  hoped 
for  or  dreamed  of  the  extermination  of  Germany  as  an  empire, 
we  have,  indeed,  hoped  for  and  dreamed  of  the  destruction 


128  APPENDIX 

of  the  German  political  ideal  which  is  based,  as  we  see  it, 
on  the  idea  that  civilization,  culture,  and  the  general  wel- 
fare of  the  human  family  are  secured  by  the  dominion  and 
tyranny  of  the  sword,  with  its  inevitable  consequences  of 
the  violation  of  the  liberties  of  little  nations  and  the  gen- 
eral Germanizing  of  the  world.  After  two  and  a  half  years 
of  war  we  see  no  sign  yet  that  Germany  has  parted  com- 
pany with  this  ideal  and  therefore  no  indication  of  a  peace 
that  could  be  built  on  Christian  principles  of  the  equal 
rights  of  all  peoples. 

You  think  that  to  prolong  the  war  at  a  cost  of  more  and 
worse  suffering  would  lead  to  such  exacerbation  of  the  feel- 
ings of  the  belligerents  as  would  be  deleterious  to  the  future 
peace  of  Europe.  We  think,  on  the  contrary,  that  to  end 
it  at  this  inconclusive  stage,  when  neither  side  can  be  said 
to  have  reached  a  military  conclusion,  would  be  the  surest 
way  to  create  other  wars,  by  giving  time  for  recuperation 
and  a  renewal  of  hostilities  which  neither  of  the  belligerents 
has  repented  of  or  seen  the  futility  of  pursuing. 

You  think  that  though  Germany  may  have  been  the 
sinister  aggressor  she  has  learned  her  lesson  and  that  if 
peace  comes  now  she  may  be  relied  upon  to  do  her  best  to 
prevent  more  wars.  We  think,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
only  lesson  Germany  has  yet  learned  is  a  military  lesson, 
the  lesson  that  has  come  of  setting  too  low  a  value  on  the 
power,  courage,  and  resources  of  her  enemies,  and  that  the 
only  safeguard  of  enduring  peace  is  that  she  should  also 
learn  the  moral  lesson  that  comes  of  seeing  the  uselessness 
of  war  as  a  means  toward  human  welfare.  Of  that  lesson 
Germany,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  has  yet  learned  nothing. 

Why  the  War  Must  Go  on 

You  think,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  that  if  peace  came  now 
both  belligerents  would  recognize  the  folly  of  war  as  a  means 
of  settling  international  disputes,  and  so  having  jointly 
learned  their  lesson  would  strive  together  to  avoid  its  re- 
currence. 


APPENDIX  129 

We  think,  on  the  contrary,  that  such  recognition  could 
only  come  to  both  at  once  after  complete  exhaustion,  and 
then  the  only  value  of  the  lesson  would  be  to  the  rest  of  the 
world — America,  for  example,  which  surely  cannot  need  it. 
It  is  probably  true  that  a  full  sense  of  the  futility  and  foolish- 
ness of  war  will  come  to  the  world  only  out  of  the  spectacle 
of  the  great  part  of  it  ruined,  vanquished,  and  laid  waste; 
but  even  this  does  not  shake  our  feeling  that  worse  than  the 
utmost  ruin  that  can  be  wrought  by  war,  terrible  and  awful 
as  that  may  be,  is  the  spiritual  enslavement  that  may  be 
prevented  by  it.  God  forbid  that  the  very  least  of  us  against 
any  hopeful  plea  for  peace  should  say  one  word  that  would 
prolong  the  horrors  of  war,  but  we  of  the  allied  nations  hate 
war  with  so  deep  a  hatred  that  the  hope  of  ending  it  once 
for  all  inspires  us  to  carry  it  on.  It  is  just  because  our  hearts 
are  bleeding  from  the  frightful  sacrifices  we  are  now  making 
day  by  day  in  the  best  of  our  blood  and  brain  that  we  feel, 
terribly  and  cruelly  hard  as  it  is  to  say  it,  that  they  must 
continue  to  bleed.  Nor  do  we  think  that  these  impulses 
conflict  either  with  the  best  interests  of  civilization  or  with 
our  faith. 

We  are  acutely  and  most  painfully  conscious  that  in 
struggling  for  what  we  believe  with  all  our  souls  to  be  right 
we  have  been  compelled  to  submit  the  issue  of  our  cause  to 
a  power  which  has  in  itself  nothing  to  do  with  right.  We 
know  that  our  religion  teaches  us  that  Christ  pronounced 
anathema  on  war,  and  that  as  soon  as  Christianity  shall 
have  established  its  ascendency  war  will  cease;  but  we  also 
know  and  have  lately  been  made  most  bitterly  to  feel  that 
war  is  sometimes  necessary  to  keep  the  worst  elements  of 
human  nature  in  check,  that  an  appeal  to  might  may  be 
the  last  resources  of  right,  and  therefore  it  is  right  to  fight 
and  to  continue  to  fight  for  a  righteous  cause.  On  this 
foundation  we  of  the  allied  nations,  with  extreme  reluctance, 
in  August,  1914,  built  our  belief  in  the  necessity  of  entering 
into  the  present  conflict. 

And  what  would  be  the  result  now  if  after  two  and  a 


130  APPENDIX 

half  years  of  a  war  which  has  convulsed  Europe,  sweepmg 
armies  of  men  into  innumerable  graves  and  bringing  misery 
to  millions  of  women  and  children,  we  were  to  make  peace 
with  an  unrepentant  enemy  on  the  grounds  of  expediency 
alone?  We  think  there  would  be  only  one  result,  the  com- 
plete breakdown  in  Europe  of  all  moral  law  in  the  govern- 
ment of  nations  and  all  faith  in  the  divine  rule  of  the  world. 

Confidence  in  the  United  States 

We  are  profoundly  grateful  to  the  United  States  for  the 
watchful  eye  it  has  always  kept  and  is  still  keeping  on  the 
prospects  of  peace,  and  we  sleep  with  more  security  from  a 
certainty  that  the  one  world  empire  which  remains  outside 
this  maelstrom  of  devastating  forces  will  step  in  with  pro- 
posals to  end  the  war  the  instant  it  becomes  right  and  pos- 
sible to  do  so. 

Meantime  we  rest  content  with  the  part  America  is  now 
taking  and  will,  we  trust,  continue  to  take.  That  part  is 
the  part  of  the  friend  and  champion,  not  of  either  bellig- 
erent, but  of  humanity.  In  our  view  it  has  been  a  long 
step  forward  from  the  rigid  and  frozen  neutrality  which 
America  imposed  on  her  people  at  the  beginning  of  war  to 
the  recent  warm-blooded  declaration  of  her  President  that 
henceforward  neutrality  is  impossible  to  a  great  nation  in 
any  conflict  which  affects  the  welfare  of  a  vast  part  of  the 
human  family. 

That  is  not  a  new  doctrine,  but  it  is  a  great  doctrine.  It 
was  the  doctrine  whereon  the  mighty  Englishman,  Oliver 
Cromwell,  made  England  not  only  the  most  powerful  but 
the  most  honored  among  the  nations  of  the  world,  and  in 
the  midst  of  the  revivals  of  methods  of  warfare  which  seem 
to  us  to  be  destitute  of  all  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong,  and  to  deserve  no  other  names  than  murder  and 
slavery,  we  shall  be  satisfied  if  America  should  continue  to 
stand  steadfastly  for  the  high  principle,  on  whichever  side 
assailed,  that  the  laws  of  humanity,  which  are  immutable, 


APPENDIX  131 

shall  not  be  outraged.  That  of  itself  will  help  to  keep  the 
spirit  of  justice  alive  in  the  world  and  go  far  toward  bring- 
ing nearer  the  day  of  peace. 

Hall  Caine. 

II 

COSMOS  TO  HALL  CAINE 

November  27,  1916. 
To  Hall  Caine: 

By  the  courtesy  of  The  New  York  Times  I  am  able  to  make 
immediate  reply  to  your  cabled  letter  dated  November  25. 
You  have  quite  misunderstood  the  purpose  of  my  discussions. 
This  misunderstanding  is  doubtless  due  to  the  imperfect  or 
partial  form  in  which  they  have  reached  you.  It  may  be 
due  in  part  to  the  fact  that,  at  the  moment  of  their  publi- 
cation, there  were  made  both  in  this  country  and  elsewhere  a 
number  of  expressions  of  opinion  regarding  the  termination 
of  the  war  with  which  my  discussions  may  have  been  quite 
unjustifiably  associated.  The  misunderstanding  may  be  due 
in  part  to  the  caption  under  which  they  were  printed. 

I  make  no  plea  for  immediate  peace.  On  the  contrary,  I 
entirely  dissociate  myself  from  those  persons  and  those 
movements  which  would  urge,  on  humanitarian  grounds,  an 
immediate  peace,  even  at  the  cost  of  the  great  objects  of 
the  war.  Until  those  objects  are  gained  and,  having  been 
gained,  are  secured  for  the  future,  this  war  cannot  end  in 
anything  that  would  deserve  the  name  of  peace.  Under 
such  circumstances  the  result  would  be  at  best  a  new  era  of 
competitive  armaments  and  a  new  and  desperate  struggle, 
by  the  use  of  every  means  known  to  man,  to  gain  a  position 
of  advantage  from  which  to  carry  on  another  and  equally 
terrible  contest. 

»  The  starting-point  of  my  discussions,  assuming  the  cer- 
tain defeat  of  Germany  and  her  allies,  is  the  belief  that  the 
time  has  come  to  consider  whether  the  war  may  not  be  ended 


132  APPENDIX 

in  the  not  distant  future  by  an  international  agreement  in 
which  the  United  States  shall  participate.  With  a  view  to 
securing  a  basis  for  the  discussion  of  such  an  international 
agreement  certain  definite  proposals  are  being  brought  for- 
ward and  examined  in  my  contributions  to  The  New  York 
Times.  It  would  be  most  helpful  if,  when  these  specific  pro- 
posals have  been  read  in  full  and  carefully  considered,  it 
might  then  be  pointed  out  how  far,  if  at  all,  they  may  be 
made  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  a  future  international  agreement 
whose  aim  shall  be  to  do  everything  that  is  humanly  possible 
to  protect  civilization  against  a  recurrence  of  the  present 
calamity. 

You  are  mistaken,  too,  in  assuming  that  these  articles 
have  been  written  under  the  disadvantage  of  aloofness  from 
the  emotions  excited  by  the  war.  While  an  effort  has  been 
made  to  keep  any  expression  of  these  emotions  from  appear- 
ing in  the  discussions,  this  has  been  a  difficult  task  because 
of  the  depth  of  the  writer's  feelings.  No  one  to  whom  the 
cause  of  the  Allies  in  this  war  does  not  make  a  profound 
emotional  appeal  is  likely  to  be  at  all  able  to  contribute  to 
a  discussion  of  the  terms  of  a  durable  peace. 

Cosmos. 

Ill 

HALL  CAINE  TO  COSMOS 

(Cable  to  The  New  York  Times) 

London,  November  29,  1916. 
To  Cosmos: 

By  courtesy  of  The  New  York  Times  I  have  read  your  let- 
ter cabled  on  Monday,  and  I  hasten  to  say  that  hardly  any- 
thing could  be  less  like  the  general  purport  of  your  articles, 
as'^made  known  to  us  by  the  digest  published  on  this  side 
oi^'the  ocean.  That  digest  represented  them  as  a  peace 
kite,  flown  possibly  in  German  interests,  *or  at  least  capable 
of^being  turned  to  Germany's  accoimt.  *  But  my  letter  was 
not  inspired  by  that  injurious  interpretation.     On  the  con- 


APPENDIX  133 

trary,  it  was  suggested  by  regret  that  such  language  should 
be  employed  by  a  responsible  organ  of  British  opinion  about 
a  writer  who  was  obviously  sincere  and  in  relation  to  a 
journal,  The  New  York  Times,  which  has  published  some  of 
the  most  enlightening,  searching,  deeply  felt  and  sympa- 
thetic articles  that  have  appeared  in  any  country  during 
the  period  of  the  war. 

My  letter  was  also  prompted  by  a  desire  to  make  recogni- 
tion of  the  obvious  fact  that  the  United  States  could  only 
be  inspired  by  the  noblest  motives  of  humanity — against 
the  manifest  opposition  of  material  interests — in  initiating 
a  propaganda  in  favor  of  peace. 

Therefore  I  did  my  best  to  answer  you  on  the  high  ground 
of  moral  law,  not  of  mihtary  opportunity  or  necessity,  fre- 
quently quoting  the  precise  terms  attributed  to  you  and 
drawing  no  inferences  from  your  argument  except  such  as 
seemed  to  be  fair  to  the  general  trend  of  it.  In  doing  this 
I  think  I  represented  the  spirit  of  our  people,  who  are  not 
imgrateful  to  America  for  what  she  is  doing,  and  would 
certainly  not  presume  to  banish  the  word  "peace"  from 
the  vocabulary  of  the  greatest  of  neutral  nations,  however 
little  they  may  desire  to  use  it  themselves. 

But  if  you  feel  that  you  have  cause  for  complaint  in  the 
language  sometimes  held  toward  America  in  this  country, 
I  ask  you  to  put  yourself  in  our  place.  It  may  be  true  that 
the  Junkers  are  not  all  in  Germany,  that  the  Huns  are  not 
all  in  Prussia,  that  boastful  and  overbearing  threats  are  used 
here  as  well  as  beyond  the  Rhine,  and  that  in  the  midst  of 
the  immeasurable  suffering  that  has  been  created  by  the 
war  the  loudest  clamor  against  proposals  for  peace  may 
in  this  country,  as  in  the  countries  of  our  enemies,  come 
from  the  warHke  pulpits,  heroic  sofas,  and  invincible  arm- 
chairs; but  that  is  by  no  means  the  whole  story. 

Our  people  are  a  proud,  brave,  high-spirited  race,  unac- 
customed to  defeat  and  unwilling  to  bear  the  shame  of  it. 
In  times  past  we  have  known  the  full  bitterness  of  dark  and 
threatening  hours.    Less  than  three  centuries  ago,  after  a 


134  APPENDIX 

period  of  world  supremacy,  we  saw  the  Dutch  fleet  riding 
triumphantly  in  the  Thames.  Less  than  two  centuries 
ago,  on  the  eve  of  our  greatest  victories,  we  saw  our  forces 
broken  on  land  and  sea. 

But  our  national  spirit  has  never  been  broken.  We  have 
never  yet  submitted  to  a  disgraceful  peace,  and  now,  when 
we  are,  as  we  believe,  the  victim  of  a  cruel  and  cowardly 
plot,  when  we  are  suffering  with  our  allies  and  with  some 
of  the  neutral  nations,  not  excluding  America,  from  every 
imaginable  horror  of  treacherous  warfare  which  inhumanity 
can  devise  or  barbarity  execute,  we  feel  that  it  is  not  for  us 
to  prate  about  peace  until  it  is  near,  and  we  know  it  to  be 
right. 

Let  our  enemies  squeal  for  it,  whether  in  bravado  or 
fear.  It  is  not  in  the  spirit  of  our  people  to  do  so,  what- 
ever price  we  have  to  pay  for  our  silence.  That  is  the  first 
trait  of  our  national  character,  and  not  to  know  it  is  not 
to  know  our  Britain — what  it  is  and  what  it  has  gone 
through. 

Some  of  us  who  have  it  for  our  duty  to  speak  to  our 
people  through  great  newspapers  from  day  to  day  or  week 
to  week  have  been  made  acutely  conscious  of  this  undying 
national  characteristic.  There  are  subjects  we  cannot  dis- 
cuss because  our  people  do  not  admit  that  they  come  within 
the  realm  of  question.  There  are  eventualities  we  cannot 
contemplate  because  they  are  not  beUeved  to  be  within  the 
region  of  possibilities,  and  above  all  such  subjects  and 
eventualities  is  the  subject  and  eventuality  of  a  peace  that 
shall  be  premature  and  therefore  dishonoring  and  dangerous. 
On  that  question,  in  spite  of  all  our  sufferings,  past,  present, 
and  to  come,  the  soul  of  our  Empire  is  on  fire.  Hence  the 
impatience  and  even  suspicion  with  which  some  of  the  so- 
called  peace  talk  of  America  has  been  received  in  this  coun- 
try, and  hence,  too,  the  misconception  which,  as  your  let- 
ter shows,  sometimes  prevails  as  to  the  scope  and  aim  of  it. 

With  the  general  trend  of  your  letter,  as  cabled  to  me,  I 
find  myself  in  complete  agreement    That  when  the  war 


APPENDIX  135 

has  been  righteously  ended  (God  grant  it  may  be  soon  1)  an 
effort  ought  to  be  made  to  establish  an  international  agree- 
ment whose  aim  would  be  to  protect  civilization  against  the 
recurrence  of  such  another  calamity  is  a  proposition  that 
will  commend  itself  to  the  vast  majority  of  my  countrymen, 
and  it  will  seem  to  us  to  be  fit  and  right  that  America  should 
take  the  lead  in  this  high  enterprise  as  the  one  great  nation 
whose  power  would  command  authority  throughout  the 
world,  and  whose  hands  are  clean  of  the  present  crime. 

But  in  joining  your  league  of  peace  we  should  have  no  il- 
lusions. We  should  not  necessarily  think  that  we  were  pro- 
moting the  peace  principles  of  the  Founder  of  our  faith. 
Those  principles,  as  most  of  us  understand  them,  are  based 
on  the  cry  that  violence  in  whatever  form  employed  pro- 
duces violence,  and  that  the  only  way  to  establish  the  rule 
of  moral  law  is  not  to  resist  evil. 

But  we  see  that  that  doctrine  may  make  martyrs  and  re- 
ligions, not  nations,  and  that  your  international  league  of 
peace  would  have  to  be  founded  on  force.  Like  a  civil  gov- 
ernment, it  would  depend  in  the  final  resort  on  the  power 
behind  it,  and  therefore  be  liable  to  deadlocks  and  break- 
downs and  some  of  the  lesser  dangers  of  present  condi- 
tions. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  recognize  the  difference  that  the 
force  behind  your  league  of  peace  would  be  a  world  force, 
not  a  national  force.  That  difference  would  be  fundamental. 
It  would  give  us  reason  to  hope  that  moral  law  would  be 
allowed  to  operate  in  international  disputes,  and  there- 
fore an  ultimatum  like  that  of  Austria  to  Serbia  would  be  ' 
impossible;  that  the  rights  of  little  nations  would  be  con- 
sidered apart  from  the  power  to  enforce  them,  and  there- 
fore the  violations  of  Belgimn  and  the  enslavement  of  her 
people  would  be  unthinkable,  and,  above  all,  that  such  a 
world  war  as  we  are  in  the  midst  of,  involving  incalculable 
sufferings  to  millions,  would  never  again  be  undertaken 
after  a  few  delirious  days  of  intoxicating  diplomacy,  con- 
ducted in  secret  by  a  handful  of  men  who  are  not  all  dis- 


136  APPENDIX 

tinguished  for  intelligence  or  above  the  suspicion  of  un- 
worthy motives. 

If  America  in  due  time  can  bring  to  pass  a  coalition  like 
that,  it  will  have  rendered  a  service  to  hiunanity  such  as 
the  worid  has  hardly  yet  dared  to  hope  for.  So  blessed  a 
consummation  would  almost  reconcile  us  to  the  immeasur- 
able misery  of  the  present  frightful  conflict  by  making  us 
feel  that  for  this  reason  God  permitted  it  that,  as  once  by 
flood  so  now  by  fire,  the  world  might  be  purged  of  the  worst 
of  its  impurities;  that  He  has  allowed  nothing  to  be  wasted, 
no  suffering,  no  sacrifice;  and  that  through  the  grandeur 
as  well  as  the  sorrow  of  the  time  He  has  given  to  his  stricken 
world  a  glorious  resurrection.    God  grant  it ! 

Hall  Caine. 

IV 

COSMOS  TO  HIS  CRITICS 

December  i,  1916. 

To  the  Editor  of  The  New  York  Times: 

To  a  number  of  letters  that  have  reached  me  through 
you,  written  either  in  criticism  or  in  commendation  of  my 
discussions  now  appearing  in  The  Times  as  to  the  basis  of 
that  durable  peace  which  all  nations,  whether  belligerent 
or  neutral,  profess  to  desire,  I  should  like  to  make  brief 
acknowledgment  and  reply. 

Let  me  repeat  once  more  that  these  discussions  presup- 
pose the  military  and  economic  victory  of  the  Allies  over 
the  Central  Powers  and  the  continuance  of  the  war  until 
it  appears  to  be  certain  that  an  international  agreement  can 
be  formulated  which  will,  first,  accomplish  and  make  secure 
the  ends  for  which  the  Allies  are  prosecuting  the  war,  and, 
second,  make  every  provision  that  is  humanly  possible 
against  the  outbreak  of  a  similar  international  struggle  in 
the  future. 


APPENDIX  137 

These  discussions  are  addressed  primarily  to  Americans, 
in  the  hope  that  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  may 
be  led  to  inform  itself  specifically  and  in  detail  as  to  the 
precise  ends  of  the  war  and  as  to  the  ways  and  means  of 
accomplishing  and  making  secure  those  ends  when  terms  of 
peace  are  drawn  up.  The  United  States  is  a  neutral  par- 
ticipant in  this  war  and  is  directly  and  profoundly  interested 
in  the  outcome,  not  only  on  the  field  of  battle  but  in  the 
realm  of  political  ideas  and  policies.  It  was  hoped,  of  course, 
that  these  discussions  would  be,  as  they  are  being,  followed 
in  Europe,  in  order  that  to  some  extent  at  least  the  mind  of 
the  United  States  and  the  mind  of  Europe  might  be  as- 
sisted to  meet,  at  least  in  some  degree,  in  regard  to  the 
vital  issues  under  examination. 

Let  me  repeat  once  more  that  these  discussions  have  not 
been  written  and  printed  as  part  of  any  pro-German  prop- 
aganda for  an  immediate  peace,  and  that  they  have  no 
connection,  direct  or  indirect,  with  any  organization  or 
movement  in  this  or  other  countries  speedily  to  end  the 
war  on  the  basis  of  a  drawn  military  battle.  It  is  a  mere 
coincidence,  and  not  a  fortunate  one,  that  these  discussions 
*have  been  printed  at  a  time  when  such  organizations  and 
movements  are  prominently  in  the  public  eye. 

Let  me  suggest  also  that  it  would  be  more  satisfactory 
and  also  more  flattering  if  my  correspondents  would  take 
the  pains  to  read  these  discussions  before  either  criticising 
or  commending  them. 

Cosmos. 

V 

THE  ARTICLES  OF  COSMOS 
From  The  New  York  Times,  December  18 

In  the  series  of  articles  contributed  by  Cosmos  to  the 
columns  of  The  Times,  the  sixteenth  and  concluding  article 
appearing  this  morning,  we  have  heard  the  voice  of  reason 


138  APPENDIX 

amid  the  clash  of  arms.  The  conditions  upon  which  a 
lasting  peace  must  be  based  after  the  end  of  the  war  have 
been  his  theme.  A  sound  understanding  of  the  rivalry  of 
interests,  the  political  maladjustments  and  the  false  ideals 
out  of  which  the  war  grew  was  his  qualification,  justice  and 
the  deep  conviction  that  out  of  this  war  must  come  measures 
of  assurance  against  future  wars  have  guided  him  to  his  con- 
clusions. The  articles  of  Cosmos  have  called  forth  some 
criticism,  even  more  they  have  stimulated  discussion.  They 
are  a  comprehensive  prevision  of  the  readjustments  after 
the  war  that  are  essential  to  enduring  peace. 

In  the  opening  sentence  of  his  ninth  article  the  writer  of 
these  contributions  restated  the  conditions  which,  in  his 
judgment,  must  be  the  basis  of  peace  if  it  is  to  be  lasting: 

*'The  ground  that  has  now  been  traversed  includes  the 
outline  of  a  settlement  of  the  issues  of  the  war  that  would 
insure  the  free  national  development  of  every  state  whether 
great  or  small,  the  policy  of  the  open  door  in  international 
trade,  the  exemption  of  private  property  at  sea,  other  than 
contraband,  from  capture  or  destruction,  and  that  would 
restore  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  as  well  as  make  Russia 
mistress  of  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosporus." 

There  remains  that  other  purpose  of  the  war  of  which 
Mr.  Asquith  said  that  Great  Britain  would  never  sheathe  the 
sword,  not  lightly  drawn,  until  it  had  been  accomplished,  the 
complete  and  final  destruction  of  Prussian  militarism,  that 
"state  of  the  Prussian  mind,"  as  Cosmos  calls  it,  that  has 
made  Germany  a  militaristic  nation.  There  remains,  too, 
reparation  to  Belgium  by  Germany,  to  Serbia  by  Austria. 

The  enduring  safeguards  against  war  which  nations  must 
erect,  the  league  of  all  to  secure  peace  for  all,  provision  for 
commissions  of  inquiry  to  examine  causes  of  difference,  and 
an  International  Court  of  Justice  have  been  discussed  in  the 
concluding  articles  of  the  series  with  a  remarkable  breadth 
of  view  and  a  clear  comprehension  both  of  what  is  desired 
and  of  the  diflSculties  that  lie  in  the  way.  Particularly  il- 
luminating is  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  measures 


APPENDIX  139 

by  which  sanction  and  enforcement  are  to  be  given  to  agree- 
ments among  nations,  which  must  be  made  binding  if  any 
good  thing  is  to  come  of  them,  and  of  the  part  the  United 
States,  in  view  of  its  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  traditional 
detachment  from  European  politics,  may  safely  and  properly 
take  upon  itself.  And  there  are  words  of  admonition  ad- 
dressed to  our  people  and  to  our  States,  warnings  of  what 
must  follow  their  failure  to  come  to  a  due  sense  of  national 
duty  and  national  service,  of  which  it  will  be  well  for  all 
Americans  to  take  heed. 

In  Inviting  these  contributions  from  Cosmos  and  in  pub- 
lishing them,  The  Times  feels  that  it  has  performed  a  service 
of  which  the  value  will  become  strikingly  evident  when, 
after  the  war,  the  conditions  of  peace,  in  all  their  variety, 
consequences,  and  projections,  come  to  the  test  of  practical 
discussion.  Cosmos  has  brought  into  view  not  merely  terms 
and  conditions  but  fimdamental  principles. 


INDEX  OF  PROPER  NAMES 


Abb6  de  St.  Pierre,  89. 

Adams,  John,  28. 

^gean  Sea,  47. 

Africa,  95,  105;  South,  10,  12,  15. 

African,  South — War,  10. 

Allied  Powers,  Economic  Confer- 
ence of,  18, 

Alsace,  13,  39,  40,  41,  42,  43,  44, 
45,  54,  63. 

America,  20,  59,  95. 

American  Institute  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  64. 

Amity  and  Commerce,  Treaty  of 
— with  Prussia,  27. 

Appomattox,  Battle  of,  58. 

Arbitral  Justice,  Court  of,  73,  82. 

Arbitration,  Court  of,  74,  77. 

Argentina,  30, 103. 

Asia,  47,  52, 95, 105;  Minor,  47, 50. 

Asiatic  Monroe  Doctrine,  117. 

Asquith,  Herbert  H.,  7, 10,  54,  57, 
90, 91. 

Australia,  10,  12,  15. 

Austria-Himgary,  5,  21,  30, 31,  37, 
80,  82,  99,  117. 

Avebury,  Lord,  31. 

Bacon,  Robert,  83. 
Balkan  Peninsula,  47,  50. 
Beaconsfield,  Lord,  53. 
Belgium,  6,  9,  10,  12,  13,  21,  31, 

37,61. 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  90. 
Berlin,  53. 
Bethmann-Hollweg,       Chancellor 

von,  7, 9, 10, 14,  22, 61, 91,  us- 
Bismarck,  Prince  von,  43, 61,  zoa. 
Black  Sea,  47,  53. 


Blackstone,  Sir  William,  67. 

Blanc,  Louis,  41. 

Bordeaux,  41 ;  Protest  of,  42. 

Borden,  Sir  Robert  Laird,  32. 

Bosporus,  50,  52,  54,  63. 

Bourgeois,  L^on,  73. 

BourtzefE,  M.  B.,  49. 

Brazil,  30. 

Brentano,  Professor,  17. 

Briand,  Aristide,  36. 

Bright,  John,  18. 

Britain,  Great,  4,  5,  6,  10,  11,  12, 
14, 18,  21,  23,  24,  25,  27,  30,  31, 
32, 33,  34,  37,  60,  61,  63,  64,  67, 
68,  75,  79,  82,  loi,  114. 

Bulgaria,  31. 

Billow,  Prince  von,  13,  73. 

Bund  Neues  Vaterland,  22. 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  66. 

Calais,  6. 

Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  Henry, 
10. 

Canada,  10,  12,  15,  32. 

Canning,  George,  53, 

Casablanca  Case,  75. 

Case,  Casablanca,  75;  North  At- 
lantic Coast  Fisheries,  75; 
Pious  Fimd,  75;  Savarkar,  75; 
Venezuelan  Preferential,  75. 

Catherine,  Empress  of  Russia,  48. 

Chamberlain,  Houston,  57. 

China,  30,  104. 

Choate,  Joseph  H.,  69. 

Circular  Note,  Russian,  29,  70. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  19. 

Clemenceau,  Georges,  41. 

Qeveland,  President  Grover,  zqq. 


141 


142 


INDEX 


Cobden,  Richard,  i8. 

Commerce,  Treaty  of  Amity  and 
^with  Prussia,  27. 

Commissions,  International — of 
Inquiry,  87,88,91,  93. 

Conference,  Economic — of  the  Al- 
lied Powers,  18;  First  Hague, 
28,  29,  69,  71,  73,  74,  94,  118; 
Second  Hague,  29,  30,  69,  77, 
80,  81,  84,  87,  94, 118;  Naval, 
82;  Pan-American,  67. 

Constantinople,  52,  53. 

Conventions,  Hague,  37. 

Council,  Order  in — of  August  20, 
1914,27. 

Court  of  Arbitral  Justice,  73,  82; 
of  Arbitration,  74,  77;  Interna- 
tional— of  Justice,  37, 68, 69,  73, 
76,  77,  79,  80,  81,  83,  84,  8s,  87, 
88,91,93,94,96,97,117;  Inter- 
national Prize,  81 ;  United  States 
Supreme,  68,  78,  79,  84,  85. 

Cruc6,  Emeric,  89. 

Dardanelles,  50,  52,  54,  63. 

Declaration,  Guildhall,  54;  of  In- 
dependence, 65;  of  London,  27, 
82;  of  Paris,  38. 

Denmark,  xa. 

Demburg,  Dr.,  33. 

Doctrine,  Monroe,  xo6,  108,  109; 
Asiatic  Monroe,  X17. 

Dover,  Straits  of,  6. 

Dublin,  90. 

Einkreisungspolitik,  51. 

Empire,  German,  4,  45,  55;  Holy 

Roman,  44;  Russian,  48. 
England,  13, 15,  34,  52,  53,  59,  67. 
d'Estoumelles  de  Constant,  Baron, 

73. 
Europe,  5,  19,  20,  37,  40,  44,  47, 
57,  64,  89,  90,  93,  95,  98,  104, 
X05,  xc6,  X08. 


Falkenhayn,  General  von,  48. 

Farewell  Address,  Washington's, 
105, 106. 

Fichte,  Johann  Gottlieb,  121. 

Fisheries,  North  Atlantic  Coast — 
Case,  75 

France,  6,  16,  21,  30,  31,  34,  35, 
36, 37, 38,  40,  41,  42,  44,  45,  52, 
S4,  59, 60,  63,  64,  75,  80,  82,  92, 
loi,  114,  116;  He  de,  43. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  28. 

Frederick  the  Great,  48. 

Frederick  William  III,  121. 

French  Revolution,  44,  48. 

Fimd,  Pious — Case,  75. 

Gadsden  Treaty,  loi. 

Gambetta,  L6on,  41. 

German  Empire,  4,  45,  55. 

Germany,  5, 6,  7, 8, 12, 13, 14,  X5, 
16,  20,  21,  22,  23,  24,  25, 30,  31, 
34,  37,  39,  41,  43,  43,  44,  45,  47, 
48,  51,  55.  58,  59,  60,  61, 63,  73, 
75,  80,  82, 91,  99,  loi,  XX4,  XX5, 
116,  X18,  X19. 

Gladstone,  William  E.,  xo,  40,  44, 
53,64. 

Gorchakof,  Prince,  sa 

Great  Britain,  4, 5, 6,  xo,  xx,  X3,  X4, 
x8,  31,  33,  34,  35,  37, 30,  31, 33, 
33, 34, 37, 60, 61, 63, 64,  67, 68, 
75,  79,  83,  xoi,  X14. 

Greece,  xo,  X2,  X03. 

Grey,  Viscoimt,  7,  8,  9,  xo,  is,  14, 

«2.  54, 115- 
Grotius,  23. 

Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  Treaty  of,  xox. 
Guildhall  Declaration,  54. 

Hague,  First — Conference,  38,  39, 
69,  71,  73,  74,  84,  "8;  Second- 
Conference,  39,  30,  69,  77,  80, 
8x,  84,  87,  89,  94,  X18;  The,  77, 
8x,  93;  Tribunal,  75,  78. 


INDEX 


143 


Hamilton,  Alexander,  68. 
Hay,  John,  28. 
Holland,  23,  82. 
Holls,  Frederick  W.,  73. 
Holstein,  Schleswig-,  13. 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  44. 
Huerta,  General,  100. 
Hugo,  Victor,  41. 

India,  52. 

Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  His- 
tory, Mahan's,  24. 

Inquiry,  International  Commis- 
Mons  of,  87,  88,  91,  93. 

Institute  of  International  Law, 
American,  64. 

Interessenpolitik,  61. 

International  Commissions  of  In- 
quiry, 87,  88,  91,  93;  Court  of 
Justice,  37,  68,  69,  73,  76,  77, 
79,80,81,83,84,85,87,88,91, 
93i  94,  96,  97,  117;  Prize  Court, 
8x. 

Ireland,  11,  14,  21. 

Italy,  10, 12,  31,  37, 63,  82, 101. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  85. 

Japan,  31,  64,  75,  82,  loi,  117. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  28,  68,  108. 

Jena,  123. 

Joffre,  General,  35. 

Joubert,  39, 

Kant,  Immanuel,  90. 
Kitchener,  Lord,  4. 

Ladd,  William,  90. 

London,  7,  82;    Declaration  of, 

27,  82. 
Lorraine,  13,  39,  40,  41,  43,  44, 45, 

54,  63. 
Loudon,  Dr.  J.,  82. 
Lusitania,  33. 


McKinley,  President  William,  28. 

Machipolitik,  47,  50,  61. 

Mackensen,  General,  48. 

Mahan's,  Admiral,  Influence  of 
Sea  Power  upon  History,  24. 

Majuba  Hill,  10. 

Mansfield,  Lord  Chief  Justice,  67. 

Mame,  Battle  of  the,  4,  35. 

Marshall,  John,  85. 

Martens,  F.  de,  30. 

Mazzini,  96. 

Mettemich,  53. 

Mejdco,  75,  09,  100. 

Michelet,  9  a. 

MilioukoS,  Paul,  53. 

Moltke,  General  von,  43. 

Monroe,  Asiatic — Doctrine,  117; 
Doctrine,  106,  108,  109;  Presi- 
dent James,  106,  108. 

Montenegro,  31. 

Moscow,  52. 

Mouravieff,  Count,  47,  71. 

Napoleon,  45,  60. 

Naval  Conference,  82. 

Netherlands,  The,  83. 

New  York,  32. 

North   Atlantic    Coast    Fisheries 

Case,  75. 
Norway,  30. 

Order  in  Council  of  August  ao, 
1914,  27. 

Pacific  Ocean,  52. 
Palmerston,  Lord,  10,  53. 
Pan-American  Conference,  67. 
Paris,    18;    Declaration    of,    aS; 

Treaty  of,  19. 
Pauncefote,  Lord,  73. 
Peace  of  Utrecht,  89. 
Penn,  William,  89. 
Persia,  52. 
Pious  Fimd  Case,  75. 


144 


INDEX 


Poincar6,  President,  35,  36. 
Poland,  12,  13, 14,  21,  37. 
Portugal,  30,  31. 
Powers,  Economic  Conference  of 

the  Allied,  18. 
Prussia,  13,  48,  54,  55,  S6,  58,  60, 

118,  119;  Treaty  of  Amity  and 

Commerce  with,  27. 

Quinet,  Edgar,  41. 

Reichsland,  39,  44. 

Reichstag,  7,  8,  91. 

Renault,  73. 

Revolution,  French,  44,  48. 

Rio  de  Janeiro,  67. 

Roosevelt,    President    Theodore, 

28, 75. 
Root,  Elihu,  89,  67,  77,  78,  79,  83. 
Rousseau,  ^o. 
Rimiania,  31, 48,  117. 
Russell,  Lord,  10,  53. 
Russia,  6, 13, 14,  21,  22, 30, 31, 34, 

46, 47, 48,  49,  50,  SI,  52,  54,  63, 

70, 80, 82, 99, 101, 103, 114, 116, 

117. 
Russian   Ciroilar  Note,    29,    70; 

Empire,  48. 
Russkia  Viidomosti,  52. 

St.  Pierre,  Abb6  de,  89. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  53. 

Savarkar  Case,  75. 

Schleswig-Holstein,  13. 

Schmoller,  Professor,  17. 

Scotland,  12. 

Scott,  James  Brown,  82,  83. 

Sea  PmveTy  Mahan's,  Influence  of 

— upon  History,  34. 
Serbia,  S.  6,  9,  ai,  37. 
Slavs,  6,  47;  South,  14,  21. 
Somme,  Battle  of  the,  4. 
South  African  War,  10. 
Spain,  103. 


Straits  of  Dover,  6. 

Strasbourg,  40,  43. 

Sumner,  Professor  William  G.,  20. 

Sussex,  33. 

Sweden,  30. 

Switzerland,  53. 

Talbot,  Lord  Chancellor,  67. 
Talleyrand,  38,  39. 
Tampico,  99. 
Thirty  Years'  War,  44. 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  52. 
Treaty,  Gadsden,  101;  of  Guada- 
lupe Hidalgo,  loi;  of  Paris,  19. 
Treitschke,  45. 

Troubetzkol,  Prince  Eugene,  52. 
Tsar,  The,  71, 117. 
Turkey,3i,  52, 117. 

United  States,  3, 16, 19,  23,  25,  27, 
28,  29,  30,  31,  64,  6s,  68,  7S,  78, 
80,  82,  86,  88,  92,  93,  94,  95, 
96,  100,  loi,  103,  104,  105,  106, 

107,     109,    no,    III,    JI2,    113, 
114,  116,  117. 

Utopia,  104,  120. 
Utrecht,  Peace  of,  89. 

Venezuela,  75. 
Vera  Cruz,  100. 
Verdun,  4. 
Vienna,  38. 

Wagner,  Professor,  17. 

Wales,  12. 

Washington,  D.  C,  64,  91. 

Washington's    Farewell    Address, 

105,  106;  George,  106,  107. 
Waterloo,  60. 
Webster,  Daniel,  108. 
White,  Andrew  D.,  73,  74. 
Wilhelmina,  27. 
Wilson,  President  Woodrow,  91, 

104. 


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